Liberation or Moksa
In the Hindu tradition, the ultimate aim of religious striving – and indeed of human life in general – is most commonly termed mokṣa, meaning “freedom” or “liberation.” Although correspondences are of course far from exact, the idea occupies the place in Hindu thought that parallels concepts of perfection, salvation, redemption, freedom, and the like in other religious traditions. While it is the most widely accepted term for the final spiritual goal in Hinduism, it is not the only term so used. Others, which will be mentioned in passing, include apavarga (cessation), nirvāṇa (extinction), duḥkhānta (the end of suffering), kaivalya (isolation), and siddhi (perfection).
From the Sanskrit root muc-, “to release,” “to set free,” mokṣa and its feminine cognate and synonym mukti convey the idea of liberation from the rounds of birth and rebirth (punarbhava, saṃsāra ) in the mundane world, along with the suffering (duḥkha) associated therewith. The individual who has attained this state of freedom is referred to using the past participle form mukta, the one who is liberated. All Hindus accept this basic definition in terms of “liberation from” as a starting point, but – through history and across the spectrum of the various Hindu schools of thought – there is a wide divergence as to the positive content of the mokṣa experience. The bulk of this article will be devoted to outlining these divergences, as represented in the ancient and classical traditions of scripture and theology. While most schools of thought regard mokṣa as the common destiny of all souls, a few, as we shall see, teach that some are not fit for this goal. Finally, while the general view is that mokṣa, once attained, is permanent and eternal, at least one Hindu teacher, the 19th-century reformer Dayananda Saraswati, understood mokṣa as a temporary state, from which return to earthly life was inevitable.
The idea of the radical transcendence of mundane existence that is represented by mokṣa arose in part as an answer to concerns internal to vedic religion, especially anxiety about the possibility of “re-death” (punarmṛtyu) after a postmortem period in the world of the ancestors. It is likely that there was also significant influence from the non-Brahmanical shamanic and ascetic cultures termed Śramaṇa (lit. striver), which eventually crystallized in Jainism, Buddhism, and Yoga. The development of the discourse about mokṣa paralleled the rise to religious consciousness of the related concepts of karman and saṃsāra. These ideas were combined with a less than optimistic evaluation of ordinary human existence in terms of the suffering (duḥkha) seen to be endemic to saṃsāra, forming a complex that became the common heritage of all Indic religions. Like the idea of mokṣa, the doctrines of karman and saṃsāra also found their earliest literary expression in the Upaniṣads (BĀU. 4.4.3–7; KaṭhU. 3.7–8; ŚvetU. 6.16; MaiU. 1.4).
Beyond the Upaniṣads, the doctrine of mokṣa moved gradually toward wide acceptance in the Hindu tradition, but never achieved a complete ascendency in relation to other religious goals. The mokṣa ideal vied continually and most especially with dharma – one’s duty toward ritual maintenance of the world – for status as the primary aim of human life. Although the Dharmaśāstras and the Arthaśāstra are aware of mokṣa as an ultimate horizon, they limit the puruṣārthas formally to the trivarga (triad) of dharma, artha , and kāma . Likewise, the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata speak of the trivarga of human goals only, although the latter contains significant portions – for example, the Mokṣadharma – in which the world-denying mokṣa ethos eclipses the this-worldly triad of puruṣārthas. The addition of mokṣa to the list of puruṣārthas, forming the classical caturvarga (quartet) of human goals, is a later development. Among the ultra-orthodox Mīmāṃsa theorists of ritual, intent as they were on the pursuit of dharma and the associated goal of svarga, the idea of mokṣa was not fully accepted until the time of Kumārila and Prabhākara (7th cent. CE). Nevertheless, by this time the mokṣa ideal had gained ground in other areas of Brahmanical culture to the extent that the schools of Vedānta were speaking of it as the paramapuruṣārtha, the “supreme goal of human life,” as does Śaṅkara (7th–8th cents. CE) in his commentary on Brahmasūtra 2.1.3.
