VITAKKA/VITARKA AND VICARA -Stages of samadhi in Buddhism and Yoga
The two terms vitakka/vitarka and vicara are crucial to the understanding of the stages of samadhi in both the Buddhist tradition and in the influential yoga tradition attributed to Patanjali. However, at present interpretation is often dominated by notions derived from later commentarial sources.
Such notions, although in themselves of great interest, create an artificial appearance of difference between the two traditions which is probably unjustified. It suffices to note the marked difference in English renderings of these two words in translations from Sanskrit and from Pali.
This is exacerbated by the, no doubt inevitable, tendency to treat the Buddhist and Brahmanical traditions as if they operated in complete isolation from one another. In fact it is clear that each has both influenced and been influenced by the other in numerous ways. Buddhist origins are
obviously from a milieu in which both orthodox and heterodox Brahmanical ideas and practices were ubiquitous. Not surprisingly influences from and reactions to Vedic traditions pervade the early Buddhist texts. Subsequently, after Buddhism's rapid growth and early creative period, influences are for a while mainly, but not exclusively, from Buddhism to Brahmanism. After the formation of classical Hinduism and during the gradual decline in mportance of Buddhism and Jainism which took place from the Gupta period onwards, it is clear that Buddhism borrows much more than it
contributes. No doubt this is what one would expect, but it seems surprisingly little recognised.
The present issue is a case in point. Influences from Buddhist sources (to my mind, very frequent) on the Yoga-sutra are often minimized or ignored. In the particular example with which we are concerned here the Yoga-sutra is often seen as having a distinctive analysis of the stages of samadhi. I think this is a mistake, partly due to focussing on later Buddhist literature rather than on the canonical account. The reason for this is possibly the fact that the canonical material often needs to be approached through the early abhidhamma literature which is less studied than the sutta material.
The most important source for this purpose is the first book of the Abhidhamma-pitaka, the Dhammasangani. This gives mnemonic registers for both vitakka and for vicara.
VITAKKA IN THE DHAMMASANGANI
The dhammuddesa for vitakka in the Dhammasangani is as follows:
1. takka 2. vitakka 3. sankappa 4. appana 5. vyappana 6. cetaso abhiniropana 7. samma-satikappa
Unusually for the Dhammasangani the complete register for vitakka is already to be found in a single location in the nikayas, namely in the Mahdcattarisaka-sutta. This discourse is an abhidhamma-style analysis of the Eightfold Path. In fact the sutta reads suspiciously as if it were itself based on the Dhammasangani, but if so it is difficult to explain why no additional sources can be found for some of the terms. We must then assume that this sutta is the source of this Dhammasangani register and presumably of much of the methodology of the Dhammasangani, but it is
surprising that no additions have been made. Perhaps the list was already too established in the tradition to allow of amendment. It would be interesting to know if the corresponding sutta preserved in Chinese contains the same passage.
Taking the terms of the register in order:
1. Takka
This occurs in a number of contexts in the earlier literature, but can always be rendered by 'speculation'. The more specific later meaning of (systematic) logic would be anachronistic, while the translation sometimes given of doubt' is incorrect for the nikAyas. The context which the Dhammasangani or its source probably has in mind is one which occurs in the Brahmajala- sutta
some mendicant or brahmana speculative (takkin) and inclined to investigation
(vimamsin). He says that which is beaten out by speculation, that which is attended by
investigation ....
In the Anguttara-nikaya we find the statement that one should not believe anything by reason of speculation (takka-hetu). Another important sutta formula also occurs in the Brahmajala-sutta:
There are, monks, still further truths (dhamma) -- deep, hard to see, hard to comprehend,peaceful, excellent, outside the sphere of speculation (atakkawacara), subtle, (only) to be known by the wise -- which the Tathagata makes known after having himself comprehended them by his higher knowledge and after having directly experienced them.
Similar passages occur in several contexts concemed with the truth assessment of views or wisdom. Finally in the canonical accounts of the request of Brahma Sahampati the same set of epithets is applied to the dhamma which the Buddha has reached.
To go by the position of right view as last in the list it would seem that an ascending order is intended. If so, the implication is probably meant to be that speculation is a rather weak and inferior form of thinking. Certainly the commentaries have little difficulty in interpreting these contexts in terms of their understanding of vitakka as the fixing of the mind on an object of thought or sense. For them speculation is merely a form of weak vitakka whose object is constantly changing. So the term takka-pariyahata recalls the commentarial definition of the function (rasa) of vitakka as ahanana- pariyahanana: "for by means of this the yogavacara makes the object struck
by vitakka, struck around by vitakka". ~ In the present context it would be easy to interpret takka-pariyahata as meaning that the speculative complex of ideas which arises in weak mentality requires application of the mind from many different angles.
2. Vitakka
The word vitakka occurs frequently in definitions and explanations of samadhi or jhana, but is not explained in that context. Apart from this I have collected about forty other passages from the four nikayas; there are probably some more. It is clear that it can always be rendered as 'thinking'
or 'thought', although it is unlikely that this would have the same significance as the concept does for us today. Of course this is even more unlikely among a community containing many contemplatives. It may therefore be the case that thought was already pictured as essentially the activity of bringing different objects into firm focus before the mind's eye -- be those objects thoughts or mental pictures. Such a view of the matter would after all be very natural to people with a very highly developed eidetic faculty.
Apart from the above-mentioned accounts of jhana and the like, vitakka occurs most frequently in passages referring to the three skilful thoughts or the three unskilful thoughts or all six together i.e. thought connected with desire or with desirelessness, with aversion or with non-aversion and with
cruelty or non-cruelty. Less commonly it is found as part of a series.
(There are of course many similar sequences which do not include vitakka at all.) In a number of places it means simply thought or thinking in a fairly general sense. A few less usual contexts connected with samadhi can be added. Also we are told that vitakka and vicdra are the activities which fashion speech: "when one has thought and examined (vicaretva), afterwards one utters speech. ''is There is also one discourse which applies the genre of riddle and answer to the subject of sankappa-vitakka. It is clear from this and one other passage that sakappa and vitakka are not always identical in meaning.
3. Sankappa
This should perhaps mean thought formation rather than thought, but not surprisingly it does not in practice seem greatly differentiated in its use from vitakka. For example, in a number of contexts the same division into three unskilful and three skilful types is found. In a general sense of
'thinking' we find 'remembering thoughts' (sara-sankappa) used a number of times in ways obviously related to the usage of the three unskilful thoughts) Several times we have expressions like 'due to that' (e.g. fame and gain) 'he is happy and his purpose is fulfilled (paripunna-sankappa)'.
This appears to be the only context where the translation 'purpose' is required, although it is a possible alternative in some cases, and may perhaps be appropriate in some passages where sankappa and vitakka are juxtaposed or differentiated.
Finally the use of sankappa as part of a series needs to be mentioned.This is closely parallel to similar uses of vitakka. It is especially frequent to juxtapose sanna with either vitakka or sankappa. It is emphasized that sanna arises dependent upon the sense objects and corresponding sankappa
arises dependent upon sanna, but the converse is not the case. This seems to mean that only if there is say a visual stimulus (rupa-dhatu) can there be recognition of the visual object (i.e. rupa-sanna); only if a visual object has been recognised can there be thoughts about what has been seen (rupa- sankappa). The precise degree of introspective acuteness envisaged is unclear.
