Early Meanings of Dependent-Origination
Dependent-origination, possibly the most fundamental Buddhist philosophical principle, is generally understood as a description of all that exists. Mental as well as physical phenomena are believed to come into being only in relation to, and conditioned by, other phenomena. This paper argues that such an understanding of pratı¯tya-samutpa¯da is mistaken with regard to the earlier meanings of the concept. Rather than relating to all that exists, dependent-origination related originally only to processes of mental conditioning. It was an analysis of the self, not of reality, embedded in the Upanis:adic search for the atman. The teaching also possessed important ontological implications regarding the nature of the relation between consciousness and reality. These implications suggest that rather than things being conditioned by other things, they are actually conditioned by consciousness
Dependent-origination is widely acknowledged by students of all schools of Buddhism as one of Buddhism’s most fundamental principles. The principle that things arise in dependence on their conditions is understood to be a central aspect of Buddhist philosophy, psychology and soteriology. Nonetheless, as will become evident in the following pages, we still lack a clear definition of what dependent-origination actually means. Different understandings, representing distinct uses of the concept by numerous Buddhist teachers and schools, are grouped together so as to cloud our view of the development of the teaching. This paper intends to cut through the later layers of these developments so as to reveal the earlier, perhaps original uses of the concept. The prevalent understanding of prat¯ıtya-samutpa¯da is that all factors of existence depend on other factors in order to exist. Nothing exists on its own, no-thing possesses independent identity. This principle is said to apply to all mental as well as material phenomena. In the famous words of the suttas: ‘‘When this is, that is. Once this arises, that arises. When this is not, that is not. Once this ceases, that ceases.’’ Imasmim: sati idam: hoti, imass’ uppa¯da¯, idam: uppajjati. Imasmim: asati, idam: na hoti, imassa nirodha¯ idam: nirujjhati. In the following pages I will address the question of the initial meaning of this formula. Commonly, the formula is read as a characterization of all that exists. This view is adhered to by the majority of modern scholars writing on the subject. Specifically, it is accepted by authors who discuss early Buddhist doctrine. Many agree that Buddhism is not an ontological teaching, or was not so initially, and that its doctrinal emphasis is on the workings of the mind.1 Nonetheless, it is generally believed that the Buddha described all things as pat:iccasamuppanna—dependent arisings.2 A good example is Steven Collins’ classic Selfless Persons: In considering the teaching of dependent origination, which Buddhism used to oppose Brahmanism on the conceptual level, it is crucially important to distinguish between the general idea of conditionality, and the 12-fold series which has come to be the traditional way in which the teaching is expressed. He continues to quote the formula quoted above, and says that This general principle is idappaccayata¯, ‘the fact of things having a specific cause’, which is said always to be the case even when there is no Buddha to penetrate it in depth and teach the full sequence.’’ (p. 106) Collins’ words offer an example of the understanding that all ‘‘things’’ exist dependently. Many other examples can be supplied in which leading modern scholars support such a claim.3 Most popular is the view that the teaching of the 12 links of dependent-origination—which as we will soon see discusses the workings of the mind—is a ‘‘particular case’’ of the more general principle of idappaccayata¯ (‘‘dependence’’) and of the abstract formula quoted above. This paper will claim that the reading of dependent-origination thus described deviates significantly from the initial meaning of the concept. Although the teaching does have ontological implications, it is not an ontological teaching as such. In addition, these ontological implications differ from the ones generally ascribed to the doctrine, relating rather to certain phenomena being dependent on subjectivity. In clear distinction from dependent-origination as ‘‘existence in dependence’’ and as the true nature of all phenomena, I will argue that dependent-origination addresses the workings of the mind alone. Dependent-origination should be understood to be no more than an inquiry into the nature of the self (or better, the lack of a self). Viewing pratı¯tya-samutpa¯da as a description of the nature of reality in general means investing the words of the earlier teachings with meanings derived from later Buddhist discourse. This results in a misrepresentation of much of what early Buddhism was about. Before we begin our analysis of the relevant materials, we must consider a number of methodological matters. Readers who regard the Pali Canon as an authentic representation of ‘‘what the Buddha taught’’ may prefer to skip the next section.
In speaking of early understandings of dependent-origination I will be relying on materials from the Pali Canon. Such a use of Pali texts is notoriously problematic, as it is more than clear that these scriptures have been worked over by many generations of Buddhists.4 Hence it is necessary to explain why I believe I may use the Pali texts as evidence for prominent trends in the early Buddhist community. Although there are many problems regarding the authenticity of the Pali Canon, the major issue concerns the antiquity of the materials.5 The oldest sources we have to work with in Pali in order to assess the date of the suttas are commentaries from the fifth and sixth centuries A.D. The Chinese Agama texts parallel to the Pali suttas are slightly earlier, dating from the fourth century A.D. In addition, we are in no position to assess the precise contents of the Pali canon redacted towards the end of the first century B.C. at Alu-viha¯ra.6 Another problem is posed by the different ‘‘layers’’ the canonical texts seem to be composed of.7 Although this situation is clearly problematic when discussing Buddhist history, I wish to argue it is not nearly as perturbing when discussing such central doctrinal concepts as prat¯ıtya-samutpa¯da. In dealing with foundational articulations of doctrine, it is implausible to argue that they ceased to reflect their original meanings when the oral teachings were committed to writing. It is also unlikely that time worked on such central notions so as to give them completely new forms. In a case like pat:iccasamuppa¯da, it is likely that the words of the Pali suttas are relatively close to the earlier meanings of the term. This argument is particularly strong when dealing with a concept like dependent-origination, which possesses explicit philosophical and analytic aspects. It could be argued that oral traditions would be fairly scrupulous in preserving the original intentions of materials of this sort.8 The considerations I am suggesting are further corroborated by a number of comparative works. Minh Ciau (1991) conducted a comprehensive study, comparing the contents of the Pali Majjhima Nika¯ya with the Chinese Madhyama-A¯ gama. Although he found a plethora of distinctions between the canons regarding technical and practical issues,9 he discovered a striking agreement in doctrinal matters.10 Such conclusions were reached also by Lamotte (1988, p. 156): ‘‘[W]ith the exception of the Maha¯ya¯nist interpolations in the Ekottara (-a¯gama), which are easily discernable, the variations in question affect hardly anything save the method of expression or the arrangement of the subjects. The doctrinal basis common to the a¯gamas and nika¯yas is remarkably uniform.’’ Based on such observations we can agree that Pali Canon materials were generally accepted in the IVth century A.D. Another interesting piece of evidence will allow us to extend these conclusions back to the first two centuries A.D. Basing himself on Gandha¯ran manuscripts from the Robert Senior collection, Andrew Glass (2006) compared su¯ tras from the beginning of the second century A.D. with their Tibetan, Sanskrit, Pali and Chinese counterparts. Although his sample is small, based on only four short su¯ tras, his conclusions are much in line with those reached by Minh Ciau and Lamotte. Again we find technical differences and doctrinal unity. The translations read much like the more familiar ones from the Pali, and are clearly examples of the same Buddhist attitudes to life and reality. According to Richard Salomon (1999, ch. 1), the materials contained in the fragments from the British Library collection, which date from the beginning of the first century A.D, do not diverge significantly from better known traditions in regard to central points of doctrine as well. The studies mentioned, although not conclusive, support the view that the Pali suttas reflect Buddhist scriptures in circulation at the beginning of the first Millenium A.D. In fact, this discussion brings us very close to the Alu-viha¯ra redaction of the canon in the last quarter of the first century B.C. Therefore, I believe it fair to claim that with regard to central doctrinal concepts we can regard the materials in the Pali Canon as representative of major Buddhist trends in the last few centuries B.C. By no means am I suggesting that these materials can be seen as an accurate representation of the words of the Buddha. But they are probably not very far off the mark, at least in essence, and can be seen as representative of views held by early generations of Buddhists. In order to further substantiate my position, my presentation of pat:iccasammuppa¯da in the Pali Canon will discuss only materials contained in the four major Nika¯yas.11 Specifically, I will focus on discourses contained in the most elaborate discussion of dependent-origination in the canon, the Nida¯na-sam: yautta (NS) of the SN. Although the four major Nika¯yas are only one type of Buddhist scripture, they were clearly among the most widely accepted teachings of the tradition. This will afford a clear vision of what was probably a central understanding to many of the early Buddhist communities.12 To conclude this stage of the discussion, I wish to make clear that I do not necessarily believe the views I will identify were subscribed to by all the early Buddhist sanghas. I do believe, however, that they were a major current in the _ Buddhism of the last few centuries B.C. At the very least, we have here a presentation of the meaning of dependent-origination in the four major Nika¯yas of the Pali canon. At most, we are discussing the Buddha’s original notion of dependent-origination