More positively, we read of going to brahman (BĀU. 4.4.6; KaṭhU. 6.14), reaching the supreme light (paraṃ jyotiḥ; ChāU. 8.12.3), becoming immortal (amṛta; BĀU. 4.4.7; KaṭhU. 6.8), reaching the world of Brahmā (Brahmaloka; ChāU. 8.4.1; 8.15.1), and so on. As these varied metaphors suggest, while there is general agreement among the upanishadic teachers that this final release is a state of blissful freedom from earthly limitations, positive conceptions of the content of the experience vary. We find accounts that suggest personal immortality (ChāU. 8.12.3), having one’s desires spontaneously fulfilled (ChāU. 8.2.1–10; 8.7.1–3; TaiU. 2.1, 3.10.5), reaching a state of complete desirelessness (BĀU. 4.4.7; MuU. 3.2.2; MaiU. 6.30), attaining likeness to the supreme (MuU. 3.1.3), enjoying a heavenly paradise (ChāU. 8.12.3; KauṣU. 1.3–5), attaining oneness with the “divine person” (puruṣam divyam; MuU. 3.2.8), merging in brahman (lῑnā brahmaṇi; ŚvetU. 1.7), or even finding complete isolation from pleasure and pain (kevalatva; MaiU. 6.21). In some cases, the soul’s retention of individual form, or even some kind of spiritual embodiment, is suggested (ChāU. 7.26.2; 8.12.3), while in others complete loss of individuality is clearly indicated (BĀU. 2.4.12–14; 4.3.30; 4.4.6; ChāU. 6.10.1; MuU. 3.2.8–9; PrU. 6.5).
The Brahmasūtra addresses several key questions concerning the state of the liberated soul (mukta), the first and most obvious being the relation between the liberated soul and brahman. There seems to have been general agreement that the mukta abided in a state “without distinction” (avibhāga) from the ultimate (BrS. 4.4.4), though the word avibhāga was vague enough to give later commentators much latitude. There was disagreement, however, regarding the nature of the liberated soul itself. Is the soul in liberation to be defined as pure consciousness (citi) only, or does it posses other qualities? The author of the Brahmasūtra wants to allow other brahman-like attributes in addition to pure consciousness (BrS. 4.4.5–7). Does the mukta, for example, enjoy supernatural powers? Bādarāyaṇa suggests that this is the case, but that these powers do not encroach upon the functions of cosmic creation, sustenance, and so on, which are exclusive to brahman (BrS. 4.4.17–21). How should we read scriptural passages that suggest that the desires of the liberated are realized simply by willing (BrS. 4.4.8–9)? We must accept them. Are the liberated somehow embodied? If so, may they enjoy more than one body? Bādarāyaṇa seems to believe that some kind of embodiment, and even multiple embodiments, is possible but not necessary (BrS. 4.4.10–16). An additional question is the issue of whether certain liberated souls under certain conditions attain only the lower or effected (kārya) brahman – the world of Brahmā (Brahmaloka) or Hiraṇyagarbha – instead of the supreme (para) brahman (BrS. 4.3.7–16). At least in Śaṅkara’s reading, the author of the Brahmasūtra allows for this, which opens the door for a central debate among later commentators: do the scriptural passages referring to the mukta as embodied and possessed of desire, powers, and other celestial attributes and experiences pertain only to those who have attained the lower brahman, or do they teach that the highest state might include such experiences? The distinction between the supreme and the lower brahman as goals for liberated souls also opens the door for the conceptualization of what Śaṅkara calls kramamukti, “stepwise” or “gradual” liberation. The Brahmasūtra (4.3.10–11) – referring perhaps to Muṇḍakopaniṣad 3.2.6 – suggests that those who have attained the world of Brahmā attain full liberation along with Brahmā when, at the end of cosmic cycle, the world is dissolved.
While there is general agreement that, once liberation is attained, there is no return (anāvṛtti) to the mundane world (BrS. 4.4.22), Bādarāyaṇa does suggest one interesting exception. Those muktas who have been appointed to certain cosmic missions may retain their bodies, or take up new bodies, as long as their appointed missions last (BrS. 3.3.32). Commentators take this idea to refer to certain sages ( ṛṣis ) –such as Apāntaratamas, Vasiṣṭha, and others – who are known in tradition for having assumed new bodies at the behest of the Lord to carry out certain divinely appointed tasks.
The word mokṣa is used five times (BhG. 5.28; 7.29; 13.34; 17.25; 18.30) in the text, with the verbal forms (mukta etc.) appearing considerably more frequently. The text speaks of liberation from the body (BhG. 5.23), from old age and death (BhG. 7.29), from subjection to rebirth (BhG. 2.51), from evil (BhG. 4.16, 9.1), and especially from the bondage of karman (BhG. 9.28). The liberated soul crosses “beyond māyā ” (BhG. 7.14), ever again to be reborn (BhG. 4.9; 5.17; 8.15–16) and attains – positively – immortality (amṛtatva; BhG. 2.15; 13.12; 14.20), peace (śānti; BhG. 2.71), the highest perfection (saṃsiddhiṃ paramām; BhG. 8.15), the supreme bliss (atyantaṃ sukham; BhG. 6.28), and the eternal, immutable state (śāśvataṃ avyayam padam; BhG. 18.56).
