Plotinus -his life and works

Plotinus was born in AD 205 (in the 13th year of the rule of Septimius Severus) and died in 270 at the age of 66 (Porph. Vita Plotini 2,34). His ethnic origin is difficult to determine. Eunapius (p. 456 Boissonnade) lists as his place of birth Lycon in Egypt (the town has been identified as Lyconpolis). The information is problematic because according to Porphyrius P. kept his place of birth secret. Proclus (Platonis Theologia 1,1) called him an 'Egyptian'. His name is in the Latin form [1]. The only detail that P. ever told about his childhood was that he still wanted to nurse from his wet-nurse at the age of seven (Porph. Vita Plotini 3,6). This anecdote probably belongs in the context of the Stoic doctrine of the onset of reason at the age of seven.
In Alexandria P. studied with several teachers of philosophy. When he was 28 years old he met the Platonist Ammonius  Saccas and was captivated by his teaching. He remained his student for 11 years. In 243, probably through the intervention of his apparently wealthy and influential family, he came to the court of emperor Gordianus III and accompanied him in the campaign against the Persians “to also learn about the philosophy of the Persians and Indians” (Porph. Vita Plotini 3,15-16). When in early 244 Gordianus was assassinated by his army (possibly instigated by the prefect Philippus Arabs) P. fled to Antioch [1] on the Orontes - probably because he felt his association with the imperial court put him in danger. From Antioch P. went to Rome where he opened a school, probably the first year after his arrival. When the school was in its second year, the philosopher Amelius Gentilianus became his student and later his 'assistant'.
In 263 the philosopher Porphyrius came to Rome from Athens; for 6 years he belonged to P.'s school (263-268). Because of his initial reluctance to accept the Plotinian theory of the relationship between the intellect (noûs) and the intelligible (noëtá) he was not immediately admitted to the inner circle. Only after accepting the theory, was Porphyrius given access to P.'s writings and was even asked to edit them. Thanks to his biography of P. we have information about P.'s life in Rome. He stayed in the house of Gemina, a woman “who was very interested in his philosophy”. Her house appears to have been rather large; in addition to Gemina (who was not - as mistakenly assumed - the widow of emperor Trebonius  since Trebonius' widow had died before 251) and her daughter Gemina, there stayed also a widow by the name of Chione with her children, and there were many more children whose guardian P. was; there were also the slaves of the various families.
Porphyrius reports that emperor Gallienus (sole ruler from 260 to 268) and empress Salonia greatly revered P. (Vita Plotini 12,2). In this context he mentions P.'s dream of rebuilding a 'city of philosophers' in Campania. The site was probably a former estate of Cicero, located between Cumae and Bacoli. It was to become a real academy, suitable for philosophical conversations . The opposition of Gallienus' advisors thwarted the effort to restore the site. In 268 Gallienus was assassinated. The school closed a year later. There may have been a political reason, related to the beginning of the rule of Gallienus' successor Claudius Gothicus. But the more likely cause for the closing of the school was P.'s progressing illness (tuberculosis according to [4]). Porphyrius was in Sicily at that time and Amelius in Apamea in Syria. P. retired to Campania where he died in 270 in the presence of Eustochius, one of his students.