We will begin our discussion with an examination of pat:iccasamuppa¯da in the Pali suttas. Once we achieve a clear definition of the meaning of dependentorigination in the early Buddhist materials, we will proceed to contextualize our conclusions historically. The teaching of dependent-origination appears in the Pali Nika¯yas most prominently in the context of the 12 links.13 Although the 12 links are clearly not the oldest formulation of dependent-origination,14 they will serve as the basis for our discussion, as they have become the standardized form of the teaching. More importantly, the 12 links agree fundamentally with the more archaic expressions of dependent-origination in their basic message: they express the way the mind functions in sam: sa¯ra, the processes of mental conditioning that transmigration consists of.15 The Nida¯na-sam: yutta opens with the following words of the Buddha, the standard exposition of the 12 links:
And what, monks, is dependent-origination? Dependent on (1) ignorance, monks, (2) mental dispositions. Dependent on mental dispositions, (3) consciousness. Dependent on consciousness, (4) name and form. Dependent on name and form, (5) the six bases (of the senses). Dependent on the six bases, (6) contact. Dependent on contact, (7) sensation. Dependent on sensation, (8) thirst. Dependent on thirst, (9) grasping. Dependent on grasping, (10) being. Dependent on being, (11) birth. Dependent on birth, (12) old age and death, sadness, pain, suffering, distress and misery arise. This is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. This, monks, I say is dependent-origination
. Katamo ca, bhikkhave, pat:iccasamuppa¯do? Avijja¯paccaya¯, bhikkhave, san_kha¯ra¯; san_kha¯rapaccaya¯ vin˜n˜a¯n: am: ; vin˜n˜a¯n: apaccaya¯ na¯maru¯pam: ; na¯maru¯papaccaya¯ sal: a¯yatanam: ; sal: a¯yatanapaccaya¯ phasso; phassapaccaya¯ vedana¯; vedana¯paccaya¯ tan: ha¯; tan: ha¯paccaya¯ upa¯da¯nam: ; upa¯da¯napaccaya¯ bhavo; bhavapaccaya¯ ja¯ti ja¯tipaccaya¯ jara¯maran: am: sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupa¯ya¯sa¯ sambhavanti. Evam etassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti. Ayam: vuccati, bhikkhave, pat:iccasamuppa¯do
Many issues arise regarding this well-known paragraph. Discarding specific questions concerning the translation, most importantly those concerning the 12 links themselves, it will be valuable to begin our discussion with the way tradition prefers to understand the teaching. According to the traditional reading, the 12 links depict the process of transmigration in sam: sa¯ra over a period of three life-times. The first, a past existence, is expressed in the first two links Depending on ignorance one creates mental dispositions through action, which lead to his or her present rebirth, beginning with consciousness, the third link. Consciousness continues to condition according to a set pattern in which thirst (or desire, tan: ha¯) and grasping (or better—‘‘dependence,’’ upa¯da¯na) are generated due to attraction and aversion toward pleasant and unpleasant sensation. Grasping will then create being (bhava, sometimes translated as becoming18), that will lead to future birth, and thus to aging and death, the 11th and 12th links that represent a future life. This, we are told, is how pain is generated. Whether the 12 links refer to three different lives, as the traditional view holds,19 or whether they relate only to one life20 or even to a single instance of perception,21 whether they were articulated in this same sequence by the Buddha or were later arranged in this way by his disciples, the different views of the 12 links all agree on one major point: They discuss the manner in which the mind conditions sam: sa¯ric experience and existence. The teaching is concerned with an analysis of the workings of the mind, with identifying the different processes of mental conditioning and describing their relations. The 12 links do not deal with how things exist, but with the processes by which the mind operates. It is true that the doctrine of the 12 links has important ontological implications. It is based on a metaphysics which seems to believe that objects—real objects!—are conditioned by consciousness. Such an understanding is implied by the fact that form (ru¯pa) and the objects of the senses, the ‘‘external’’ side of links four and five, are conditioned by mental dispositions and consciousness (links two and three).22 The same metaphysics is expressed in the enigmatic move from link nine to ten, where grasping conditions being. The point is that one is reborn in direct relation to acts of attachment conducted during his or her previous life/lives. These forms of conditioning undermine the realistic ontology normally attributed to early Buddhism.23 It may be argued in response that the Buddha is speaking only about experience, in complete disregard for the way objects ‘‘really’’ exist. But such an argument demands too heavy a distinction between mental objects and the non-mental world they represent. It also ignores the metaphysics implied by the theory of karma,24 of special relevance to our discussion because of the traditional connection between karma and the 12 links.25 Such an interpretation also fails to take into account concepts like manomaya (‘‘the mind made body’’26) along with the other supernatural powers ascribed to the religious adept, and disregards the religious context from which the Buddha emerged.27 These intuitions regarding the nature of the relation between mental conditioning and the objective world suggest that the mind has power over objects beyond what we normally believe. They suggest that ontology is secondary to experience. What we are, including the material aspects of our being, is conditioned primarily, if not only, by our previous subjective maneuvers. But these conjectures, although revealing much about underlying Buddhist inclinations, are not really what the 12 links formula is about. The 12 links are an explanation of mental conditioning, an analysis of subjective existence. They do not deal directly with the manner in which all things exist. The ontological implications are no more than an offshoot of the discussion, possibly an echo of the Upanis:adic notions regarding the relations between the Self and the cosmos (see Section ‘‘Dependent - Origination Contextualized’’ below). So far, what I have been saying about the 12 links is not very new. The fact that they deal with subjective existence rather than external reality should come as no surprise. The important question for our discussion is whether the 12 links can be understood as a private case of a more general principle which recognizes that ‘‘all that is—exists in dependence.’’ We are concerned with the meaning of the abstract formula quoted above, as well as with the meaning of the term idappaccayata¯. I am arguing that the abstract formula of dependent-origination deals exclusively with the process encapsulated in the 12 links. When the Buddha says ‘‘When this is, that is, etc.,’’ he is speaking only of mental conditioning, and is saying absolutely nothing about existence per se. The most significant evidence for this fact is that the phrase ‘‘imasmim: sati idam: hoti…’’ never occurs detached from the articulation of the 12 links, save one occurrence which I will relate to below. Let us examine a standard appearance of the abstract formula. In the Dasa-bala-sutta of the Nida¯na-Sam: yutta, the Buddha says: ‘‘Imasmim: sati idam: hoti... yad idam: avijja¯ paccaya¯…’’ (When this is, that is… That is: depending on ignorance…). The abstract formula is followed by yad idam: , followed by the standard articulation of the 12 links. If the yad idam: meant ‘‘for example’’ or ‘‘such as,’’ we could accept the view that the 12 links are a private case of a general principle of conditionality. But it clearly does not. What it does express is more akin to ‘‘that is,’’ or even more precisely ‘‘that which is.’’ Hence it should be clear that the abstract formula relates precisely and only to the mutual conditioning of the 12 links. This is in fact exactly what it says: ‘‘When this (i.e. ignorance, etc.) is, that (i.e. mental dispositions, etc.) is. Once this (again—ignorance, etc.) arises, that arises. When this is not, that is not. Once this ceases, that ceases.’’ Imasmim: sati idam: hoti, imass’ uppa¯da¯, idam: uppajjati. Imasmim: asati, idam: na hoti, imassa nirodha¯ idam: nirujjhati