The Bhagavadgῑtā describes the sage as fit for becoming brahman (BhG. 18.53), as established in brahman (5.19–20), or even as having become brahman (brahmabhūta; BhG. 5.24; 6.27; 18.54). Kṛṣṇa promises that, at death, the sage will attain brahman or the nirvāṇa that is brahman (BhG. 4.30–31; 5.6; 5.24–26; 8.24; 13.30). Brahman is defined, as in the Upaniṣads, as the imperishable (akṣara; BhG. 8.3).
While these passages have given comfort to commentators who sought a nondualist, transtheistic reading of the text, there are verses that have just as readily provided support for a final theistic import. Kṛṣṇa himself is identified with the supreme brahman (paraṃ brahma; BhG. 10.12) and the unexcelled goal (anuttamaṃ gatim; BhG. 7.18). The liberated sage attains the supreme divine person (paraṃ puruṣaṃ divyam; BhG. 8.7–10). Indeed, over and over again, Kṛṣṇa proclaims that the liberated soul will come to, attain, or enter into him (BhG. 4.9; 7.23; 8.7, 15–16; 9.25, 28, 34; 10.10; 11.54–55; 12.8; 18.55, 65, 68), his being (madbhāvam; BhG. 4.10; 8.5; 13.18), or his supreme abode (dhāma paramaṃ mama; BhG. 15.6).
The nontheistic, pluralist conceptions of mokṣa can be found among the Hindu darśaṇas (philosophical schools) Nyāya, Vaiṣeśika, Mīmāṃsā, and Sāṃkhya-Yoga. All of these recognize an infinite multiplicity of spiritual selves ( ātman , puruṣa, jīva). At the same time, none allows in mokṣa any participation in a higher reality beyond the self. Rather, the vision involves a cessation or removal (apavarga) of connection with the suffering of the world and an isolation (kaivalya) in the individual self’s essential nature. Among these traditions, only the later Nyāya and the Yoga of Patañjali offer a conception of god. The conception is minimalist, however, and mokṣa – as perfect isolation in the self ātman – does not for them involve any sort of communion or identity with god. The primary appeal of the mokṣa ideal in these traditions is a negative one: the guarantee of the permanent and complete cessation of suffering (duḥkhānta, ātyantikaduḥkanivṛtti). There is no positive experience of bliss, since in none of these systems is bliss accepted as part of the soul’s essential nature. In Sāṃkhya-Yoga there is consciousness (cit) in mokṣa, since it is for them part of the soul’s inalienable nature; for the Nyāya-Vaiṣeśika and the Mīmāṃsā, consciousness also is denied in liberation, being an adventitious attribute of the jīva.
The various schools of Vedānta base their vision on the Upaniṣads and thus do offer, in various modalities, participation in a reality beyond and higher than the individual self. All emphasize, moreover, that mokṣa is not merely the end of suffering but also a positive experience of the highest bliss (paramānanda). Among these, the Advaita Vedānta offers a transtheistic, nondualist conception of liberation. It is transtheistic in the sense that the mokṣa experience in Advaita entails identity with the attributeless ( nirguṇa ) brahman, conceived of as a reality that transcends, yet does not negate, the attribute-full ( saguṇa ), or theistic, aspect of the ultimate. The conception, if not commonsensical, is fairly simple. In Śaṅkara’s words, “mokṣa is brahman” (brahmabhāvaś ca mokṣaḥ; BrSBh. 1.1.4). It is not a question of an individual ātman becoming, or – as is often said – merging into brahman. Mokṣa occurs with the realization that the single self (ātman), which is present uniformly in all beings as their inmost consciousness, is and has always been nothing other than brahman. Although the reward of this nondualist realization is supreme bliss (paramānanda), the cost is dear: the postmortem state – termed videhamukti, or “disembodied liberation” – is one in which, with rare exceptions (as at BrS. 3.3.32, discussed above), all traces of the mukta’s former individuality is dissolved.