Writings

P. started to put his philosophical treatises in writing only after 254, i.e. 10 years after opening his school (Porph. Vita Plotini 3,35). Earlier, Amelius had compiled scholia for P.' lectures (ibidem 3,46-48; 4,4-6; not extant). P. had limited himself to oral instruction for such a long time because he and his two fellow students Herennius and Origenes [1] had agreed not to spread the doctrine of their teacher Ammonius [9] Saccas. When Herennius broke that agreement, P. decided to write as well. But P. did not write his treatises to explain his philosophical system to his readers. According to his editor Porphyrius (Porph. Vita Plotini 5,5; 5,60) his writings were elaborations on the problems that had come up in discussions during his lessons. Thus, although P.' treatises are related to his oral instruction, they are not transcripts of his lessons.
Thanks to Porphyrius' edition we have all of P.' writings. Porphyrius even provided their chronology (in round brackets in the sources under C). But he considerably changed the arrangement of these writings and their relationship; in the Pythagorean spirit he arranged them on his own accord in a systematic sequence of six groups, with each group consisting of nine treatises (the 'Enneads') and organised according to the three parts of philosophy (ethics, physics and theology). He arbitrarily divided individual writings and thereby created the impression that the resulting individual segments corresponded to the same number of self-contained writings. These segments were scattered over various Enneads (e.g. originally. 3,8; 5,8; 5,5; 2,9 were one text) - an arrangement that P. never had intended.
Almost all of P.' treatises are some kind of 'Platonic question'. E.g., they are not a direct explanation of P.' doctrine of the descent of the soul but explain it indirectly by interpreting Plato's statements. Some of these treatises are concerned with more technical issues (e.g.: why do objects in a distance seem small to us?). Most of them, however, do not intend to solve a particular philosophical problem, but rather want to provoke a psychological response in the reader: above all, they encourage him to go beyond rational thought and, through an experience that can not be communicated in words, to go beyond reason (lógos) and even beyond intellect (noûs). Porphyrius presented the chronological list of P.' writings from a rather egocentric perspective: He distinguished three periods in P.' writing: The first period prior to Porphyrius' arrival, the second spanning the six years he spent in P.' school, and a third that started with his departure. According to Porphyrius, most of P.' writings and his most significant ones came from the second period. The presence of Porphyrius, who was a productive philosopher, might have stimulated interesting discussions at school and the writings related to these discussions could have been especially numerous and thorough. Contrary to Porphyrius' opinion, the texts of the last period do not betray any sign of weakness or senility.
The 21 texts of the first period are shorter and less complicated than those of the second period. The specifically Plotinian doctrine of the emanation (aporrhoía) of the levels of Intellect and Soul from the One is expressed in great clarity (in chronological sequence in the treatises 7, 9, 10, 11). A group of writings examines the Soul (psychḗ) - its immortality, its essence, its presence in the body (2, 4, 6, 8, 14 und 21) - and matter (hýlē, 12). Other texts discuss moral issues: purification (kátharsis) through virtue or the status of the wise man (spoudaíos) in the hierarchy of beings (15, 19, 20). In the second period, there are extensive discussions about the Soul (26-29 und 41) and, probably related to them, discussions about the presence of the intelligible (noētá) in the material world (22-23). A coherent group of writings is polemical towards the Gnostics (30-33 and 38-39) and rejects the idea of a creation of the world through the will and the design of a creator: by neccessity the visible world is derived - like a reflection (eídōlon) - from the world of ideas (eídē). Treatises 34 and 42-45 discuss the structure of the intelligible world (numbers, types/génē of being, eternity). In the third period, P. apparently turned his attention to moral issues. Apart from the text devoted to the concept of self-knowledge in the realm of the intelligible (49), and from another text (50) that offers an interpretation of the myth of Eros, the last treatises dealt with evil (kakón), providence (prónoia), the influence of the heavenly bodies, the relationship of the self to what affects the body, and finally, the traditional question whether death is a good (47-48, 51, 52, 54).

C. Teachings

1. General characteristics

P. merely wanted to be an exegete of Plato. But the method of his exegesis - to reconcile the hierarchy of his hypostases with the ideas of Platonic dialectics- had already been outlined by Numenius [6] and probably by P.' teacher Ammonius [9] Saccas, about whom we know almost nothing. Basically, the Plotinian method is the ascension from one level of reality to the next higher, which generated it. The ascension can be achieved in two ways: through discursive thinking and through asceticism and mysticism. The discursive path has the following stages: the material world requires a principle of life and animation: the world soul (psychḗ toû pantós) and the individual souls. The world soul in turn requires a higher principle that illuminates it and that projects the reflection of the ideas onto it: the Intellect (noûs). The Intellect in turn requires a principle that gives it unity and definition: the One (hen). These levels of reality correspond to the hierarchical levels and states of internal reality, i.e. of the self. One can only reach the various levels and get to know them in an active and existential manner through asceticism and mystical experience. To really understand something is to practice it. We do not know whether in his oral teachings P. treated questions of ethics, physics and theology separately as was customary. As far as his writings are concerned, most of them can not be assigned to a particular area of philosophy. Instead, they cover (apart from a few exceptions) all areas of philosophy and take the reader on a path where he becomes aware of himself first as soul, then as intellect and finally glances the possibility of touch at the One. The convenient framework of philosophical disciplines is not helpful for a discussion of P.' philosophy; instead one has to constantly distinguish the philosophical discourse from the realities reached through the internal experience of the self.