There is no reason to believe that dependent-origination originally discussed anything but mental conditioning. This is evident in the words of the Buddha in the classic exposition of the 12 links quoted above: ‘‘And what, monks, is dependent-origination?’’ (katamo ca, bhikkhave, pat:iccasamuppa¯do?) he asks. The answer is a teaching of the 12 links: ‘‘Dependent on ignorance, monks…’’ The 12 links are pat:iccasamuppa¯da. As I said earlier, there is one case in which the abstract formula appears without the 12 links, in the Cu¯l: asakuluda¯yi-sutta (MN ii32). But this occurrence is unable to alter our conclusions. The context in which the formula appears involves a discussion regarding recollection of past lives, an issue closely related to what the 12 links are about. The Buddha is again speaking about the process of karmic mental conditioning. The same conclusions reached in regard to the abstract formula apply to the term idappaccayata¯ as well.28 An oft-quoted passage regarding dependent-origination, usually understood as an example of dependent arising referring to all phenomena, appears in the Paccaya-sutta (SN II.25). There the Buddha says ‘‘Monks, I will teach you dependent-origination and dependently-arisen phenomena’’ (pat:iccasamuppa¯dan˜ca vo bhikkhave desessa¯mi pat:iccasamuppanne ca dhamme). ‘‘Dependently-arisen phenomena (pat:iccasamuppanne dhamma¯)’’ are presumably any possible object. But in fact, rather than explaining how ‘‘phenomena’’ are ‘‘dependently-arisen’’, the sutta continues with the Buddha teaching the 12 links. He next gives an interesting description of each of the links as ‘‘impermanent, compounded, dependently-arisen, characterized by waning, by fading, by stopping, by destruction’’ (aniccam: san_kha¯tam: pat:iccasamuppannam: khayadhammam: vayadhammam: vira¯gadhammam: nirodhadhammam: ). The connection between being dependently-arisen (pat:icccasamuppanna) and being impermanent (anicca) and compounded (san_kha¯ta) is again emphasized in SN III. 97–100 and SN IV.211–214. In the first case the context relates again to a number of the 12 links. The second case relates first to the body, and then to the sixth link (phassa). These last cases point to the fact that when the Buddha refers to phenomena as dependently-arisen he is referring only to objects created by the process of conditioning encapsulated by the 12 links. Admittedly, in SN IV.211 he speaks of the body. But the body is no more than a product of attachment, a material expression of the process of conditioning whose major locus is experience. This is another case which points to the ontological implications of the 12 links, but which is still in accord with the hypothesis that dependent-origination deals only with mental conditioning and the phenomenal aspects affected by it. Another discourse we should consider is the Maha¯hatthipadopama-sutta (MN i184). In this sutta the Buddha defines the five aggregates as dependently-arisen. He does so after he has emphasized their composite and impermanent nature, including an explanation of the material aspect of the ru¯pa aggregate based on the four elements. In the process he goes so far as to say that this material aspect is external (ba¯hira¯). He continues by saying that: Whoever sees dependent-origination sees the dhamma, and whoever sees the dhamma sees dependent-origination. Dependently arisen indeed are these five aggregates of clinging.29 The desire toward, inclining toward, basing oneself on, and craving for these five aggregates of clinging, is the arising of suffering. The stopping and quitting of desire and passion toward these five aggregates is the cessation of suffering.
yo pat:iccasamuppa¯dam: passati so dhammam: passati, yo dhammam: passati so pat:iccasamuppa¯dam: passatı¯ti. pat:iccasamuppanna¯ kho pan’ ime yadidam pan˜c’ upa¯da¯nakkhandha¯. Yo imesu pan˜cas’ upa¯ada¯nakkhandhesu chando a¯layo anusayo ajjhosa¯nam: so dukkhasamudayo, yo imesu pan˜cas’upa¯da¯nakkhandhesu chandara¯gavinayo chandara¯gapaha¯nam: so dukkhanirodho
The beginning of this paragraph is a classic quote on the importance of dependent-origination, here equated with the heart of the Buddha’s teachings. But again, it expresses only the method by which sam: sa¯ric experience is brought into existence. The object under discussion is the five aggregates, which are clearly conditioned by the 12 links. By saying that bhava is conditioned by upa¯da¯na, the 12 links state that rebirth is caused by the attachments of this life. The aggregates come into being in relation to clinging, and are therefore characterized as dependently-arisen. The examples quoted—rare occurrences in which ‘‘phenomena’’ are said to be dependently-arisen—make clear that dependent-origination is not a teaching which characterizes all objects. The Buddha seems not to have said that all things arise dependent on their conditioning. In fact, he may have condemned such a statement an unhealthy speculative view. When the Buddha did describe something as dependently-arisen, he was referring only to phenomenal aspects of sam: sa¯ric experience. Another point worth noting is that saying that something is pat:iccasamuppanna supplements the fact that it is impermanent and compounded. Phenomenal aspects such as the aggregates arise conditioned by grasping, and are therefore of impure and of a passing nature. Hence they will lead to pain and are not to be regarded as self. A similar reading of the 12 links in the early suttas, anticipating the major thrust of the discussion conducted so far, has been presented by Collett Cox (1993). Cox traces the path by which Sarva¯stivada Abhidharma philosophers came to understand dependent-origination as an abstract theory of causation. Well aware of the dangers of reading later doctrinal developments into earlier articulations of Buddhist insight, Cox defines the shifts in meaning the doctrine of causality underwent, from the early suttas through the earlier stages of Sarva¯stiva¯da Abhidharma. In the early suttas, she claims, pat:iccasamuppa¯da does not function as an abstract theory of causation. Rather, it focuses on the way human suffering is produced and the manner by which it may be terminated. Later on Buddhist philosophers developed this early insight into a full- fledged model of causality. Cox does not specifically address the question I have been concerned with here—whether pratı¯tya-samutpa¯da relates to all things, rather than dealing exclusively with mental phenomena. Nonetheless, the suggestions I have been making fit well with the manner in which she portrays the developments undergone by of the concept of dependent-origination: originally a purely psychological insight, eventually an abstract philosophical principle. As I said earlier, the teaching of dependent-origination does have ontological implications. But although the view of reality it implies is stimulating, we should be careful not to over-emphasize the point. First, this compelling statement does not seem to be given much emphasis in the scriptures. Second, that the Buddha is talking about anything more than experience still needs to be shown. Most importantly, although this view is interesting philosophically, its true context is psychological. What I wish to stress for now is that if the Nika¯ya suttas refer at all to ‘‘things’’ being dependent-arisings—and there is serious doubt that they do—they are not saying that things depend on other things, or even that everything is conditioned. They certainly are not saying that ‘‘everything’’ depends on everything else.30 What they may be saying is that the things we encounter are brought into ontological existence because we grasp at them. Or rather, because we grasp at our selves.
In order to further substantiate our understanding that dependent-origination deals only with subjective existence, it would be worthwhile to recall another important aspect of the teaching. Dependent-origination functions as the Buddhist definition of the Middle path. In order to tread the middle path, one must avoid the extremes of eternalism (sassata) and extinction (uccheda). The point of interest for our concerns is that both the extremes represent a mistaken conception of the self. In this respect, the 12 links express the early Buddhist vision of the center: no Self/self exists, and the idea that the self is completely void is also mistaken. By offering the notion of mental conditioning portrayed by the 12 links, the Buddhist tradition supplies a positive articulation of the functioning of experience devoid of an essential gravitational center. We see again that dependent-origination is concerned with the workings of subjectivity, not with existence in general. There exist different definitions of the extreme positions of sassata and uccheda. 31 The Brahmaja¯la-sutta (DN i,13) defines sassata as a mistaken view that ‘‘the self and the world are eternal,’’32 produced by an ability to recall past lives in meditation or by logical analysis. Uccheda consists of the belief that personal existence is completely annihilated at the end of life.33 A more pragmatic definition of the extremes appears in the Acelakassapa-sutta (SN ii 20), which believes that the idea that the one who acts (so karoti) is the same as the one who experiences the result of the act (so pat:isam: vedayati) is a case of eternalism. The idea that the two are completely distinct amounts to extinction. In a similar context, the Timbaruka-sutta (SN ii 23) defines sassata as the belief that feeling (vedana¯) and feeler (so vedayati) are one. Uccheda means that feeler and feeling are distinct.34 These few examples should suffice in order to show that the conceptual definition of the middle path in the early teachings deals with the nature of the self. Sassata addresses a belief in the true existence of such a self as an essential entity continuous over time. Uccheda believes in the true existence of the self as well, but thinks it will be annihilated at the end of this life, or at the end of an act. It also tends toward a denial of moral responsibility. Although there is much more to gain from a more comprehensive analysis of the two extremes, their basic meanings are quite clear: they express a misunderstanding of the nature of the self. In many cases, the 12 links appear after the Buddha states that ‘‘avoiding both extremes the Tatha¯gata teaches a doctrine abiding by the middle.’’35 This tells us that dependent-origination is intended to be a solution to the problem of the Self. The point that the 12 links serve as a definition of the nature of experience devoid of a true self is widely accepted.36 As an exposition of the middle it aims to explain experience without a self. It should be emphasized that this is all that dependent-origination was initially—an explanation of the way the mind conditions its own experience in sam: sa¯ra. It wishes to explain the middle position between self and lack of self, that are both incoherent according to the Buddhist view. The extremes are not concerned with abstract notions of existence. What the middle path means in the context of early Buddhism, as it is articulated by the concept of pat:iccasamuppa¯da, is that there exists no true self, but that moral agency nonetheless produces real results.