Theistic expressions of the Vedānta tradition are primarily Vaiṣṇava in orientation. These include the theologies of Rāmānuja (11th–12th cents.), Madhva (13th cent.), Vallabha (15th–16th cents.), and Rūpa Gosvāmī and Jīva Gosvāmī (16th cent.). Speaking generally, they accept a multiplicity of spiritual selves (ātman, jīva), which may in mokṣa attain a state of eternal, blissful communion (but not identity) with the deity. This occurs in a heavenly realm (Vaikuṇṭha, Goloka) that transcends saṃsāra, images of which are drawn from the Upaniṣads (e.g. KauṣU. 1.3–5) and, especially, the Purāṇas (e.g. BhāgP. 3.15). It is significant that in these traditions mokṣa is not entirely a disembodied state. The mukta enjoys a spiritual body (aprākṛtadeha, siddhadeha, vaikuṇṭhamūrti, and so on) composed of pure being (śuddhasattva). A number of the Vaiṣṇava preceptors accept the idea of differing degrees of relationship with the deity in mokṣa: residence in the same realm (sālokya), partaking in divine attributes (sārṣṭi), proximity to god (sāmīpya), enjoying a divine form (sārūpya), and union (sāyujya or ekatva; BhāgP. 3.29.13). As this scheme suggests, it is not necessarily the case that all liberated souls enjoy the same degree of felicity. For Madhva, souls are qualitatively distinct (svarūpabheda), and there is a gradation of bliss (ānandatāratamya) in mokṣa, according to their worthiness. Madhva also is notable for his teaching that some souls (the nityasaṃsārins sor nityabaddhas) are destined to remain in the rounds of birth and rebirth forever, never to attain mokṣa, while others (tamoyogya, those “fit for darkness”) will slide toward an eventual eternity in hell. While not expressed so starkly, similar ideas may be found in the Nimbārka and Vallabha traditions. Finally, it should be noted that Kṛṣṇa traditions, following the Bhāgavatapurāṇa (7.8.42; 11.14.4), deemphasize the value of mokṣa in preference to bhakti , which they designate as the fifth goal of life (pañcamapuruṣārtha). They see bhakti as a supremely blissful end in itself, not merely a means to liberation.
The Śaiva and Śākta traditions have much in common theologically, so they may be considered here as a group. The Śaiva Siddhānta accepts a plurality of souls and aims in mokṣa for a blissful union with the deity that is consuming enough to be described as the attainment of Śiva-hood (śivatva), while yet being a state in which difference is retained. The varieties of mokṣa recognized by Vaiṣṇavas (sālokya, sāmīpya, etc.) are also accepted in the Śaiva Āgamas, with the difference that sāyujya (union with the deity) is valorized instead of being devalued. The realization in mokṣa of śivatva is taken more radically in the nondualist Kashmir Śaivism, represented preeminently in the work of Abhinavagupta (10th-11th cents.). In this theistic nondualism, the individualized consciousness is said to expand into a thoroughgoing identity with Śiva, actualizing to the full the mantric exclamation, śivo ‘ham, “I am Śiva.” The Śākta traditions are similarly nondualist in orientation. The goal here is not leaving the world behind, but rather transforming the yogin’s vision of the world to the point that it is seen as Śiva (or Devī) sees it, that is, as divine. Śaivas and Śāktas alike express this idea hyperbolically by proclaiming that they seek the union of bhukti and mukti (worldly enjoyment and liberation). Hence, the emphasis is on jīvanmukti, liberation while living, after which the casting off of physical embodiment becomes incidental. There is thus in the Śaiva and Śākta schools – as in the Vaiṣṇava bhakti traditions, though for somewhat different reasons – a tendency to devalue mokṣa. In this case, it is in favor of siddhi, a complete “perfection” of consciousness in which the world is not abandoned but rather transfigured. The conception of reality is dynamic and capable of sustaining paradox to the extent that the siddha, the “perfected” or “accomplished” saint, despite a close or even complete identification with the deity, retains a functional individuality. The siddha, indeed, is often understood to have achieved a state of personal immortality that holds beyond the death of the earthly body. This immortality involves a yogically engendered spiritual body (divyadeha, jñānadeha), an idea already mentioned in connection with Vaiṣṇavism. It allows for the siddha’s continued, felt presence and power in the world after the saint’s physical passing, a concept of wide currency among the followers of any number of guru-centered traditions within Hinduism.
From the Sanskrit root muc-, “to release,” “to set free,” mokṣa and its feminine cognate and synonym mukti convey the idea of liberation from the rounds of birth and rebirth (punarbhava, saṃsāra ) in the mundane world, along with the suffering (duḥkha) associated therewith. The individual who has attained this state of freedom is referred to using the past participle form mukta, the one who is liberated. All Hindus accept this basic definition in terms of “liberation from” as a starting point, but – through history and across the spectrum of the various Hindu schools of thought – there is a wide divergence as to the positive content of the mokṣa experience. The bulk of this article will be devoted to outlining these divergences, as represented in the ancient and classical traditions of scripture and theology. While most schools of thought regard mokṣa as the common destiny of all souls, a few, as we shall see, teach that some are not fit for this goal. Finally, while the general view is that mokṣa, once attained, is permanent and eternal, at least one Hindu teacher, the 19th-century reformer Dayananda Saraswati, understood mokṣa as a temporary state, from which return to earthly life was inevitable.