4. Appana
This occurs only in the one nikaya ontext previously mentioned. In commentarial usage it signifies the absorption accompanying strong concentration. The word may already occur in this sense in a doubtful passage in the Petakopadesa, a treatise which may not be long after the early abhi-
dhamma works in date. In the nikayaas verbal forms of appeti occur only in the sense of 'to flow into (e.g. the sea)' < apyeti. There are, however, a number of Vinaya passages where it appears to mean 'to fix' < arpayati. The same derivation is implied in Vibhanga passages which use it in the sense of 'made to go away' i.e. 'removed' This is the standard etymology in the later tradition, both in Pali and in Buddhist Sanskrit, no doubt rightly. It is perhaps just possible that the meaning of appana in the Dhammasangani register is influenced by the sense of 'flowing into' but on
the whole it seems adequate to take it as meaning 'fixing'.
5. Vyappana
This also appears only in the Mahacattarisaka-sutta as far as the nikayas are concerned, but vyappita is found in the same Vibhanga context mentioned above in the sense of 'completely gone'. The commentary is no doubt right to interpret this as either augmentation with a prefix for stylistic
adornment or an intensified form of appana. So it should probably be translated as 'firm fixing'
6. Cetaso abhiniropana
This too does not appear elsewhere in the nikayas. It is usually taken as deriving from abhi + ni + causative of RUH -- literally, 'transferring the mind onto (an object)'. This is probably correct, but it is worth noting that BHSD gives a form abhinirupayati, which suggests an alternative derivation
from RUP. It is this which must be intended by the Netti-pakarana (abhiniropeti) and the Petakopadesa (niropayitabba) in their explanation of nirutti. In the latter case it can be translated: 'should be given this form'.
This would offer an alternative rendering for the Dhammasangani register of 'mental forming' or 'mental defining'. However, abhiniropana occurs in the Patisambhiddmagga as the standard epithet for samma-sankappa and also for vitakka. It is also found in one passage in which it defines the
activity of resultant mind element; here it must refer to the fixing of a sense object in the mind? ~ Although the date of the Patisambhiddamagga is not known, it must be earlier than the latest of the canonical abhidhamma works.
7. Samma-sankappa
As the second link in the Eightfold Path this has an important place. The nikayas define it in exactly the same way as the three skilful vitakkas or sankappas. Likewise miccha-sankappa is defined in exactly the same way as the corresponding types of skilful thought. So a translation by 'purpose' can be ruled out -- vitakka cannot mean purpose. Moreover there are contexts in which such a meaning is hardly possible:
But although there really is another world, he has the view that there is no other world --
that is his wrong view; but although there really is another world, he forms the thought
(sankappeti) that there is no other world -- that is his wrong thought (miccha-sankappa);
but although there really is another world, he utters speech to the effect that there is no
other world -- that is his wrong speech.
Here the sequence is clear. If one's way of seeing is flawed, then the way in which one's thought will take form in the understanding will be flawed and likewise the way in which one expresses that understanding in speech.
VICARA IN THE DHAMMASANGANI
The dhammuddesa for vicara in the Dhammasangani is as follows:
1. cara 2. vicara 3. anuvicara 4. upavicara 5. cittassa anusandhanata 6. anupekkhanata
Again taking them in order:
1. Cara
This occurs in a few passages in opposition to vihara -- 'wandering' as opposed to 'abiding in one place', but such general uses do not seem very relevant to the Dhammasangani. It is possible that some usage which I have not been able to identify is referred to here -- perhaps cara as the
second member of some compound. More probably it is used here simply to indicate a mobile aspect of thought -- its 'wandering'; this would be appropriate in opposition to 'fixing' as the chief feature of vitakka.
2. Vicara
Literally interpreted, this might mean either 'constant wandering' or 'that which causes the (mind) to wander in different directions'. In practice it almost always occurs in conjunction with vitakka, while in the nikayas vicareti is usually found with vitakketi. This is nearly always in contexts associated with jhana or samddhi. At least once, however, it is part of a list.
3. Anuvicara
Although the noun does not occur in the nikayas, the verb anuvicareti is found in a few passages, always preceded by anuvitakketi. This would of course literally mean 'causing to explore', but it is clear from the Majjhima- nikaya passages that the use of these two verbs together is intended merely to indicate the repeated application of vitakka and vicara; anu is here simply a prefix indicating repetition. The Anguttara-nikaya usage is similar, although it almost always occurs there in the phrase:.., dhammam cetasa anuvitakketi anuvicareti manasanupekkhati '... applies vitakka and
vicara with the mind to the dhamma, mentally examines the dhamma.
4. Upavicara
The verb upavicarati (used in close conjunction with the noun) means 'to frequent'. The noun means that which the mind frequents and hence a sphere of activity or range of interest. Its inclusion in the Dhammasangani register is obviously based upon the formula sometimes referred to as the eighteen manopavicara:
"After seeing a visible object with the eye one frequents a visible object which is the basis for pleasant feeling" -- the number eighteen is reached by utilizing three types of feeling in conjunction with six senses. This list is found in contexts concerned with the same kind
of process that we find described in stages five to eight of the dependent origination formula. So it is closely related to the use of vitakka and vicara is part of a series.
5. Cittassa anusandhanata
This may mean either 'explorativeness of mind' or 'a state of constant uniting of the mind'. The former seems the most likely of the various senses of the Sanskrit verb, while the latter is the interpretation of the commentary: "it is a state of constant uniting of the mind because it constantly
unites the mind to the object and holds it, just as one joins an arrow to the bowstring and holds it there. '' This is not impossible, but in view of the sixth item of the register, investigation or exploration seems more likely.
Only a verbal form occurs in the nikayas and only in one doubtful context.
6. Anupekkhanata
This means 'careful examination' or 'constant examination'. Anupekkhati occurs in the nikayas in two formulae. One was cited above under upavicara. The other, which is much the more frequent, may be translated:
"dhammas are heard much, remembered, practised aloud, mentally examined (manasanupekkhita), well penetrated with insight. ''
THE TWO REGISTERS
The two registers may then be translated as follows:
vitakka:
1. speculation 2. thought 3. thought formation 4. fixing 5. firm fixing 6. applying the mind 7. right thought formation.
vicara:
1. wandering 2. wandering about 3. repeated wandering about 4. frequenting 5. explorativeness of mind 6. constant examination.
In the first case the complete register is derived from a single Majjhima- nikaya passage and three items occur only there. The others are used fairly widely. For vicara convincing nikaya contexts exist for at least items 3, 4 and 6 of the register.