‘‘What do you think, Rahula, is the eye permanent or impermanent?’’ ‘‘Impermanent, sir.’’ ‘‘And what is impermanent - is it joy or pain?’’ ‘‘Pain, sir.’’ ‘‘And is what is impermanent, pain, and characterized by change worthy of being viewed as ‘this is mine, this is what I am, this is my self.’’ ‘‘Not at all, sir.’’37
This quote form the Cu¯l: arahulova¯da-sutta of the MN is an example of the most common expression of the teaching of the anatta doctrine in the Nika¯yas. As has been pointed out by a number of scholars, it makes little sense, if any at all, unless it is understood in light of the Upanis:adic doctrine of the a¯tman.38 There is clearly no logical necessity that whatever is impermanent must be pain, and that whatever is pain not be the self. The fact that the toothache I suffered from last week was impermanent is of much joy to me, and this doesn’t at all convince me that it had nothing to do with my self. Quite the contrary, actually. But if the Self (capital S!) is defined as permanent bliss, then this most central teaching begins to make sense. If Self means only permanence and joy, then the factors of the personality cannot be regarded as the Self since they are associated with change and pain. Therefore the empirical self has no clear point of reference. This conclusion—that the teaching of non-selfhood makes sense only in relation to the Upanis:adic concept of the a¯tman—is understood to apply also to another important exposition of the anatta doctrine in the Nika¯yas, i.e., the argument about lack of control over the aggregates.39 When these observations regarding the anatta doctrine are joined to the conclusions reached in this study regarding pat:iccasamuppa¯da, a remarkably clear picture begins to emerge. The Buddha of the Nika¯yas teaches a doctrine that is based on an analysis of the Self/self. He is seen to be an integral part of the spiritual community of his day, a community in search of the deathless essence of subjectivity. The Buddha was unique in this religious milieu in that his search for the Self discovered only mental conditioning. He reached the firm conviction that such a Self is an impossibility. This impossibility probably led him to the conclusion that more empirical forms of subjectivity are based in error as well.40 With the discovery of mental conditioning the Buddha also realized that ascetic nihilistic tendencies taught by rival spiritual teachers of his day misunderstood the functioning of moral agency. Hence he ‘‘taught a teaching abiding by the middle,’’ as systematized by the 12 links. The Buddha appears as a seeker growing out of both the Brahmanic and the ascetic traditions of his day. The unique place the Buddha occupied in the changing tradition is reflected in the doctrine of prat¯ıtya-samutpa¯da as it has been defined above. The teaching deals with the nature of subjectivity, as an integral part of the search for the a¯tman. Denying such a subjective essence, the Buddhist teaching addresses embodied mental conditioning. Nonetheless, the Upanis:adic intuitions regarding the relations between the a¯tman and the cosmos are maintained in the doctrine of dependent-origination. These are the ontological implications of pratı¯tya-samutpa¯da that suggest that the objective aspects of experience result from subjective motion. Recently Joanna Jurewicz (2000) has discussed the Vedic antecedents of the prat¯ıtya-samutpa¯da doctrine. Following the lead of Gombrich (1996), Jurewicz reads the Buddha’s formulation of the doctrine as an adaptation of Vedic cosmological theories of creation, translating them into an analysis of ‘‘the process of human entanglement in empirical existence’’ (p. 79). She believes pratı¯tya-samutpa¯da to be a polemic against Vedic thought, identifying the cosmic creative process as a personal creation of suffering. Jurewicz goes on to reveal the relations between the terms used by the Buddha in the 12 links and their Vedic origins. The analysis of prat¯ıtya-samutpa¯da in this paper fits well with Jurewicz’s reading of the doctrine, albeit with a different understanding of its ontological purport. Again the Buddha is seen as a thinker and teacher interested mainly in subjectivity. He was part of a tradition that attempted a new reading of the Vedas: translating the language of sacrifice into the language of meditation, and defining existence as a reflection of the Self. The emerging tradition believed the Self to be the deep root of existence, and taught that the one who understands its relation to existence gains all he desires.42 The Buddha participated in the move from cosmological metaphysics to subjectivity, but differed from his fellow-seekers by regarding the Self as a painful fantasy. Knowledge of the Self, rather than being the pinnacle of human achievement, is a sure route to sam: sa¯ric suffering. He believed that what the Brahmanic r: s:is viewed as cosmic connections could be better expressed in a description of human psychology. The Buddha was both an integral part of, and a significant break from the Vedic-Upanis:adic spiritual tradition.43 We see in his formulation of pratı¯tya-samutpa¯da an acceptance of the new inclination to define existence in terms of subjectivity, together with a denial of the truth of any subjective essence. The Vedic meanings carried by the 12 links suggest, once again, that the ontological implications of the Buddha’s theory of dependence described things as being dependent on subjectivity, not as dependent on other things. In this context, conditionality means being conditioned by consciousness, not by abstract notions of the relation between cause and effect. This statement can go so far as to say that the objective aspects of experience are constituted by consciousness, conditioned by, or existing in relation to subjectivity. This is a radical statement, but clearly different from the one which believes all ‘‘things’’ to be ‘‘causally conditioned.’’ Note that this understanding of the significance of the Vedic meanings the 12 links are impregnated by diverges from Jurewicz’s view that the Buddha denied any ontological import to prat¯ıtya-samutpa¯da. 44 Rather, as I suggested above, the early formulation of the 12 links possesses deep ontological implications. These implications are intimately related to—one could better say conditioned by—the Vedic cosmological background that underlies the Buddhist formulation of the 12 links, as revealed by Jurewicz, together with the Upanis:adic notions regarding the relation between Self and cosmos.