Mokṣa and the Brahmanical Tradition
The concept of mokṣa as a release from bondage to ordinary existence first made its appearance in the Upaniṣads, in what may be termed the late vedic period. It did not find expression in the earlier vedic corpus, where the outlook was generally more life affirming. The highest values of vedic Brahmanism, as later distilled in the concept of the puruṣārthas or “goals of human life” (puruṣa), centered in ritual; responsibility to family, ancestors, and society; and general earthly well-being. The postmortem goal was not mokṣa but svarga, a heavenly existence that was more or less an extension of earthly life, but without its defects.The idea of the radical transcendence of mundane existence that is represented by mokṣa arose in part as an answer to concerns internal to vedic religion, especially anxiety about the possibility of “re-death” (punarmṛtyu) after a postmortem period in the world of the ancestors. It is likely that there was also significant influence from the non-Brahmanical shamanic and ascetic cultures termed Śramaṇa (lit. striver), which eventually crystallized in Jainism, Buddhism, and Yoga. The development of the discourse about mokṣa paralleled the rise to religious consciousness of the related concepts of karman and saṃsāra. These ideas were combined with a less than optimistic evaluation of ordinary human existence in terms of the suffering (duḥkha) seen to be endemic to saṃsāra, forming a complex that became the common heritage of all Indic religions. Like the idea of mokṣa, the doctrines of karman and saṃsāra also found their earliest literary expression in the Upaniṣads (BĀU. 4.4.3–7; KaṭhU. 3.7–8; ŚvetU. 6.16; MaiU. 1.4).
Beyond the Upaniṣads, the doctrine of mokṣa moved gradually toward wide acceptance in the Hindu tradition, but never achieved a complete ascendency in relation to other religious goals. The mokṣa ideal vied continually and most especially with dharma – one’s duty toward ritual maintenance of the world – for status as the primary aim of human life. Although the Dharmaśāstras and the Arthaśāstra are aware of mokṣa as an ultimate horizon, they limit the puruṣārthas formally to the trivarga (triad) of dharma, artha , and kāma . Likewise, the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata speak of the trivarga of human goals only, although the latter contains significant portions – for example, the Mokṣadharma – in which the world-denying mokṣa ethos eclipses the this-worldly triad of puruṣārthas. The addition of mokṣa to the list of puruṣārthas, forming the classical caturvarga (quartet) of human goals, is a later development. Among the ultra-orthodox Mīmāṃsa theorists of ritual, intent as they were on the pursuit of dharma and the associated goal of svarga, the idea of mokṣa was not fully accepted until the time of Kumārila and Prabhākara (7th cent. CE). Nevertheless, by this time the mokṣa ideal had gained ground in other areas of Brahmanical culture to the extent that the schools of Vedānta were speaking of it as the paramapuruṣārtha, the “supreme goal of human life,” as does Śaṅkara (7th–8th cents. CE) in his commentary on Brahmasūtra 2.1.3.
The Idea of Liberation in the Upaniṣads
In the early and middle Upanishads (c. 900–500 BCE), we begin to see forms of the verb muc- (BĀU. 4.2.1; ChāU. 6.14.2; KaṭhU. 6.8), other noun formations such as vimokṣa (BĀU. 4.13.14–16), and, rarely, the feminine noun mukti (BĀU. 3.1.6) used in senses evoking the later, formalized conception of mokṣa. By the later Upaniṣads, the word itself has attained the status of a technical term, for example, in the Śvetāśvataropaniṣad: “He is the cause of saṃsāra and mokṣa” (ŚvetU. 6.16; see also MaiU. 6.20, 30, 34). In addition, there are numerous passages in which the idea of liberation from saṃsāra is suggested by other, more metaphorical expressions, for instance, not returning (BĀU. 6.2.15; ChāU. 4.15.5–6); gaining victory over repeated death (punarmṛtyu; BĀU. 1.2.7); passing beyond sorrow, sin, and death (BĀU. 3.5.1; MuU. 3.2.9); untying the knots of the heart (MuU. 2.2.9); being released from good and evil (BĀU. 4.4.23; MuU. 3.1.3); and reaching the further shore (ChāU. 7.26.2).More positively, we read of going to brahman (BĀU. 4.4.6; KaṭhU. 6.14), reaching the supreme light (paraṃ jyotiḥ; ChāU. 8.12.3), becoming immortal (amṛta; BĀU. 4.4.7; KaṭhU. 6.8), reaching the world of Brahmā (Brahmaloka; ChāU. 8.4.1; 8.15.1), and so on. As these varied metaphors suggest, while there is general agreement among the upanishadic teachers that this final release is a state of blissful freedom from earthly limitations, positive conceptions of the content of the experience vary. We find accounts that suggest personal immortality (ChāU. 8.12.3), having one’s desires spontaneously fulfilled (ChāU. 8.2.1–10; 8.7.1–3; TaiU. 2.1, 3.10.5), reaching a state of complete desirelessness (BĀU. 4.4.7; MuU. 3.2.2; MaiU. 6.30), attaining likeness to the supreme (MuU. 3.1.3), enjoying a heavenly paradise (ChāU. 8.12.3; KauṣU. 1.3–5), attaining oneness with the “divine person” (puruṣam divyam; MuU. 3.2.8), merging in brahman (lῑnā brahmaṇi; ŚvetU. 1.7), or even finding complete isolation from pleasure and pain (kevalatva; MaiU. 6.21). In some cases, the soul’s retention of individual form, or even some kind of spiritual embodiment, is suggested (ChāU. 7.26.2; 8.12.3), while in others complete loss of individuality is clearly indicated (BĀU. 2.4.12–14; 4.3.30; 4.4.6; ChāU. 6.10.1; MuU. 3.2.8–9; PrU. 6.5).