THE LATER PALI TRADITION
Vitakka and vicara occur in a number of passages in the later canonical literature, but these do not add significantly to our understanding of their meaning. Important information is however to be found in several paracanonical works and in the commentarial literature. These can be taken
in approximate chronological order:
1. Petakopadesa
This is probably the oldest Pali work we have outside the Canon itself. It shows relatively little influence from the abhidhamma, presumably because it is in effect a general commentary on suttanta. Vitakka is defined as the first alighting (of the mind on an object), while vicara is the exploration (vicarana) of what has been understood (by vitakka). It goes on to explain
in terms of the initial perception of someone coming in the distance. Vitakka understands that it is a man or a woman and recognizes colour and shape.
Those thinking (vitakkayanto) further investigate (uttari upaparikkhanti) as to whether the person is virtuous or otherwise, rich or poor -- this is vicara.
The next sentence is corrupt, but appears to associate vitakka with fixing (appeti ) and vicara with exploring and conforming (or following).
There follows a simile in which vitakka is compared to the striving of a bird (on taking flight) while vicara is compared to the subsequent stretching out of the wings (in flight) which does not involve so much effort. The intention appears to be to indicate both the subsequent nature of vicara and its greater subtlety. Later commentaries specify the difference as between the trembling of the mind at the time of first arising and a subsequent calmer mode.
Several subsequent passages are corrupt, but some further points are clear. Another simile is given which contrasts silent recitation with (subsequent) contemplation. In view of what follows the reference is probably to contemplation of the thirty two parts of the body. The two terms are related
to the four discriminations (patisambhida) and to the stages in the development of insight knowledge. In the latter case at least vicara is compared to the higher stages. "For one established in the two, bodily and mental suffering does not arise; bodily and mental happiness does arise. Mental
happiness produced by vitakka in this way is joy (piti); bodily happiness is simply bodily. ''
2. Milindapanha
Some additional points and similes are given in the Milindapanha. These must be quite early as this portion of that work is cited by Buddhaghosa and others with specific mention of Nagasena. Vitakka is given the characteristic (lakkhana) of fixing (appana) and this is explained as similar to a
carpenter fixing a thoroughly prepared piece of wood in a joint. Vicara has the characteristic of pondering over and over (anumajjana -- literally repeated rubbing or threshing). It too is illustrated by a simile. "Just as, O king, a bronze gong, which has been struck, afterwards sounds repeatedly and echoes on. Vitakka, 0 king, should be seen as like the striking; vicara should be seen as like the sounding repeatedly."
3. Vimuttimagga
This work is now extant only in Chinese, but is clearly an important source of the Visuddhimagga. Its account contains most of the material in the Petakopadesa passage with the addition of a version of one of the similes from the Milindapanha and an analysis of vitakka and vicara in terms of
their characteristic, rasa, paccupatthana and padatthana. This last is a standard method of analysing dhammas in the commentarial literature and, as Nanamoli has suggested, is probably in part derived from the sixteen haras of the Petakopadesa.
4. The Works of Buddhaghosa
A detailed treatment of these two terms is found in three of the works attributed to Buddhaghosa. All three are plainly based on a simplification and tidying up of the Vimuttimagga. It is unlikely that Buddhaghosa had direct access to the Petakopadesa; material in his writings derived from that
source is clearly secondhand. In fact even the simile from the Milindapanha is normally cited as a bell, just as in the Vimuttimagga, whereas in the Milinda itself it is a gong. The Dhammasangani commentary gives the bell, but also cites the Milinda directly, either from memory or from a
different version, as there are some variations from the text we have -- most notably the gong is cited as a drum.
Of the three commentaries the Vinaya commentary is fairly close to the Vimuttimagga version with relatively little additional information but omitting some of the less comprehensible ideas from the Petakopadesa.
Probably the most important addition is the new simile of the bee -- vitakka is compared to a bee with its mind following a scent that drops straight onto a lotus while vicara is compared to the bee's wandering over the lotus after it has alighted.
The fullest account is given in the Dhammasangani commentary. The Visuddhimagga gives a rewritten and simplified version of this. Both give a series of new similes. If someone is firmly gripping a dirty metal vessel with one hand and rubbing on (anumajjana) powder or oil with a cloth, then vitakka is like the hand which grips firmly and vicara is like the hand which rubs. If a potter who is making a vessel has spun the wheel with the blow of a stick, then vitakka is like the hand which presses down (to hold the clay) and vicdra is like the hand which moves about here and there (to shape the clay). Similarly vitakka applies (the mind) (abhiniropana) just like a fixed pin which has been fastened in the middle when someone is drawing a circle. Vicara ponders over (anumajjana) (the object) just like the pin which circumscribes the circle.
Elsewhere abhiniropana and anumajjana are given as the respective characteristics of vitakka and vicara. This must come from an old commentarial passage (giving exegesis of the word Tathagata) which describes the characteristics of various dhammas. Closely related to this is a rewritten
version of the Petaka's simile of the bird. Vitakka, which "occurs by way of applying the mind to its object", is compared to the movement of a large bird flying in the sky which takes the air with both wings and then holds its wings steady; for vitakka becomes one-pointed and then enters absorption (appeti). Vicara which "occurs by way of pondering over the object", is compared to the movement of the bird when it swiftly moves its wings in order to take the air; for vicdra ponders over the object. The Dhamma-sangani commentary specifically attributes this simile to the [old] atthakatha.
The same work is the only one to give another simile -- just as one goes up into (drohati) a royal palace depending upon a friend or relative who is a courtier, so the mind takes up (drohati) an object in dependence upon vitakka.
NORTH INDIAN BUDDHIST TEXTS
The Abhidharmakosa-bhasya defines vitarka as cittaudarikata 'grossness of mind' and vicara as cittasuksmata 'subtlety of mind'. The Abhidharmvatara gives a similar definition which must be fairly old, since it appears also in the Jnanaprasthana - one of the latest of the Sarvastivadin canonical texts -- and in the Abhidharmahrdaya. This application of the distinction between gross and subtle does not appear in the Pali tradition before the Vimuttimagga and is therefore probably of Sarvastivadin origin.
Noticeably, whereas the Vimuttimagga probably gave it in the form 'grossness of mind, etc.', Buddhaghosa refers simply to grossness, etc. This is significant in the light of the discussion in the Abhidharmakosa-bhasya, where Vasubandhu criticizes the above definition. As he points out, gross-
ness and subtlety are relational terms (in abhidharma) and should extend as far as the highest level of existence (i.e. the bhavagra). In other words each dhyana or attainment is subtle in relation to the one below and gross in relation to the one above -- a process extending to the fourth formless
jhana. The intended implication is that this is incompatible with the canonical account where neither vitarka nor vicara are present in the higher dhyanas. The Pali tradition avoids this problem by making vitakka and vicara gross and subtle in relation to one another rather than the causes of
the mind's grossness and subtlety in general.
The Abhidharmavatara and the Abhidharmadipa declare that vitarka is the cause of the activity of the five (sensory) consciousnesses which are gross, while vicara is favourable to the activity of mind consciousness (manovijnana). They also describe vitarka as differentiating the type of sensory feature (visayanimittaprakaravikalpin) involved and as having its activity stirred up by the wind of labelling (samjna) i.e. it is stimulated by the constant flow of labelled sensations. Yogacarinauthors give definitions which are slightly more reminiscent of the Pali Abhidhammapitaka and the
Petakopadesa. It suffices to quote the Abhidharmasamuccaya:
What is vitarka? It is a mental murmuring which searches about (for the object) in
dependence either upon volition (cetana) or upon understanding (prajna). But that is
grossness of mind. What is vicara? It is a mental murmuring which investigates (the object)
in dependence either upon volition or upon understanding. But that is subtlety of mind.