Note that Jurewicz’s interpretation of prat¯ıtya-samutpa¯da probably tells us much about the Buddha, but less about his disciples.45 The Vedic meanings of the terms the Buddha used to describe mental conditioning may have resonated deeply in the ears and hearts of his students. Two hundred years later (to pick an arbitrary figure), after Buddhism developed mainly within its own confines, probably much less was left of that resonance. For the generations of Buddhist that followed the Buddha, avidya¯, sam: ska¯ra and upa¯da¯na contained presumably mainly cognitive meanings, as they do today. We can assume that the subjective aspect of the teaching was strengthened the more it was practiced, as Buddhism was defining its self-identity by distancing itself from Brahmanic teaching
In conclusion I would like to sketch the basic outline of the argument. Dependent-origination was initially the sets of causal links (most familiar to us as 12), nothing more. More precisely it was the notion of mental conditioning these links employ. Nowhere in the Pali suttas of the major four nika¯yas is there found, to my knowledge, a passage that should cause us to think otherwise. The insight of dependent-origination expresses the Buddha’s analysis of the dynamics of subjectivity, an endeavor arising from the search for Self-knowledge, the like of which we find in the Upanis:ads. Dependent-origination was concerned with subjectivity, but extended beyond the mental to intimations regarding the relation between consciousness and the world it encounters. The understanding of pratı¯tya-samutpa¯da popular today as a general principle of causality relating to all things proves to be a result of later doctrinal developments. The formulation of dependent-origination allowed the Buddha both to participate in and to distinguish himself from the spiritual traditions of his day
Dependent-origination is widely acknowledged by students of all schools of Buddhism as one of Buddhism’s most fundamental principles. The principle that things arise in dependence on their conditions is understood to be a central aspect of Buddhist philosophy, psychology and soteriology. Nonetheless, as will become evident in the following pages, we still lack a clear definition of what dependent-origination actually means. Different understandings, representing distinct uses of the concept by numerous Buddhist teachers and schools, are grouped together so as to cloud our view of the development of the teaching. This paper intends to cut through the later layers of these developments so as to reveal the earlier, perhaps original uses of the concept. The prevalent understanding of prat¯ıtya-samutpa¯da is that all factors of existence depend on other factors in order to exist. Nothing exists on its own, no-thing possesses independent identity. This principle is said to apply to all mental as well as material phenomena. In the famous words of the suttas: ‘‘When this is, that is. Once this arises, that arises. When this is not, that is not. Once this ceases, that ceases.’’ Imasmim: sati idam: hoti, imass’ uppa¯da¯, idam: uppajjati. Imasmim: asati, idam: na hoti, imassa nirodha¯ idam: nirujjhati. In the following pages I will address the question of the initial meaning of this formula. Commonly, the formula is read as a characterization of all that exists. This view is adhered to by the majority of modern scholars writing on the subject. Specifically, it is accepted by authors who discuss early Buddhist doctrine. Many agree that Buddhism is not an ontological teaching, or was not so initially, and that its doctrinal emphasis is on the workings of the mind.1 Nonetheless, it is generally believed that the Buddha described all things as pat:iccasamuppanna—dependent arisings.2 A good example is Steven Collins’ classic Selfless Persons: In considering the teaching of dependent origination, which Buddhism used to oppose Brahmanism on the conceptual level, it is crucially important to distinguish between the general idea of conditionality, and the 12-fold series which has come to be the traditional way in which the teaching is expressed. He continues to quote the formula quoted above, and says that This general principle is idappaccayata¯, ‘the fact of things having a specific cause’, which is said always to be the case even when there is no Buddha to penetrate it in depth and teach the full sequence.’’ (p. 106) Collins’ words offer an example of the understanding that all ‘‘things’’ exist dependently. Many other examples can be supplied in which leading modern scholars support such a claim.3 Most popular is the view that the teaching of the 12 links of dependent-origination—which as we will soon see discusses the workings of the mind—is a ‘‘particular case’’ of the more general principle of idappaccayata¯ (‘‘dependence’’) and of the abstract formula quoted above. This paper will claim that the reading of dependent-origination thus described deviates significantly from the initial meaning of the concept. Although the teaching does have ontological implications, it is not an ontological teaching as such. In addition, these ontological implications differ from the ones generally ascribed to the doctrine, relating rather to certain phenomena being dependent on subjectivity. In clear distinction from dependent-origination as ‘‘existence in dependence’’ and as the true nature of all phenomena, I will argue that dependent-origination addresses the workings of the mind alone. Dependent-origination should be understood to be no more than an inquiry into the nature of the self (or better, the lack of a self). Viewing pratı¯tya-samutpa¯da as a description of the nature of reality in general means investing the words of the earlier teachings with meanings derived from later Buddhist discourse. This results in a misrepresentation of much of what early Buddhism was about. Before we begin our analysis of the relevant materials, we must consider a number of methodological matters. Readers who regard the Pali Canon as an authentic representation of ‘‘what the Buddha taught’’ may prefer to skip the next section.
In speaking of early understandings of dependent-origination I will be relying on materials from the Pali Canon. Such a use of Pali texts is notoriously problematic, as it is more than clear that these scriptures have been worked over by many generations of Buddhists.4 Hence it is necessary to explain why I believe I may use the Pali texts as evidence for prominent trends in the early Buddhist community. Although there are many problems regarding the authenticity of the Pali Canon, the major issue concerns the antiquity of the materials.5 The oldest sources we have to work with in Pali in order to assess the date of the suttas are commentaries from the fifth and sixth centuries A.D. The Chinese Agama texts parallel to the Pali suttas are slightly earlier, dating from the fourth century A.D. In addition, we are in no position to assess the precise contents of the Pali canon redacted towards the end of the first century B.C. at Alu-viha¯ra.6 Another problem is posed by the different ‘‘layers’’ the canonical texts seem to be composed of.7 Although this situation is clearly problematic when discussing Buddhist history, I wish to argue it is not nearly as perturbing when discussing such central doctrinal concepts as prat¯ıtya-samutpa¯da. In dealing with foundational articulations of doctrine, it is implausible to argue that they ceased to reflect their original meanings when the oral teachings were committed to writing. It is also unlikely that time worked on such central notions so as to give them completely new forms. In a case like pat:iccasamuppa¯da, it is likely that the words of the Pali suttas are relatively close to the earlier meanings of the term. This argument is particularly strong when dealing with a concept like dependent-origination, which possesses explicit philosophical and analytic aspects. It could be argued that oral traditions would be fairly scrupulous in preserving the original intentions of materials of this sort.8 The considerations I am suggesting are further corroborated by a number of comparative works. Minh Ciau (1991) conducted a comprehensive study, comparing the contents of the Pali Majjhima Nika¯ya with the Chinese Madhyama-A¯ gama. Although he found a plethora of distinctions between the canons regarding technical and practical issues,9 he discovered a striking agreement in doctrinal matters.10 Such conclusions were reached also by Lamotte (1988, p. 156): ‘‘[W]ith the exception of the Maha¯ya¯nist interpolations in the Ekottara (-a¯gama), which are easily discernable, the variations in question affect hardly anything save the method of expression or the arrangement of the subjects. The doctrinal basis common to the a¯gamas and nika¯yas is remarkably uniform.’’ Based on such observations we can agree that Pali Canon materials were generally accepted in the IVth century A.D. Another interesting piece of evidence will allow us to extend these conclusions back to the first two centuries A.D. Basing himself on Gandha¯ran manuscripts from the Robert Senior collection, Andrew Glass (2006) compared su¯ tras from the beginning of the second century A.D. with their Tibetan, Sanskrit, Pali and Chinese counterparts. Although his sample is small, based on only four short su¯ tras, his conclusions are much in line with those reached by Minh Ciau and Lamotte. Again we find technical differences and doctrinal unity. The translations read much like the more familiar ones from the Pali, and are clearly examples of the same Buddhist attitudes to life and reality. According to Richard Salomon (1999, ch. 1), the materials contained in the fragments from the British Library collection, which date from the beginning of the first century A.D, do not diverge significantly from better known traditions in regard to central points of doctrine as well. The studies mentioned, although not conclusive, support the view that the Pali suttas reflect Buddhist scriptures in circulation at the beginning of the first Millenium A.D. In fact, this discussion brings us very close to the Alu-viha¯ra redaction of the canon in the last quarter of the first century B.C. Therefore, I believe it fair to claim that with regard to central doctrinal concepts we can regard the materials in the Pali Canon as representative of major Buddhist trends in the last few centuries B.C. By no means am I suggesting that these materials can be seen as an accurate representation of the words of the Buddha. But they are probably not very far off the mark, at least in essence, and can be seen as representative of views held by early generations of Buddhists. In order to further substantiate my position, my presentation of pat:iccasammuppa¯da in the Pali Canon will discuss only materials contained in the four major Nika¯yas.11 Specifically, I will focus on discourses contained in the most elaborate discussion of dependent-origination in the canon, the Nida¯na-sam: yautta (NS) of the SN. Although the four major Nika¯yas are only one type of Buddhist scripture, they were clearly among the most widely accepted teachings of the tradition. This will afford a clear vision of what was probably a central understanding to many of the early Buddhist communities.12 To conclude this stage of the discussion, I wish to make clear that I do not necessarily believe the views I will identify were subscribed to by all the early Buddhist sanghas. I do believe, however, that they were a major current in the _ Buddhism of the last few centuries B.C. At the very least, we have here a presentation of the meaning of dependent-origination in the four major Nika¯yas of the Pali canon. At most, we are discussing the Buddha’s original notion of dependent-origination