Liberation in the Brahmasūtra
The Upaniṣads, being visionary in content rather than systematic, make no attempt to harmonize the various perspectives presented. The first record we have of any such endeavor is the Brahmasūtra, attributed to Bādarāyaṇa (3rd–2nd cents. BCE). The third and fourth chapters of this work discuss a number of upanishadic passages dealing with the postmortem state of brahman knowers and reveal that, even at this relatively early stage in the development of the Vedānta, there were teachers worthy of mention by name who had divergent views on the topic of mokṣa, to the extent that Bādarāyaṇa felt it necessary to seek a reconciliation.The Brahmasūtra addresses several key questions concerning the state of the liberated soul (mukta), the first and most obvious being the relation between the liberated soul and brahman. There seems to have been general agreement that the mukta abided in a state “without distinction” (avibhāga) from the ultimate (BrS. 4.4.4), though the word avibhāga was vague enough to give later commentators much latitude. There was disagreement, however, regarding the nature of the liberated soul itself. Is the soul in liberation to be defined as pure consciousness (citi) only, or does it posses other qualities? The author of the Brahmasūtra wants to allow other brahman-like attributes in addition to pure consciousness (BrS. 4.4.5–7). Does the mukta, for example, enjoy supernatural powers? Bādarāyaṇa suggests that this is the case, but that these powers do not encroach upon the functions of cosmic creation, sustenance, and so on, which are exclusive to brahman (BrS. 4.4.17–21). How should we read scriptural passages that suggest that the desires of the liberated are realized simply by willing (BrS. 4.4.8–9)? We must accept them. Are the liberated somehow embodied? If so, may they enjoy more than one body? Bādarāyaṇa seems to believe that some kind of embodiment, and even multiple embodiments, is possible but not necessary (BrS. 4.4.10–16). An additional question is the issue of whether certain liberated souls under certain conditions attain only the lower or effected (kārya) brahman – the world of Brahmā (Brahmaloka) or Hiraṇyagarbha – instead of the supreme (para) brahman (BrS. 4.3.7–16). At least in Śaṅkara’s reading, the author of the Brahmasūtra allows for this, which opens the door for a central debate among later commentators: do the scriptural passages referring to the mukta as embodied and possessed of desire, powers, and other celestial attributes and experiences pertain only to those who have attained the lower brahman, or do they teach that the highest state might include such experiences? The distinction between the supreme and the lower brahman as goals for liberated souls also opens the door for the conceptualization of what Śaṅkara calls kramamukti, “stepwise” or “gradual” liberation. The Brahmasūtra (4.3.10–11) – referring perhaps to Muṇḍakopaniṣad 3.2.6 – suggests that those who have attained the world of Brahmā attain full liberation along with Brahmā when, at the end of cosmic cycle, the world is dissolved.
While there is general agreement that, once liberation is attained, there is no return (anāvṛtti) to the mundane world (BrS. 4.4.22), Bādarāyaṇa does suggest one interesting exception. Those muktas who have been appointed to certain cosmic missions may retain their bodies, or take up new bodies, as long as their appointed missions last (BrS. 3.3.32). Commentators take this idea to refer to certain sages ( ṛṣis ) –such as Apāntaratamas, Vasiṣṭha, and others – who are known in tradition for having assumed new bodies at the behest of the Lord to carry out certain divinely appointed tasks.
Liberation in the Bhagavadgῑtā
Along with the Upaniṣads and the Brahmasūtra, the Bhagavadgῑtā is one of the three primary texts (prasthānatrayī) of the Vedānta. Like the Upanishads, the Bhagavadgῑtā is not a systematic treatise. Indeed, it is something of a syncretic document. While it clearly represents a stage in Hindu thought at which the idea of saṃsāra is approaching its full classical articulation, there is no single, definitively expressed view of liberation in the text. Rather, as in the earlier texts, there is ample scope for both a nondualist and a theistic reading, though it is easily arguable that the Bhagavadgῑtā tends more strongly toward a theistic conception.The word mokṣa is used five times (BhG. 5.28; 7.29; 13.34; 17.25; 18.30) in the text, with the verbal forms (mukta etc.) appearing considerably more frequently. The text speaks of liberation from the body (BhG. 5.23), from old age and death (BhG. 7.29), from subjection to rebirth (BhG. 2.51), from evil (BhG. 4.16, 9.1), and especially from the bondage of karman (BhG. 9.28). The liberated soul crosses “beyond māyā ” (BhG. 7.14), ever again to be reborn (BhG. 4.9; 5.17; 8.15–16) and attains – positively – immortality (amṛtatva; BhG. 2.15; 13.12; 14.20), peace (śānti; BhG. 2.71), the highest perfection (saṃsiddhiṃ paramām; BhG. 8.15), the supreme bliss (atyantaṃ sukham; BhG. 6.28), and the eternal, immutable state (śāśvataṃ avyayam padam; BhG. 18.56).