STAGES OF SAMADHI IN THE YOGA-SUTRA
The parallelism between the description of samprajnata-samadhi in the Yoga-sutra and the traditional descriptions of the rupa-jhanas in Buddhist sources has long been noted. Careful examination of the text of the Yoga- sutra (Yogas) and its bhasya suggests that the resemblance is even closer than has always been appreciated. Two passages are relevant for this purpose. The first of these (Yogas i 17) reads:
vitarka-vicaranandasmita-rupanugamat samprajnatah.
It is called [the cessation ] which clearly comprehends [its object] as a result of being accompanied by forms of vitarka, vicara, bliss and a sense of I.
The commentators are agreed that this indicates four distinct stages, which may be tabulated, after the bhasya
Such a series poses no problems and is, as we shall see, in good agreement with the Buddhist sources.
The bhasya to this passage defines vitarka as: cittasyalambane sthula abhogah. "gross directing of the mind to an object." Vicara is correspondingly subtle. This is quite close to some of the Buddhist definitions we have seen and strikingly different to the more typical definition of the later
commentaries which sees grossness and subtlety in terms of the object of the mind rather than as a feature of the mind itself. However this should not be overstated. It is certainly a fundamental assumption of both abhi-dharma and Samkhya-yoga that higher states of consciousness are both
themselves more subtle and possess subtler objects. The point is rather that in adapting material of ultimately Buddhist origin the Yoga tradition tends to shift it from the rather psychological bias of abhidharma towards a more cosmological orientation.
In fact this definition in terms of the subtlety of the object is in part derived from a passage later in the same chapter of the Yoga-sutra which we must now turn:
sabdartha-jnana-vikalpaih, samkirn sa-vitarka samapattih. [42]
smrti-parisuddhau sva-rupa sunyevartha-matra-nirbhasa
nirvitarkd [43]
etayaiva sa-vicara nirvicara ca suksma-visaya vyakhyata [44]
suksma-visayatvam calinga-paryavasanam [45]
42. The attainment with vitarka is associated with concepts arising from knowledge of the meanings of words.
43. When mindfulness (smrti) is pure [the attainment[ without vitarka reveals only the object and is as if empty of its own nature.
44. By this has been explained [the attainment] with vicara, whereas [the attainment[ without vicara may be explained as having subtle objects.
45. Moreover the sphere of subtle objects ends with that which has no distinguishing marks [i.e. prakrti].
The commentators are a little misleading here. Their discussion is in terms of the savitarka/nirvitarka, savicara/nirvicara terminology, creating a new set of four samapattis. If this is taken literally, it creates problems in reconciling the new set with the version from the bhasya set
In the light of the Buddhist information that interpretation is almost certainly correct. Yet there is no place for a nirvitarka-samadhi distinct from savicara-samadhi.
According to the commentaries to i 44 savicara- and nirvicara- (samapatti) are suksma-visaya; savitarka- and nirvitarka- are sthala-visaya.
This can be interpreted as a single pair -- these last are gross and all higher stages of sabija-samadhi are subtle. However, on further investigation an alternative solution appears possible. The redactor of the Yoga-sutra may rather have been thinking in terms of a series of stages. A is gross in relation to the subtlety of B, which is itself gross in relation to the subtlety of C, yet again gross in relation to D, and so on.
In the light of the general nature of this type of yogic practice, this second explanation seems much more plausible. Some examples of this kind of usage are cited in the Visuddhimagga from traditional sources. Here the first jhana is gross (oldrika) where the second is subtle (sukhuma), but
the second is gross where the third is subtle and the third is gross where the fourth is subtle. Many other examples could be cited from abhidhammic contexts.
It should also be mentioned that the influence of the Buddhist account of the four dhyanas is already evident in one passage of the Mahabharata, as pointed out by V. M. Bedekar
BUDDHIST SOURCES
It is clear that at the time of the formation of many of the classical abhidhamma schools in the second and third centuries B.C., several different lists of factors of samadhi were extant in different suttas. By far the most important of these was the list contained in the standard formula for the
four jhanas:
1. First jhana -- savitakkam. , savicaram. , vivekajam. , pitisukham. ;
2. Second jhana -- ajjhattam sampasadanam. , cetaso ekodibhavam. ,
samadhijam. , pitisukham. ;
3. Third jhana -- upekkhako viharati, sato ca sampajano sukha~ ca
kayena patisam, vedeti, upekkhako, satima sukhavihari;
4. Fourth jhana - adukkham. , asukham. , upekkhasatiparisuddhi.
The list given in the Abhidharmakosa differs only for the fourth dhyana, where it has: 1. neutral feeling; 2. upeksaparisuddhi; 3. smrtiparisuddhi; 4. samadhi
Also in early sources was a division of samadhi into three kinds
1. With vitakka and vicara;
2. Without vitakka but with vicara;
3. With neither vitakka nor vicara.
The list posed problems for systematic analysis, as the second kind cannot be precisely equated with any one of the four jhanas. Early schools resolved the probem in one of two different ways. The Sarvastivadinand others introduced an intermediate stage or dhyanantara between the first
and second dhyanas.
Another ancient list divided similar material into three sections: .
1 Samadhi with vitakka and vicara, with only vicara, with neither;
2 Samadhi with and without joy;
3 Samadhi with sata or with equipoise.
It seems clear that two distinct stages are to be found in the sources. In the early material we find a less standardized situation with the experience of samadhi at the centre of the stage and the classification into types more varied and perhaps more experiential in nature. Only later arises the
attempt to harmonize this material into a single list, as is done in the Sarvastivadin~ tradition. In this respect the Theravadin device of an alternate set of five jhanas preserves more faithfully an earlier variety
IN CONCLUSION
For the canonical abhidhamma, vitakka at its weakest results in a tendency to speculate and fix upon ideas. More strongly developed it is the ability to apply the mind to something and to fix it upon a (meditative) object. Vicara at its weakest is simply the tendency of the mind to wander. More highly developed it is the ability to explore and examine an object. In one way we
can say that vitakka is 'thinking of' something, whereas vicara is 'thinking about' that same thing, but in fact the latter is probably intended to refer more to what we would now describe as the mind's associative faculty.
A samadhi with vicara but without vitakka is a state of mind in which the mind freely associates about a meditative object without deliberately thinking of anything specific. It must obviously be preceded by one with vitakka. If it were not, then the mind would simply wander to any kind of
object and soon lose (or never acquire) the kind of focus and unification required for samddhi. The situation is different once a samadhi with vitakka is sufficiently strongly developed. Then vitakka can drop away because that focus is well enough established not to need further rein-
forcement.