We will begin our discussion with an examination of pat:iccasamuppa¯da in the Pali suttas. Once we achieve a clear definition of the meaning of dependentorigination in the early Buddhist materials, we will proceed to contextualize our conclusions historically. The teaching of dependent-origination appears in the Pali Nika¯yas most prominently in the context of the 12 links.13 Although the 12 links are clearly not the oldest formulation of dependent-origination,14 they will serve as the basis for our discussion, as they have become the standardized form of the teaching. More importantly, the 12 links agree fundamentally with the more archaic expressions of dependent-origination in their basic message: they express the way the mind functions in sam: sa¯ra, the processes of mental conditioning that transmigration consists of.15 The Nida¯na-sam: yutta opens with the following words of the Buddha, the standard exposition of the 12 links:
And what, monks, is dependent-origination? Dependent on (1) ignorance, monks, (2) mental dispositions. Dependent on mental dispositions, (3) consciousness. Dependent on consciousness, (4) name and form. Dependent on name and form, (5) the six bases (of the senses). Dependent on the six bases, (6) contact. Dependent on contact, (7) sensation. Dependent on sensation, (8) thirst. Dependent on thirst, (9) grasping. Dependent on grasping, (10) being. Dependent on being, (11) birth. Dependent on birth, (12) old age and death, sadness, pain, suffering, distress and misery arise. This is the origin of this whole mass of suffering. This, monks, I say is dependent-origination
. Katamo ca, bhikkhave, pat:iccasamuppa¯do? Avijja¯paccaya¯, bhikkhave, san_kha¯ra¯; san_kha¯rapaccaya¯ vin˜n˜a¯n: am: ; vin˜n˜a¯n: apaccaya¯ na¯maru¯pam: ; na¯maru¯papaccaya¯ sal: a¯yatanam: ; sal: a¯yatanapaccaya¯ phasso; phassapaccaya¯ vedana¯; vedana¯paccaya¯ tan: ha¯; tan: ha¯paccaya¯ upa¯da¯nam: ; upa¯da¯napaccaya¯ bhavo; bhavapaccaya¯ ja¯ti ja¯tipaccaya¯ jara¯maran: am: sokaparidevadukkhadomanassupa¯ya¯sa¯ sambhavanti. Evam etassa kevalassa dukkhakkhandhassa samudayo hoti. Ayam: vuccati, bhikkhave, pat:iccasamuppa¯do
Many issues arise regarding this well-known paragraph. Discarding specific questions concerning the translation, most importantly those concerning the 12 links themselves, it will be valuable to begin our discussion with the way tradition prefers to understand the teaching. According to the traditional reading, the 12 links depict the process of transmigration in sam: sa¯ra over a period of three life-times. The first, a past existence, is expressed in the first two links Depending on ignorance one creates mental dispositions through action, which lead to his or her present rebirth, beginning with consciousness, the third link. Consciousness continues to condition according to a set pattern in which thirst (or desire, tan: ha¯) and grasping (or better—‘‘dependence,’’ upa¯da¯na) are generated due to attraction and aversion toward pleasant and unpleasant sensation. Grasping will then create being (bhava, sometimes translated as becoming18), that will lead to future birth, and thus to aging and death, the 11th and 12th links that represent a future life. This, we are told, is how pain is generated. Whether the 12 links refer to three different lives, as the traditional view holds,19 or whether they relate only to one life20 or even to a single instance of perception,21 whether they were articulated in this same sequence by the Buddha or were later arranged in this way by his disciples, the different views of the 12 links all agree on one major point: They discuss the manner in which the mind conditions sam: sa¯ric experience and existence. The teaching is concerned with an analysis of the workings of the mind, with identifying the different processes of mental conditioning and describing their relations. The 12 links do not deal with how things exist, but with the processes by which the mind operates. It is true that the doctrine of the 12 links has important ontological implications. It is based on a metaphysics which seems to believe that objects—real objects!—are conditioned by consciousness. Such an understanding is implied by the fact that form (ru¯pa) and the objects of the senses, the ‘‘external’’ side of links four and five, are conditioned by mental dispositions and consciousness (links two and three).22 The same metaphysics is expressed in the enigmatic move from link nine to ten, where grasping conditions being. The point is that one is reborn in direct relation to acts of attachment conducted during his or her previous life/lives. These forms of conditioning undermine the realistic ontology normally attributed to early Buddhism.23 It may be argued in response that the Buddha is speaking only about experience, in complete disregard for the way objects ‘‘really’’ exist. But such an argument demands too heavy a distinction between mental objects and the non-mental world they represent. It also ignores the metaphysics implied by the theory of karma,24 of special relevance to our discussion because of the traditional connection between karma and the 12 links.25 Such an interpretation also fails to take into account concepts like manomaya (‘‘the mind made body’’26) along with the other supernatural powers ascribed to the religious adept, and disregards the religious context from which the Buddha emerged.27 These intuitions regarding the nature of the relation between mental conditioning and the objective world suggest that the mind has power over objects beyond what we normally believe. They suggest that ontology is secondary to experience. What we are, including the material aspects of our being, is conditioned primarily, if not only, by our previous subjective maneuvers. But these conjectures, although revealing much about underlying Buddhist inclinations, are not really what the 12 links formula is about. The 12 links are an explanation of mental conditioning, an analysis of subjective existence. They do not deal directly with the manner in which all things exist. The ontological implications are no more than an offshoot of the discussion, possibly an echo of the Upanis:adic notions regarding the relations between the Self and the cosmos (see Section ‘‘Dependent - Origination Contextualized’’ below). So far, what I have been saying about the 12 links is not very new. The fact that they deal with subjective existence rather than external reality should come as no surprise. The important question for our discussion is whether the 12 links can be understood as a private case of a more general principle which recognizes that ‘‘all that is—exists in dependence.’’ We are concerned with the meaning of the abstract formula quoted above, as well as with the meaning of the term idappaccayata¯. I am arguing that the abstract formula of dependent-origination deals exclusively with the process encapsulated in the 12 links. When the Buddha says ‘‘When this is, that is, etc.,’’ he is speaking only of mental conditioning, and is saying absolutely nothing about existence per se. The most significant evidence for this fact is that the phrase ‘‘imasmim: sati idam: hoti…’’ never occurs detached from the articulation of the 12 links, save one occurrence which I will relate to below. Let us examine a standard appearance of the abstract formula. In the Dasa-bala-sutta of the Nida¯na-Sam: yutta, the Buddha says: ‘‘Imasmim: sati idam: hoti... yad idam: avijja¯ paccaya¯…’’ (When this is, that is… That is: depending on ignorance…). The abstract formula is followed by yad idam: , followed by the standard articulation of the 12 links. If the yad idam: meant ‘‘for example’’ or ‘‘such as,’’ we could accept the view that the 12 links are a private case of a general principle of conditionality. But it clearly does not. What it does express is more akin to ‘‘that is,’’ or even more precisely ‘‘that which is.’’ Hence it should be clear that the abstract formula relates precisely and only to the mutual conditioning of the 12 links. This is in fact exactly what it says: ‘‘When this (i.e. ignorance, etc.) is, that (i.e. mental dispositions, etc.) is. Once this (again—ignorance, etc.) arises, that arises. When this is not, that is not. Once this ceases, that ceases.’’ Imasmim: sati idam: hoti, imass’ uppa¯da¯, idam: uppajjati. Imasmim: asati, idam: na hoti, imassa nirodha¯ idam: nirujjhati