The Bhagavadgῑtā describes the sage as fit for becoming brahman (BhG. 18.53), as established in brahman (5.19–20), or even as having become brahman (brahmabhūta; BhG. 5.24; 6.27; 18.54). Kṛṣṇa promises that, at death, the sage will attain brahman or the nirvāṇa that is brahman (BhG. 4.30–31; 5.6; 5.24–26; 8.24; 13.30). Brahman is defined, as in the Upaniṣads, as the imperishable (akṣara; BhG. 8.3).
While these passages have given comfort to commentators who sought a nondualist, transtheistic reading of the text, there are verses that have just as readily provided support for a final theistic import. Kṛṣṇa himself is identified with the supreme brahman (paraṃ brahma; BhG. 10.12) and the unexcelled goal (anuttamaṃ gatim; BhG. 7.18). The liberated sage attains the supreme divine person (paraṃ puruṣaṃ divyam; BhG. 8.7–10). Indeed, over and over again, Kṛṣṇa proclaims that the liberated soul will come to, attain, or enter into him (BhG. 4.9; 7.23; 8.7, 15–16; 9.25, 28, 34; 10.10; 11.54–55; 12.8; 18.55, 65, 68), his being (madbhāvam; BhG. 4.10; 8.5; 13.18), or his supreme abode (dhāma paramaṃ mama; BhG. 15.6).
Mokṣa in the Various Schools
As Hindu religious literature developed in the classical period, a rich variety of conceptualizations of mokṣa arose, corresponding to various theological/philosophical traditions, which – each in its own way – interpreted the suggestive ambiguity of scripture. Space does not permit a detailed analysis, but one may roughly divide these visions into (a) nontheistic or pluralist/isolationist, (b) transtheistic nondualist, and (c) theistic.The nontheistic, pluralist conceptions of mokṣa can be found among the Hindu darśaṇas (philosophical schools) Nyāya, Vaiṣeśika, Mīmāṃsā, and Sāṃkhya-Yoga. All of these recognize an infinite multiplicity of spiritual selves ( ātman , puruṣa, jīva). At the same time, none allows in mokṣa any participation in a higher reality beyond the self. Rather, the vision involves a cessation or removal (apavarga) of connection with the suffering of the world and an isolation (kaivalya) in the individual self’s essential nature. Among these traditions, only the later Nyāya and the Yoga of Patañjali offer a conception of god. The conception is minimalist, however, and mokṣa – as perfect isolation in the self ātman – does not for them involve any sort of communion or identity with god. The primary appeal of the mokṣa ideal in these traditions is a negative one: the guarantee of the permanent and complete cessation of suffering (duḥkhānta, ātyantikaduḥkanivṛtti). There is no positive experience of bliss, since in none of these systems is bliss accepted as part of the soul’s essential nature. In Sāṃkhya-Yoga there is consciousness (cit) in mokṣa, since it is for them part of the soul’s inalienable nature; for the Nyāya-Vaiṣeśika and the Mīmāṃsā, consciousness also is denied in liberation, being an adventitious attribute of the jīva.
The various schools of Vedānta base their vision on the Upaniṣads and thus do offer, in various modalities, participation in a reality beyond and higher than the individual self. All emphasize, moreover, that mokṣa is not merely the end of suffering but also a positive experience of the highest bliss (paramānanda). Among these, the Advaita Vedānta offers a transtheistic, nondualist conception of liberation. It is transtheistic in the sense that the mokṣa experience in Advaita entails identity with the attributeless ( nirguṇa ) brahman, conceived of as a reality that transcends, yet does not negate, the attribute-full ( saguṇa ), or theistic, aspect of the ultimate. The conception, if not commonsensical, is fairly simple. In Śaṅkara’s words, “mokṣa is brahman” (brahmabhāvaś ca mokṣaḥ; BrSBh. 1.1.4). It is not a question of an individual ātman becoming, or – as is often said – merging into brahman. Mokṣa occurs with the realization that the single self (ātman), which is present uniformly in all beings as their inmost consciousness, is and has always been nothing other than brahman. Although the reward of this nondualist realization is supreme bliss (paramānanda), the cost is dear: the postmortem state – termed videhamukti, or “disembodied liberation” – is one in which, with rare exceptions (as at BrS. 3.3.32, discussed above), all traces of the mukta’s former individuality is dissolved.