The later texts do not depart radically from this understanding. Such differences as we do find are simply due to the need to conform to the requirements of theory. For the Vaibhasikas and Buddhaghosa this means conformity to strict momentariness and precise definition as distinct
dharmas. For the Yoga-sutra, and even more for its commentaries, the stages of samadhi need to be related to the levels of Samkhya evolution.(25 levels)
Such notions, although in themselves of great interest, create an artificial appearance of difference between the two traditions which is probably unjustified. It suffices to note the marked difference in English renderings of these two words in translations from Sanskrit and from Pali.
This is exacerbated by the, no doubt inevitable, tendency to treat the Buddhist and Brahmanical traditions as if they operated in complete isolation from one another. In fact it is clear that each has both influenced and been influenced by the other in numerous ways. Buddhist origins are
obviously from a milieu in which both orthodox and heterodox Brahmanical ideas and practices were ubiquitous. Not surprisingly influences from and reactions to Vedic traditions pervade the early Buddhist texts. Subsequently, after Buddhism's rapid growth and early creative period, influences are for a while mainly, but not exclusively, from Buddhism to Brahmanism. After the formation of classical Hinduism and during the gradual decline in mportance of Buddhism and Jainism which took place from the Gupta period onwards, it is clear that Buddhism borrows much more than it
contributes. No doubt this is what one would expect, but it seems surprisingly little recognised.
The present issue is a case in point. Influences from Buddhist sources (to my mind, very frequent) on the Yoga-sutra are often minimized or ignored. In the particular example with which we are concerned here the Yoga-sutra is often seen as having a distinctive analysis of the stages of samadhi. I think this is a mistake, partly due to focussing on later Buddhist literature rather than on the canonical account. The reason for this is possibly the fact that the canonical material often needs to be approached through the early abhidhamma literature which is less studied than the sutta material.
The most important source for this purpose is the first book of the Abhidhamma-pitaka, the Dhammasangani. This gives mnemonic registers for both vitakka and for vicara.
VITAKKA IN THE DHAMMASANGANI
The dhammuddesa for vitakka in the Dhammasangani is as follows:
1. takka 2. vitakka 3. sankappa 4. appana 5. vyappana 6. cetaso abhiniropana 7. samma-satikappa
Unusually for the Dhammasangani the complete register for vitakka is already to be found in a single location in the nikayas, namely in the Mahdcattarisaka-sutta. This discourse is an abhidhamma-style analysis of the Eightfold Path. In fact the sutta reads suspiciously as if it were itself based on the Dhammasangani, but if so it is difficult to explain why no additional sources can be found for some of the terms. We must then assume that this sutta is the source of this Dhammasangani register and presumably of much of the methodology of the Dhammasangani, but it is
surprising that no additions have been made. Perhaps the list was already too established in the tradition to allow of amendment. It would be interesting to know if the corresponding sutta preserved in Chinese contains the same passage.
Taking the terms of the register in order:
1. Takka
This occurs in a number of contexts in the earlier literature, but can always be rendered by 'speculation'. The more specific later meaning of (systematic) logic would be anachronistic, while the translation sometimes given of doubt' is incorrect for the nikAyas. The context which the Dhammasangani or its source probably has in mind is one which occurs in the Brahmajala- sutta
some mendicant or brahmana speculative (takkin) and inclined to investigation
(vimamsin). He says that which is beaten out by speculation, that which is attended by
investigation ....
In the Anguttara-nikaya we find the statement that one should not believe anything by reason of speculation (takka-hetu). Another important sutta formula also occurs in the Brahmajala-sutta:
There are, monks, still further truths (dhamma) -- deep, hard to see, hard to comprehend,peaceful, excellent, outside the sphere of speculation (atakkawacara), subtle, (only) to be known by the wise -- which the Tathagata makes known after having himself comprehended them by his higher knowledge and after having directly experienced them.
Similar passages occur in several contexts concemed with the truth assessment of views or wisdom. Finally in the canonical accounts of the request of Brahma Sahampati the same set of epithets is applied to the dhamma which the Buddha has reached.
To go by the position of right view as last in the list it would seem that an ascending order is intended. If so, the implication is probably meant to be that speculation is a rather weak and inferior form of thinking. Certainly the commentaries have little difficulty in interpreting these contexts in terms of their understanding of vitakka as the fixing of the mind on an object of thought or sense. For them speculation is merely a form of weak vitakka whose object is constantly changing. So the term takka-pariyahata recalls the commentarial definition of the function (rasa) of vitakka as ahanana- pariyahanana: "for by means of this the yogavacara makes the object struck
by vitakka, struck around by vitakka". ~ In the present context it would be easy to interpret takka-pariyahata as meaning that the speculative complex of ideas which arises in weak mentality requires application of the mind from many different angles.
2. Vitakka
The word vitakka occurs frequently in definitions and explanations of samadhi or jhana, but is not explained in that context. Apart from this I have collected about forty other passages from the four nikayas; there are probably some more. It is clear that it can always be rendered as 'thinking'
or 'thought', although it is unlikely that this would have the same significance as the concept does for us today. Of course this is even more unlikely among a community containing many contemplatives. It may therefore be the case that thought was already pictured as essentially the activity of bringing different objects into firm focus before the mind's eye -- be those objects thoughts or mental pictures. Such a view of the matter would after all be very natural to people with a very highly developed eidetic faculty.
Apart from the above-mentioned accounts of jhana and the like, vitakka occurs most frequently in passages referring to the three skilful thoughts or the three unskilful thoughts or all six together i.e. thought connected with desire or with desirelessness, with aversion or with non-aversion and with
cruelty or non-cruelty. Less commonly it is found as part of a series.
(There are of course many similar sequences which do not include vitakka at all.) In a number of places it means simply thought or thinking in a fairly general sense. A few less usual contexts connected with samadhi can be added. Also we are told that vitakka and vicdra are the activities which fashion speech: "when one has thought and examined (vicaretva), afterwards one utters speech. ''is There is also one discourse which applies the genre of riddle and answer to the subject of sankappa-vitakka. It is clear from this and one other passage that sakappa and vitakka are not always identical in meaning.
3. Sankappa
This should perhaps mean thought formation rather than thought, but not surprisingly it does not in practice seem greatly differentiated in its use from vitakka. For example, in a number of contexts the same division into three unskilful and three skilful types is found. In a general sense of
'thinking' we find 'remembering thoughts' (sara-sankappa) used a number of times in ways obviously related to the usage of the three unskilful thoughts) Several times we have expressions like 'due to that' (e.g. fame and gain) 'he is happy and his purpose is fulfilled (paripunna-sankappa)'.
This appears to be the only context where the translation 'purpose' is required, although it is a possible alternative in some cases, and may perhaps be appropriate in some passages where sankappa and vitakka are juxtaposed or differentiated.
Finally the use of sankappa as part of a series needs to be mentioned.This is closely parallel to similar uses of vitakka. It is especially frequent to juxtapose sanna with either vitakka or sankappa. It is emphasized that sanna arises dependent upon the sense objects and corresponding sankappa
arises dependent upon sanna, but the converse is not the case. This seems to mean that only if there is say a visual stimulus (rupa-dhatu) can there be recognition of the visual object (i.e. rupa-sanna); only if a visual object has been recognised can there be thoughts about what has been seen (rupa- sankappa). The precise degree of introspective acuteness envisaged is unclear.