There is no reason to believe that dependent-origination originally discussed anything but mental conditioning. This is evident in the words of the Buddha in the classic exposition of the 12 links quoted above: ‘‘And what, monks, is dependent-origination?’’ (katamo ca, bhikkhave, pat:iccasamuppa¯do?) he asks. The answer is a teaching of the 12 links: ‘‘Dependent on ignorance, monks…’’ The 12 links are pat:iccasamuppa¯da. As I said earlier, there is one case in which the abstract formula appears without the 12 links, in the Cu¯l: asakuluda¯yi-sutta (MN ii32). But this occurrence is unable to alter our conclusions. The context in which the formula appears involves a discussion regarding recollection of past lives, an issue closely related to what the 12 links are about. The Buddha is again speaking about the process of karmic mental conditioning. The same conclusions reached in regard to the abstract formula apply to the term idappaccayata¯ as well.28 An oft-quoted passage regarding dependent-origination, usually understood as an example of dependent arising referring to all phenomena, appears in the Paccaya-sutta (SN II.25). There the Buddha says ‘‘Monks, I will teach you dependent-origination and dependently-arisen phenomena’’ (pat:iccasamuppa¯dan˜ca vo bhikkhave desessa¯mi pat:iccasamuppanne ca dhamme). ‘‘Dependently-arisen phenomena (pat:iccasamuppanne dhamma¯)’’ are presumably any possible object. But in fact, rather than explaining how ‘‘phenomena’’ are ‘‘dependently-arisen’’, the sutta continues with the Buddha teaching the 12 links. He next gives an interesting description of each of the links as ‘‘impermanent, compounded, dependently-arisen, characterized by waning, by fading, by stopping, by destruction’’ (aniccam: san_kha¯tam: pat:iccasamuppannam: khayadhammam: vayadhammam: vira¯gadhammam: nirodhadhammam: ). The connection between being dependently-arisen (pat:icccasamuppanna) and being impermanent (anicca) and compounded (san_kha¯ta) is again emphasized in SN III. 97–100 and SN IV.211–214. In the first case the context relates again to a number of the 12 links. The second case relates first to the body, and then to the sixth link (phassa). These last cases point to the fact that when the Buddha refers to phenomena as dependently-arisen he is referring only to objects created by the process of conditioning encapsulated by the 12 links. Admittedly, in SN IV.211 he speaks of the body. But the body is no more than a product of attachment, a material expression of the process of conditioning whose major locus is experience. This is another case which points to the ontological implications of the 12 links, but which is still in accord with the hypothesis that dependent-origination deals only with mental conditioning and the phenomenal aspects affected by it. Another discourse we should consider is the Maha¯hatthipadopama-sutta (MN i184). In this sutta the Buddha defines the five aggregates as dependently-arisen. He does so after he has emphasized their composite and impermanent nature, including an explanation of the material aspect of the ru¯pa aggregate based on the four elements. In the process he goes so far as to say that this material aspect is external (ba¯hira¯). He continues by saying that: Whoever sees dependent-origination sees the dhamma, and whoever sees the dhamma sees dependent-origination. Dependently arisen indeed are these five aggregates of clinging.29 The desire toward, inclining toward, basing oneself on, and craving for these five aggregates of clinging, is the arising of suffering. The stopping and quitting of desire and passion toward these five aggregates is the cessation of suffering.
yo pat:iccasamuppa¯dam: passati so dhammam: passati, yo dhammam: passati so pat:iccasamuppa¯dam: passatı¯ti. pat:iccasamuppanna¯ kho pan’ ime yadidam pan˜c’ upa¯da¯nakkhandha¯. Yo imesu pan˜cas’ upa¯ada¯nakkhandhesu chando a¯layo anusayo ajjhosa¯nam: so dukkhasamudayo, yo imesu pan˜cas’upa¯da¯nakkhandhesu chandara¯gavinayo chandara¯gapaha¯nam: so dukkhanirodho
The beginning of this paragraph is a classic quote on the importance of dependent-origination, here equated with the heart of the Buddha’s teachings. But again, it expresses only the method by which sam: sa¯ric experience is brought into existence. The object under discussion is the five aggregates, which are clearly conditioned by the 12 links. By saying that bhava is conditioned by upa¯da¯na, the 12 links state that rebirth is caused by the attachments of this life. The aggregates come into being in relation to clinging, and are therefore characterized as dependently-arisen. The examples quoted—rare occurrences in which ‘‘phenomena’’ are said to be dependently-arisen—make clear that dependent-origination is not a teaching which characterizes all objects. The Buddha seems not to have said that all things arise dependent on their conditioning. In fact, he may have condemned such a statement an unhealthy speculative view. When the Buddha did describe something as dependently-arisen, he was referring only to phenomenal aspects of sam: sa¯ric experience. Another point worth noting is that saying that something is pat:iccasamuppanna supplements the fact that it is impermanent and compounded. Phenomenal aspects such as the aggregates arise conditioned by grasping, and are therefore of impure and of a passing nature. Hence they will lead to pain and are not to be regarded as self. A similar reading of the 12 links in the early suttas, anticipating the major thrust of the discussion conducted so far, has been presented by Collett Cox (1993). Cox traces the path by which Sarva¯stivada Abhidharma philosophers came to understand dependent-origination as an abstract theory of causation. Well aware of the dangers of reading later doctrinal developments into earlier articulations of Buddhist insight, Cox defines the shifts in meaning the doctrine of causality underwent, from the early suttas through the earlier stages of Sarva¯stiva¯da Abhidharma. In the early suttas, she claims, pat:iccasamuppa¯da does not function as an abstract theory of causation. Rather, it focuses on the way human suffering is produced and the manner by which it may be terminated. Later on Buddhist philosophers developed this early insight into a full- fledged model of causality. Cox does not specifically address the question I have been concerned with here—whether pratı¯tya-samutpa¯da relates to all things, rather than dealing exclusively with mental phenomena. Nonetheless, the suggestions I have been making fit well with the manner in which she portrays the developments undergone by of the concept of dependent-origination: originally a purely psychological insight, eventually an abstract philosophical principle. As I said earlier, the teaching of dependent-origination does have ontological implications. But although the view of reality it implies is stimulating, we should be careful not to over-emphasize the point. First, this compelling statement does not seem to be given much emphasis in the scriptures. Second, that the Buddha is talking about anything more than experience still needs to be shown. Most importantly, although this view is interesting philosophically, its true context is psychological. What I wish to stress for now is that if the Nika¯ya suttas refer at all to ‘‘things’’ being dependent-arisings—and there is serious doubt that they do—they are not saying that things depend on other things, or even that everything is conditioned. They certainly are not saying that ‘‘everything’’ depends on everything else.30 What they may be saying is that the things we encounter are brought into ontological existence because we grasp at them. Or rather, because we grasp at our selves.
In order to further substantiate our understanding that dependent-origination deals only with subjective existence, it would be worthwhile to recall another important aspect of the teaching. Dependent-origination functions as the Buddhist definition of the Middle path. In order to tread the middle path, one must avoid the extremes of eternalism (sassata) and extinction (uccheda). The point of interest for our concerns is that both the extremes represent a mistaken conception of the self. In this respect, the 12 links express the early Buddhist vision of the center: no Self/self exists, and the idea that the self is completely void is also mistaken. By offering the notion of mental conditioning portrayed by the 12 links, the Buddhist tradition supplies a positive articulation of the functioning of experience devoid of an essential gravitational center. We see again that dependent-origination is concerned with the workings of subjectivity, not with existence in general. There exist different definitions of the extreme positions of sassata and uccheda. 31 The Brahmaja¯la-sutta (DN i,13) defines sassata as a mistaken view that ‘‘the self and the world are eternal,’’32 produced by an ability to recall past lives in meditation or by logical analysis. Uccheda consists of the belief that personal existence is completely annihilated at the end of life.33 A more pragmatic definition of the extremes appears in the Acelakassapa-sutta (SN ii 20), which believes that the idea that the one who acts (so karoti) is the same as the one who experiences the result of the act (so pat:isam: vedayati) is a case of eternalism. The idea that the two are completely distinct amounts to extinction. In a similar context, the Timbaruka-sutta (SN ii 23) defines sassata as the belief that feeling (vedana¯) and feeler (so vedayati) are one. Uccheda means that feeler and feeling are distinct.34 These few examples should suffice in order to show that the conceptual definition of the middle path in the early teachings deals with the nature of the self. Sassata addresses a belief in the true existence of such a self as an essential entity continuous over time. Uccheda believes in the true existence of the self as well, but thinks it will be annihilated at the end of this life, or at the end of an act. It also tends toward a denial of moral responsibility. Although there is much more to gain from a more comprehensive analysis of the two extremes, their basic meanings are quite clear: they express a misunderstanding of the nature of the self. In many cases, the 12 links appear after the Buddha states that ‘‘avoiding both extremes the Tatha¯gata teaches a doctrine abiding by the middle.’’35 This tells us that dependent-origination is intended to be a solution to the problem of the Self. The point that the 12 links serve as a definition of the nature of experience devoid of a true self is widely accepted.36 As an exposition of the middle it aims to explain experience without a self. It should be emphasized that this is all that dependent-origination was initially—an explanation of the way the mind conditions its own experience in sam: sa¯ra. It wishes to explain the middle position between self and lack of self, that are both incoherent according to the Buddhist view. The extremes are not concerned with abstract notions of existence. What the middle path means in the context of early Buddhism, as it is articulated by the concept of pat:iccasamuppa¯da, is that there exists no true self, but that moral agency nonetheless produces real results.