2. The level of the Soul

In the first stage of the ascent (anábasis) to which P. invites his students, they should use their intellect in a philosophical manner to become aware of the fact that they have risen above the level of the unreasoning soul (it animates the body, and hence it is troubled by desire and the pains that accompany the life of the body). Abstract argumentation is of no use; to really rise to the level of the intelligent soul one needs too undergo purification of desires through asceticism. The desires, essentially connected to the unreasoning soul, attach themselves to the reasoning soul as well (Plot. Enneades 4,7 (2),10,27). Thus purified, the reasoning soul can rise to the level of the world soul (psychḗ toû pantós), which is not troubled by its relation to the world body and is always directed to the Intellect. P. does not define clearly the relationship between the world soul and the hypostasis (hypóstasis) of the soul that always remains in the Intelligible

3. The level of the Intellect

But one has to go further than the reasoning soul. Philosophical discourse has to admit that the Soul can only think reasonably if there exists some kind of substantial thought that is both present in the soul and that rises above it and makes discursive reasoning possible. Again, there are two possibilities for self-knowledge: to recognise oneself as a reasoning soul, illuminated by the Intellect, yet persisting on the level of the reasoning soul, and to recognise oneself as an emerging Intellect, i.e. knowledge (Enneades 5,3 (43),4,8-14) that “knows it is is no longer a man, but something that has become completely different, something which tore itself loose from itself, up into the higher world.” This is no longer a discourse, but rather a mystical experience since its is a supra-rational knowledge. Thereby the self realises that it constantly and unconsciously lives the life of the Intellect (Enneades 4,8 (6),8,3). The Intellect should be seen as our proper self. 'To become Intellect' means to reach a state of the self where the self has the same transparency toward itself as the Intellect. This happens by dismissing the individual aspect of the self that is attached to a body and a soul and by rising to a thinking of wholeness. According to P. the Intellect contains the totality of the forms that constitute the intelligible world where each is in everything and everything is in each. To think oneself as Intellect is to overcome one's individuality and think oneself as totality; that happens not by dividing the totality into details, but through experience, since the totality is a kind of organic system. By leaving behind individual differences one becomes the Whole (hólon).

4. The contact with the One

In P.' colourful language (6,7 (38), 36,17) the Intellect, with whom the self identifies, is like a surge that throws us onto the shore of the One. Philosophical discourse can demonstrate that what generates the One-All, i.e. the Intellect, is the absolute and first unity. With this demonstration the philosophical discourse has reached its limit, because speaking means relating attributes and direct or indirect objects to a subject. But the One has neither objects nor attributes because it is completely One. As far as the One is concerned, we can only deny all objects and attributes; this method is called apophatic theology. But if we still believe we can say something about it, such as: “The One is the reason for all things”, then we don't say what it is, but rather what we are in relation to it, and that means that we are its effects. Instead of talking about it, we talk about us (6,9 (9),3,51-52). The only way to reach the One is through mystical experience, through contact and presence. Then the philosophical discourse can be resumed again, at least it can explain why there are two levels of mystical experience and how we can experience the One.
The self can lead the life of the Intellect on two levels. One is the level of the thinking intellect, i.e. of the completely structured Intellect; it corresponds to the supra-rational level reached in the first mystical experience (4,8 (6),1,1; 5,8 (31), 10-11). The second level P. calls 'loving intellect' (nous érōn, 6,7 (38),35); it could also be called 'emerging Intellect'. The Intellect comes from the One just as undefined matter emanates from the One like a ray and returns to it in pre-intellectual contact. Because of this contact with the One, says P., the intellect is full of love, drunk with nectar (6,7 (38),35). In this mystical experience of the One, the self puts itself on the point of origin where all things emanate from the One, in other words the emanating Intellect - like the radius of a circle that returns to the point where it coincides with the centre but is not the centre itself.