4. Appana
This occurs only in the one nikaya ontext previously mentioned. In commentarial usage it signifies the absorption accompanying strong concentration. The word may already occur in this sense in a doubtful passage in the Petakopadesa, a treatise which may not be long after the early abhi-
dhamma works in date. In the nikayaas verbal forms of appeti occur only in the sense of 'to flow into (e.g. the sea)' < apyeti. There are, however, a number of Vinaya passages where it appears to mean 'to fix' < arpayati. The same derivation is implied in Vibhanga passages which use it in the sense of 'made to go away' i.e. 'removed' This is the standard etymology in the later tradition, both in Pali and in Buddhist Sanskrit, no doubt rightly. It is perhaps just possible that the meaning of appana in the Dhammasangani register is influenced by the sense of 'flowing into' but on
the whole it seems adequate to take it as meaning 'fixing'.
5. Vyappana
This also appears only in the Mahacattarisaka-sutta as far as the nikayas are concerned, but vyappita is found in the same Vibhanga context mentioned above in the sense of 'completely gone'. The commentary is no doubt right to interpret this as either augmentation with a prefix for stylistic
adornment or an intensified form of appana. So it should probably be translated as 'firm fixing'
6. Cetaso abhiniropana
This too does not appear elsewhere in the nikayas. It is usually taken as deriving from abhi + ni + causative of RUH -- literally, 'transferring the mind onto (an object)'. This is probably correct, but it is worth noting that BHSD gives a form abhinirupayati, which suggests an alternative derivation
from RUP. It is this which must be intended by the Netti-pakarana (abhiniropeti) and the Petakopadesa (niropayitabba) in their explanation of nirutti. In the latter case it can be translated: 'should be given this form'.
This would offer an alternative rendering for the Dhammasangani register of 'mental forming' or 'mental defining'. However, abhiniropana occurs in the Patisambhiddmagga as the standard epithet for samma-sankappa and also for vitakka. It is also found in one passage in which it defines the
activity of resultant mind element; here it must refer to the fixing of a sense object in the mind? ~ Although the date of the Patisambhiddamagga is not known, it must be earlier than the latest of the canonical abhidhamma works.
7. Samma-sankappa
As the second link in the Eightfold Path this has an important place. The nikayas define it in exactly the same way as the three skilful vitakkas or sankappas. Likewise miccha-sankappa is defined in exactly the same way as the corresponding types of skilful thought. So a translation by 'purpose' can be ruled out -- vitakka cannot mean purpose. Moreover there are contexts in which such a meaning is hardly possible:
But although there really is another world, he has the view that there is no other world --
that is his wrong view; but although there really is another world, he forms the thought
(sankappeti) that there is no other world -- that is his wrong thought (miccha-sankappa);
but although there really is another world, he utters speech to the effect that there is no
other world -- that is his wrong speech.
Here the sequence is clear. If one's way of seeing is flawed, then the way in which one's thought will take form in the understanding will be flawed and likewise the way in which one expresses that understanding in speech.
VICARA IN THE DHAMMASANGANI
The dhammuddesa for vicara in the Dhammasangani is as follows:
1. cara 2. vicara 3. anuvicara 4. upavicara 5. cittassa anusandhanata 6. anupekkhanata
Again taking them in order:
1. Cara
This occurs in a few passages in opposition to vihara -- 'wandering' as opposed to 'abiding in one place', but such general uses do not seem very relevant to the Dhammasangani. It is possible that some usage which I have not been able to identify is referred to here -- perhaps cara as the
second member of some compound. More probably it is used here simply to indicate a mobile aspect of thought -- its 'wandering'; this would be appropriate in opposition to 'fixing' as the chief feature of vitakka.
2. Vicara
Literally interpreted, this might mean either 'constant wandering' or 'that which causes the (mind) to wander in different directions'. In practice it almost always occurs in conjunction with vitakka, while in the nikayas vicareti is usually found with vitakketi. This is nearly always in contexts associated with jhana or samddhi. At least once, however, it is part of a list.
3. Anuvicara
Although the noun does not occur in the nikayas, the verb anuvicareti is found in a few passages, always preceded by anuvitakketi. This would of course literally mean 'causing to explore', but it is clear from the Majjhima- nikaya passages that the use of these two verbs together is intended merely to indicate the repeated application of vitakka and vicara; anu is here simply a prefix indicating repetition. The Anguttara-nikaya usage is similar, although it almost always occurs there in the phrase:.., dhammam cetasa anuvitakketi anuvicareti manasanupekkhati '... applies vitakka and
vicara with the mind to the dhamma, mentally examines the dhamma.
4. Upavicara
The verb upavicarati (used in close conjunction with the noun) means 'to frequent'. The noun means that which the mind frequents and hence a sphere of activity or range of interest. Its inclusion in the Dhammasangani register is obviously based upon the formula sometimes referred to as the eighteen manopavicara:
"After seeing a visible object with the eye one frequents a visible object which is the basis for pleasant feeling" -- the number eighteen is reached by utilizing three types of feeling in conjunction with six senses. This list is found in contexts concerned with the same kind
of process that we find described in stages five to eight of the dependent origination formula. So it is closely related to the use of vitakka and vicara is part of a series.
5. Cittassa anusandhanata
This may mean either 'explorativeness of mind' or 'a state of constant uniting of the mind'. The former seems the most likely of the various senses of the Sanskrit verb, while the latter is the interpretation of the commentary: "it is a state of constant uniting of the mind because it constantly
unites the mind to the object and holds it, just as one joins an arrow to the bowstring and holds it there. '' This is not impossible, but in view of the sixth item of the register, investigation or exploration seems more likely.
Only a verbal form occurs in the nikayas and only in one doubtful context.
6. Anupekkhanata
This means 'careful examination' or 'constant examination'. Anupekkhati occurs in the nikayas in two formulae. One was cited above under upavicara. The other, which is much the more frequent, may be translated:
"dhammas are heard much, remembered, practised aloud, mentally examined (manasanupekkhita), well penetrated with insight. ''
THE TWO REGISTERS
The two registers may then be translated as follows:
vitakka:
1. speculation 2. thought 3. thought formation 4. fixing 5. firm fixing 6. applying the mind 7. right thought formation.
vicara:
1. wandering 2. wandering about 3. repeated wandering about 4. frequenting 5. explorativeness of mind 6. constant examination.
In the first case the complete register is derived from a single Majjhima- nikaya passage and three items occur only there. The others are used fairly widely. For vicara convincing nikaya contexts exist for at least items 3, 4 and 6 of the register.
THE LATER PALI TRADITION
Vitakka and vicara occur in a number of passages in the later canonical literature, but these do not add significantly to our understanding of their meaning. Important information is however to be found in several paracanonical works and in the commentarial literature. These can be taken
in approximate chronological order:
1. Petakopadesa
This is probably the oldest Pali work we have outside the Canon itself. It shows relatively little influence from the abhidhamma, presumably because it is in effect a general commentary on suttanta. Vitakka is defined as the first alighting (of the mind on an object), while vicara is the exploration (vicarana) of what has been understood (by vitakka). It goes on to explain
in terms of the initial perception of someone coming in the distance. Vitakka understands that it is a man or a woman and recognizes colour and shape.