Theistic expressions of the Vedānta tradition are primarily Vaiṣṇava in orientation. These include the theologies of Rāmānuja (11th–12th cents.), Madhva (13th cent.), Vallabha (15th–16th cents.), and Rūpa Gosvāmī and Jīva Gosvāmī (16th cent.). Speaking generally, they accept a multiplicity of spiritual selves (ātman, jīva), which may in mokṣa attain a state of eternal, blissful communion (but not identity) with the deity. This occurs in a heavenly realm (Vaikuṇṭha, Goloka) that transcends saṃsāra, images of which are drawn from the Upaniṣads (e.g. KauṣU. 1.3–5) and, especially, the Purāṇas (e.g. BhāgP. 3.15). It is significant that in these traditions mokṣa is not entirely a disembodied state. The mukta enjoys a spiritual body (aprākṛtadeha, siddhadeha, vaikuṇṭhamūrti, and so on) composed of pure being (śuddhasattva). A number of the Vaiṣṇava preceptors accept the idea of differing degrees of relationship with the deity in mokṣa: residence in the same realm (sālokya), partaking in divine attributes (sārṣṭi), proximity to god (sāmīpya), enjoying a divine form (sārūpya), and union (sāyujya or ekatva; BhāgP. 3.29.13). As this scheme suggests, it is not necessarily the case that all liberated souls enjoy the same degree of felicity. For Madhva, souls are qualitatively distinct (svarūpabheda), and there is a gradation of bliss (ānandatāratamya) in mokṣa, according to their worthiness. Madhva also is notable for his teaching that some souls (the nityasaṃsārins sor nityabaddhas) are destined to remain in the rounds of birth and rebirth forever, never to attain mokṣa, while others (tamoyogya, those “fit for darkness”) will slide toward an eventual eternity in hell. While not expressed so starkly, similar ideas may be found in the Nimbārka and Vallabha traditions. Finally, it should be noted that Kṛṣṇa traditions, following the Bhāgavatapurāṇa (7.8.42; 11.14.4), deemphasize the value of mokṣa in preference to bhakti , which they designate as the fifth goal of life (pañcamapuruṣārtha). They see bhakti as a supremely blissful end in itself, not merely a means to liberation.
The Śaiva and Śākta traditions have much in common theologically, so they may be considered here as a group. The Śaiva Siddhānta accepts a plurality of souls and aims in mokṣa for a blissful union with the deity that is consuming enough to be described as the attainment of Śiva-hood (śivatva), while yet being a state in which difference is retained. The varieties of mokṣa recognized by Vaiṣṇavas (sālokya, sāmīpya, etc.) are also accepted in the Śaiva Āgamas, with the difference that sāyujya (union with the deity) is valorized instead of being devalued. The realization in mokṣa of śivatva is taken more radically in the nondualist Kashmir Śaivism, represented preeminently in the work of Abhinavagupta (10th-11th cents.). In this theistic nondualism, the individualized consciousness is said to expand into a thoroughgoing identity with Śiva, actualizing to the full the mantric exclamation, śivo ‘ham, “I am Śiva.” The Śākta traditions are similarly nondualist in orientation. The goal here is not leaving the world behind, but rather transforming the yogin’s vision of the world to the point that it is seen as Śiva (or Devī) sees it, that is, as divine. Śaivas and Śāktas alike express this idea hyperbolically by proclaiming that they seek the union of bhukti and mukti (worldly enjoyment and liberation). Hence, the emphasis is on jīvanmukti, liberation while living, after which the casting off of physical embodiment becomes incidental. There is thus in the Śaiva and Śākta schools – as in the Vaiṣṇava bhakti traditions, though for somewhat different reasons – a tendency to devalue mokṣa. In this case, it is in favor of siddhi, a complete “perfection” of consciousness in which the world is not abandoned but rather transfigured. The conception of reality is dynamic and capable of sustaining paradox to the extent that the siddha, the “perfected” or “accomplished” saint, despite a close or even complete identification with the deity, retains a functional individuality. The siddha, indeed, is often understood to have achieved a state of personal immortality that holds beyond the death of the earthly body. This immortality involves a yogically engendered spiritual body (divyadeha, jñānadeha), an idea already mentioned in connection with Vaiṣṇavism. It allows for the siddha’s continued, felt presence and power in the world after the saint’s physical passing, a concept of wide currency among the followers of any number of guru-centered traditions within Hinduism.
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