5. The downward motion

If philosophy means returning to the One and Good then that implies that philosophy also means becoming aware of the emanation (próodos) of all being from the Good (agathón). Thus we become aware of the fact that all being, including ourselves, have initially moved away from the One. The coming into being of all being has a twofold meaning. On the one hand it attests to the mysterious productivity of the Good (in the Middle Ages the Good is said to be diffusivum sui, 'pouring itself out'). P. speaks of the overabundance (hyperplerés) of the One (5,2 (11),1,9) which produces a kind of unformed matter or potential which comes into being by returning to the One. On the other hand, the genesis of all beings is in some way related to some kind of original sin. In other words: to be more than the Good means to be in the evil.
P. says about the first product of the One, the Intellect, that “it had the boldness (tólma) to move away from the One” (6,9 (9),5,29) and that “it would have been better for it not to have wanted to possess all being within itself”. With these words P. alludes to Kronos who rose against his father Uranus and who wanted to keep all of his children in himself (cf. [6]). The world soul and the individual souls rose like Zeus against Kronos, they differentiated themselves from the Intellect because they wanted to be themselves and achieve their independence, and because they wanted to project the images (eídōla) - the reflection of themselves, i.e. their bodies - onto matter. The motion of the conversion of the souls, the upward motion, presupposes a downward motion in which the souls experience evil.

D. Influence

The Plotinian hierarchy of the hypostases was the starting point for Neoplatonic metaphysics from Porphyrius (3rd cent. AD)to Damascius (6th cent.). The influence of Iamblichus and his exegesis of the Chaldean Oracles (Oracula Chaldaica) led to a multiplication of the various levels of the hierarchy, contrary to Plotinian thought. One might even say that Proclus' Neoplatonism leads inevitably to an extension of the criticism of P., especially of P.' theory that a part of the Soul always remains in the Intelligible. In the history of Western thought there are four Plotinian periods:
1. The revival of Plotinian spirituality and mysticism by Christian writers in the East and West: the Cappadocians Gregorius  of Nyssa, Gregorius  of Nazianzus and Basileius [1] of Caesarea; in the West especially Ambrosius and Augustine; the latter had read some texts by Plotinus in the Latin translation by Marius [II 21] Victorinus (cf. [7; 8]).
2. The circulation in the Arabic world of a text the Arabs called Theology of Aristotle and its reception in the West during the Middle Ages. For the most part this text consisted of excerpts from P.' works and was translated first from Greek into Syriac, then from Syriac into Arabic and finally from Arabic into Latin.
3. Christian Platonism beginning with the rediscovery of P.' texts in the Renaissance through the excellent translation by Marsilio Ficino at the end of the 15th cent. (1492): Christian Platonism spread from the 16th to the 18th cent. from Italy to England where it was kept alive by the Platonists from Cambridge such as R. Cuolworth, J. Smith, H. More, the poets of the Romantic Period like W. Blake, S.T. Coleridge, W. Wordsworth and modern novelists such as Ch. Morgan.
4. The P. reception by German philosophy in the early 19th cent.: G.F. Creuzer, J.W. Goethe, G. Fichte, Novalis and G.F. Schelling. Their ideas of the inner form, of beauty and of the absolute should be seen against a background of Plotinian philosophy. Towards the end of the 19th cent. H. Bergson assumed the heritage of this Romantic tradition. His idea of living organisms was inspired by P.' description of the forms  which are always complete and whole and sufficient in themselves.