‘‘What do you think, Rahula, is the eye permanent or impermanent?’’ ‘‘Impermanent, sir.’’ ‘‘And what is impermanent - is it joy or pain?’’ ‘‘Pain, sir.’’ ‘‘And is what is impermanent, pain, and characterized by change worthy of being viewed as ‘this is mine, this is what I am, this is my self.’’ ‘‘Not at all, sir.’’37
This quote form the Cu¯l: arahulova¯da-sutta of the MN is an example of the most common expression of the teaching of the anatta doctrine in the Nika¯yas. As has been pointed out by a number of scholars, it makes little sense, if any at all, unless it is understood in light of the Upanis:adic doctrine of the a¯tman.38 There is clearly no logical necessity that whatever is impermanent must be pain, and that whatever is pain not be the self. The fact that the toothache I suffered from last week was impermanent is of much joy to me, and this doesn’t at all convince me that it had nothing to do with my self. Quite the contrary, actually. But if the Self (capital S!) is defined as permanent bliss, then this most central teaching begins to make sense. If Self means only permanence and joy, then the factors of the personality cannot be regarded as the Self since they are associated with change and pain. Therefore the empirical self has no clear point of reference. This conclusion—that the teaching of non-selfhood makes sense only in relation to the Upanis:adic concept of the a¯tman—is understood to apply also to another important exposition of the anatta doctrine in the Nika¯yas, i.e., the argument about lack of control over the aggregates.39 When these observations regarding the anatta doctrine are joined to the conclusions reached in this study regarding pat:iccasamuppa¯da, a remarkably clear picture begins to emerge. The Buddha of the Nika¯yas teaches a doctrine that is based on an analysis of the Self/self. He is seen to be an integral part of the spiritual community of his day, a community in search of the deathless essence of subjectivity. The Buddha was unique in this religious milieu in that his search for the Self discovered only mental conditioning. He reached the firm conviction that such a Self is an impossibility. This impossibility probably led him to the conclusion that more empirical forms of subjectivity are based in error as well.40 With the discovery of mental conditioning the Buddha also realized that ascetic nihilistic tendencies taught by rival spiritual teachers of his day misunderstood the functioning of moral agency. Hence he ‘‘taught a teaching abiding by the middle,’’ as systematized by the 12 links. The Buddha appears as a seeker growing out of both the Brahmanic and the ascetic traditions of his day. The unique place the Buddha occupied in the changing tradition is reflected in the doctrine of prat¯ıtya-samutpa¯da as it has been defined above. The teaching deals with the nature of subjectivity, as an integral part of the search for the a¯tman. Denying such a subjective essence, the Buddhist teaching addresses embodied mental conditioning. Nonetheless, the Upanis:adic intuitions regarding the relations between the a¯tman and the cosmos are maintained in the doctrine of dependent-origination. These are the ontological implications of pratı¯tya-samutpa¯da that suggest that the objective aspects of experience result from subjective motion. Recently Joanna Jurewicz (2000) has discussed the Vedic antecedents of the prat¯ıtya-samutpa¯da doctrine. Following the lead of Gombrich (1996), Jurewicz reads the Buddha’s formulation of the doctrine as an adaptation of Vedic cosmological theories of creation, translating them into an analysis of ‘‘the process of human entanglement in empirical existence’’ (p. 79). She believes pratı¯tya-samutpa¯da to be a polemic against Vedic thought, identifying the cosmic creative process as a personal creation of suffering. Jurewicz goes on to reveal the relations between the terms used by the Buddha in the 12 links and their Vedic origins. The analysis of prat¯ıtya-samutpa¯da in this paper fits well with Jurewicz’s reading of the doctrine, albeit with a different understanding of its ontological purport. Again the Buddha is seen as a thinker and teacher interested mainly in subjectivity. He was part of a tradition that attempted a new reading of the Vedas: translating the language of sacrifice into the language of meditation, and defining existence as a reflection of the Self. The emerging tradition believed the Self to be the deep root of existence, and taught that the one who understands its relation to existence gains all he desires.42 The Buddha participated in the move from cosmological metaphysics to subjectivity, but differed from his fellow-seekers by regarding the Self as a painful fantasy. Knowledge of the Self, rather than being the pinnacle of human achievement, is a sure route to sam: sa¯ric suffering. He believed that what the Brahmanic r: s:is viewed as cosmic connections could be better expressed in a description of human psychology. The Buddha was both an integral part of, and a significant break from the Vedic-Upanis:adic spiritual tradition.43 We see in his formulation of pratı¯tya-samutpa¯da an acceptance of the new inclination to define existence in terms of subjectivity, together with a denial of the truth of any subjective essence. The Vedic meanings carried by the 12 links suggest, once again, that the ontological implications of the Buddha’s theory of dependence described things as being dependent on subjectivity, not as dependent on other things. In this context, conditionality means being conditioned by consciousness, not by abstract notions of the relation between cause and effect. This statement can go so far as to say that the objective aspects of experience are constituted by consciousness, conditioned by, or existing in relation to subjectivity. This is a radical statement, but clearly different from the one which believes all ‘‘things’’ to be ‘‘causally conditioned.’’ Note that this understanding of the significance of the Vedic meanings the 12 links are impregnated by diverges from Jurewicz’s view that the Buddha denied any ontological import to prat¯ıtya-samutpa¯da. 44 Rather, as I suggested above, the early formulation of the 12 links possesses deep ontological implications. These implications are intimately related to—one could better say conditioned by—the Vedic cosmological background that underlies the Buddhist formulation of the 12 links, as revealed by Jurewicz, together with the Upanis:adic notions regarding the relation between Self and cosmos.
Note that Jurewicz’s interpretation of prat¯ıtya-samutpa¯da probably tells us much about the Buddha, but less about his disciples.45 The Vedic meanings of the terms the Buddha used to describe mental conditioning may have resonated deeply in the ears and hearts of his students. Two hundred years later (to pick an arbitrary figure), after Buddhism developed mainly within its own confines, probably much less was left of that resonance. For the generations of Buddhist that followed the Buddha, avidya¯, sam: ska¯ra and upa¯da¯na contained presumably mainly cognitive meanings, as they do today. We can assume that the subjective aspect of the teaching was strengthened the more it was practiced, as Buddhism was defining its self-identity by distancing itself from Brahmanic teaching
In conclusion I would like to sketch the basic outline of the argument. Dependent-origination was initially the sets of causal links (most familiar to us as 12), nothing more. More precisely it was the notion of mental conditioning these links employ. Nowhere in the Pali suttas of the major four nika¯yas is there found, to my knowledge, a passage that should cause us to think otherwise. The insight of dependent-origination expresses the Buddha’s analysis of the dynamics of subjectivity, an endeavor arising from the search for Self-knowledge, the like of which we find in the Upanis:ads. Dependent-origination was concerned with subjectivity, but extended beyond the mental to intimations regarding the relation between consciousness and the world it encounters. The understanding of pratı¯tya-samutpa¯da popular today as a general principle of causality relating to all things proves to be a result of later doctrinal developments. The formulation of dependent-origination allowed the Buddha both to participate in and to distinguish himself from the spiritual traditions of his day
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