Those thinking (vitakkayanto) further investigate (uttari upaparikkhanti) as to whether the person is virtuous or otherwise, rich or poor -- this is vicara.
The next sentence is corrupt, but appears to associate vitakka with fixing (appeti ) and vicara with exploring and conforming (or following).
There follows a simile in which vitakka is compared to the striving of a bird (on taking flight) while vicara is compared to the subsequent stretching out of the wings (in flight) which does not involve so much effort. The intention appears to be to indicate both the subsequent nature of vicara and its greater subtlety. Later commentaries specify the difference as between the trembling of the mind at the time of first arising and a subsequent calmer mode.
Several subsequent passages are corrupt, but some further points are clear. Another simile is given which contrasts silent recitation with (subsequent) contemplation. In view of what follows the reference is probably to contemplation of the thirty two parts of the body. The two terms are related
to the four discriminations (patisambhida) and to the stages in the development of insight knowledge. In the latter case at least vicara is compared to the higher stages. "For one established in the two, bodily and mental suffering does not arise; bodily and mental happiness does arise. Mental
happiness produced by vitakka in this way is joy (piti); bodily happiness is simply bodily. ''
2. Milindapanha
Some additional points and similes are given in the Milindapanha. These must be quite early as this portion of that work is cited by Buddhaghosa and others with specific mention of Nagasena. Vitakka is given the characteristic (lakkhana) of fixing (appana) and this is explained as similar to a
carpenter fixing a thoroughly prepared piece of wood in a joint. Vicara has the characteristic of pondering over and over (anumajjana -- literally repeated rubbing or threshing). It too is illustrated by a simile. "Just as, O king, a bronze gong, which has been struck, afterwards sounds repeatedly and echoes on. Vitakka, 0 king, should be seen as like the striking; vicara should be seen as like the sounding repeatedly."
3. Vimuttimagga
This work is now extant only in Chinese, but is clearly an important source of the Visuddhimagga. Its account contains most of the material in the Petakopadesa passage with the addition of a version of one of the similes from the Milindapanha and an analysis of vitakka and vicara in terms of
their characteristic, rasa, paccupatthana and padatthana. This last is a standard method of analysing dhammas in the commentarial literature and, as Nanamoli has suggested, is probably in part derived from the sixteen haras of the Petakopadesa.
4. The Works of Buddhaghosa
A detailed treatment of these two terms is found in three of the works attributed to Buddhaghosa. All three are plainly based on a simplification and tidying up of the Vimuttimagga. It is unlikely that Buddhaghosa had direct access to the Petakopadesa; material in his writings derived from that
source is clearly secondhand. In fact even the simile from the Milindapanha is normally cited as a bell, just as in the Vimuttimagga, whereas in the Milinda itself it is a gong. The Dhammasangani commentary gives the bell, but also cites the Milinda directly, either from memory or from a
different version, as there are some variations from the text we have -- most notably the gong is cited as a drum.
Of the three commentaries the Vinaya commentary is fairly close to the Vimuttimagga version with relatively little additional information but omitting some of the less comprehensible ideas from the Petakopadesa.
Probably the most important addition is the new simile of the bee -- vitakka is compared to a bee with its mind following a scent that drops straight onto a lotus while vicara is compared to the bee's wandering over the lotus after it has alighted.
The fullest account is given in the Dhammasangani commentary. The Visuddhimagga gives a rewritten and simplified version of this. Both give a series of new similes. If someone is firmly gripping a dirty metal vessel with one hand and rubbing on (anumajjana) powder or oil with a cloth, then vitakka is like the hand which grips firmly and vicara is like the hand which rubs. If a potter who is making a vessel has spun the wheel with the blow of a stick, then vitakka is like the hand which presses down (to hold the clay) and vicdra is like the hand which moves about here and there (to shape the clay). Similarly vitakka applies (the mind) (abhiniropana) just like a fixed pin which has been fastened in the middle when someone is drawing a circle. Vicara ponders over (anumajjana) (the object) just like the pin which circumscribes the circle.
Elsewhere abhiniropana and anumajjana are given as the respective characteristics of vitakka and vicara. This must come from an old commentarial passage (giving exegesis of the word Tathagata) which describes the characteristics of various dhammas. Closely related to this is a rewritten
version of the Petaka's simile of the bird. Vitakka, which "occurs by way of applying the mind to its object", is compared to the movement of a large bird flying in the sky which takes the air with both wings and then holds its wings steady; for vitakka becomes one-pointed and then enters absorption (appeti). Vicara which "occurs by way of pondering over the object", is compared to the movement of the bird when it swiftly moves its wings in order to take the air; for vicdra ponders over the object. The Dhamma-sangani commentary specifically attributes this simile to the [old] atthakatha.
The same work is the only one to give another simile -- just as one goes up into (drohati) a royal palace depending upon a friend or relative who is a courtier, so the mind takes up (drohati) an object in dependence upon vitakka.
NORTH INDIAN BUDDHIST TEXTS
The Abhidharmakosa-bhasya defines vitarka as cittaudarikata 'grossness of mind' and vicara as cittasuksmata 'subtlety of mind'. The Abhidharmvatara gives a similar definition which must be fairly old, since it appears also in the Jnanaprasthana - one of the latest of the Sarvastivadin canonical texts -- and in the Abhidharmahrdaya. This application of the distinction between gross and subtle does not appear in the Pali tradition before the Vimuttimagga and is therefore probably of Sarvastivadin origin.
Noticeably, whereas the Vimuttimagga probably gave it in the form 'grossness of mind, etc.', Buddhaghosa refers simply to grossness, etc. This is significant in the light of the discussion in the Abhidharmakosa-bhasya, where Vasubandhu criticizes the above definition. As he points out, gross-
ness and subtlety are relational terms (in abhidharma) and should extend as far as the highest level of existence (i.e. the bhavagra). In other words each dhyana or attainment is subtle in relation to the one below and gross in relation to the one above -- a process extending to the fourth formless
jhana. The intended implication is that this is incompatible with the canonical account where neither vitarka nor vicara are present in the higher dhyanas. The Pali tradition avoids this problem by making vitakka and vicara gross and subtle in relation to one another rather than the causes of
the mind's grossness and subtlety in general.
The Abhidharmavatara and the Abhidharmadipa declare that vitarka is the cause of the activity of the five (sensory) consciousnesses which are gross, while vicara is favourable to the activity of mind consciousness (manovijnana). They also describe vitarka as differentiating the type of sensory feature (visayanimittaprakaravikalpin) involved and as having its activity stirred up by the wind of labelling (samjna) i.e. it is stimulated by the constant flow of labelled sensations. Yogacarinauthors give definitions which are slightly more reminiscent of the Pali Abhidhammapitaka and the
Petakopadesa. It suffices to quote the Abhidharmasamuccaya:
What is vitarka? It is a mental murmuring which searches about (for the object) in
dependence either upon volition (cetana) or upon understanding (prajna). But that is
grossness of mind. What is vicara? It is a mental murmuring which investigates (the object)
in dependence either upon volition or upon understanding. But that is subtlety of mind.
STAGES OF SAMADHI IN THE YOGA-SUTRA
The parallelism between the description of samprajnata-samadhi in the Yoga-sutra and the traditional descriptions of the rupa-jhanas in Buddhist sources has long been noted. Careful examination of the text of the Yoga- sutra (Yogas) and its bhasya suggests that the resemblance is even closer than has always been appreciated. Two passages are relevant for this purpose. The first of these (Yogas i 17) reads:
vitarka-vicaranandasmita-rupanugamat samprajnatah.
It is called [the cessation ] which clearly comprehends [its object] as a result of being accompanied by forms of vitarka, vicara, bliss and a sense of I.
The commentators are agreed that this indicates four distinct stages, which may be tabulated, after the bhasya
Such a series poses no problems and is, as we shall see, in good agreement with the Buddhist sources.
The bhasya to this passage defines vitarka as: cittasyalambane sthula abhogah. "gross directing of the mind to an object." Vicara is correspondingly subtle. This is quite close to some of the Buddhist definitions we have seen and strikingly different to the more typical definition of the later
commentaries which sees grossness and subtlety in terms of the object of the mind rather than as a feature of the mind itself. However this should not be overstated. It is certainly a fundamental assumption of both abhi-dharma and Samkhya-yoga that higher states of consciousness are both
themselves more subtle and possess subtler objects. The point is rather that in adapting material of ultimately Buddhist origin the Yoga tradition tends to shift it from the rather psychological bias of abhidharma towards a more cosmological orientation.
In fact this definition in terms of the subtlety of the object is in part derived from a passage later in the same chapter of the Yoga-sutra which we must now turn:
sabdartha-jnana-vikalpaih, samkirn sa-vitarka samapattih. [42]
smrti-parisuddhau sva-rupa sunyevartha-matra-nirbhasa
nirvitarkd [43]
etayaiva sa-vicara nirvicara ca suksma-visaya vyakhyata [44]
suksma-visayatvam calinga-paryavasanam [45]
42. The attainment with vitarka is associated with concepts arising from knowledge of the meanings of words.
43. When mindfulness (smrti) is pure [the attainment[ without vitarka reveals only the object and is as if empty of its own nature.
44. By this has been explained [the attainment] with vicara, whereas [the attainment[ without vicara may be explained as having subtle objects.
45. Moreover the sphere of subtle objects ends with that which has no distinguishing marks [i.e. prakrti].
The commentators are a little misleading here. Their discussion is in terms of the savitarka/nirvitarka, savicara/nirvicara terminology, creating a new set of four samapattis. If this is taken literally, it creates problems in reconciling the new set with the version from the bhasya set
In the light of the Buddhist information that interpretation is almost certainly correct. Yet there is no place for a nirvitarka-samadhi distinct from savicara-samadhi.
According to the commentaries to i 44 savicara- and nirvicara- (samapatti) are suksma-visaya; savitarka- and nirvitarka- are sthala-visaya.
This can be interpreted as a single pair -- these last are gross and all higher stages of sabija-samadhi are subtle. However, on further investigation an alternative solution appears possible. The redactor of the Yoga-sutra may rather have been thinking in terms of a series of stages. A is gross in relation to the subtlety of B, which is itself gross in relation to the subtlety of C, yet again gross in relation to D, and so on.
In the light of the general nature of this type of yogic practice, this second explanation seems much more plausible. Some examples of this kind of usage are cited in the Visuddhimagga from traditional sources. Here the first jhana is gross (oldrika) where the second is subtle (sukhuma), but
the second is gross where the third is subtle and the third is gross where the fourth is subtle. Many other examples could be cited from abhidhammic contexts.
It should also be mentioned that the influence of the Buddhist account of the four dhyanas is already evident in one passage of the Mahabharata, as pointed out by V. M. Bedekar
BUDDHIST SOURCES
It is clear that at the time of the formation of many of the classical abhidhamma schools in the second and third centuries B.C., several different lists of factors of samadhi were extant in different suttas. By far the most important of these was the list contained in the standard formula for the
four jhanas:
1. First jhana -- savitakkam. , savicaram. , vivekajam. , pitisukham. ;
2. Second jhana -- ajjhattam sampasadanam. , cetaso ekodibhavam. ,
samadhijam. , pitisukham. ;
3. Third jhana -- upekkhako viharati, sato ca sampajano sukha~ ca
kayena patisam, vedeti, upekkhako, satima sukhavihari;
4. Fourth jhana - adukkham. , asukham. , upekkhasatiparisuddhi.
The list given in the Abhidharmakosa differs only for the fourth dhyana, where it has: 1. neutral feeling; 2. upeksaparisuddhi; 3. smrtiparisuddhi; 4. samadhi
Also in early sources was a division of samadhi into three kinds
1. With vitakka and vicara;
2. Without vitakka but with vicara;
3. With neither vitakka nor vicara.
The list posed problems for systematic analysis, as the second kind cannot be precisely equated with any one of the four jhanas. Early schools resolved the probem in one of two different ways. The Sarvastivadinand others introduced an intermediate stage or dhyanantara between the first
and second dhyanas.
Another ancient list divided similar material into three sections: .
1 Samadhi with vitakka and vicara, with only vicara, with neither;
2 Samadhi with and without joy;
3 Samadhi with sata or with equipoise.
It seems clear that two distinct stages are to be found in the sources. In the early material we find a less standardized situation with the experience of samadhi at the centre of the stage and the classification into types more varied and perhaps more experiential in nature. Only later arises the
attempt to harmonize this material into a single list, as is done in the Sarvastivadin~ tradition. In this respect the Theravadin device of an alternate set of five jhanas preserves more faithfully an earlier variety
IN CONCLUSION
For the canonical abhidhamma, vitakka at its weakest results in a tendency to speculate and fix upon ideas. More strongly developed it is the ability to apply the mind to something and to fix it upon a (meditative) object. Vicara at its weakest is simply the tendency of the mind to wander. More highly developed it is the ability to explore and examine an object. In one way we
can say that vitakka is 'thinking of' something, whereas vicara is 'thinking about' that same thing, but in fact the latter is probably intended to refer more to what we would now describe as the mind's associative faculty.
A samadhi with vicara but without vitakka is a state of mind in which the mind freely associates about a meditative object without deliberately thinking of anything specific. It must obviously be preceded by one with vitakka. If it were not, then the mind would simply wander to any kind of
object and soon lose (or never acquire) the kind of focus and unification required for samddhi. The situation is different once a samadhi with vitakka is sufficiently strongly developed. Then vitakka can drop away because that focus is well enough established not to need further rein-
forcement.
The later texts do not depart radically from this understanding. Such differences as we do find are simply due to the need to conform to the requirements of theory. For the Vaibhasikas and Buddhaghosa this means conformity to strict momentariness and precise definition as distinct
dharmas. For the Yoga-sutra, and even more for its commentaries, the stages of samadhi need to be related to the levels of Samkhya evolution.(25 levels)
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