Mistranslations, misconceptions

Mistranslations
 After Buddhism was first introduced to China in the first century C.E., its texts were initially translated using what were seen as analogous terms from Taoism. This was partly because Taoism was the nearest thing in existing Chinese culture to Buddhism, and partly because some Chinese looked to Buddhism for solutions to problems arising in Taoist thought. In time, it came to be seen that such a method of translation tended to distort Buddhist ideas. With the great translator Kumârajïva (344-413), the process of translation was put on a sounder basis, with more careful attention to mastering the texts' concepts, which came from the very different cultural world of India. In the case of the transmission of Buddhism and its study to the Western world, there has been a tendency to a parallel pattern to that which occurred in the transmission to China, this time using Christianity as the point of reference. Thus the translation of certain central Buddhist terms has been coloured by what have been perceived as similar, or radically contrastive, Christian terms. In the first part of this paper, I will discuss some of these, and suggest that current understanding of Buddhist concepts should now allow us to step beyond this phase of cultural transmission with more nuanced and accurate translations.
 Is there no 'soul'in Buddhism?
 One interesting mistranslation, which over-emphasises the difference between Buddhism and Christianity, is 'no-soul' for anattct/anätmcm (not-Self). A classic source for this is Walpola Rähula's, What the Buddha Taught, first published in 1959. Chapter six of this is entitled 'The Doctrine of No-soul: Anatta', and in this Rähula states:
 What in general is suggested by Soul, Self, Ego, or to use the Sanskrit expression Ätman, is that in man there is a permanent, everlasting and absolute entity, which is the unchanging substance behind the changing phenomenal world. ... This soul or self in man is the thinker of thoughts, feeler of sensations, and receiver of rewards and punishments for all its actions good and bad. Such a conception is called the idea of self.

Buddhism stands unique in the history of human thought in denying the existence of such a Soul, Self or Ätman...' (p.51)

In the past, Richard Gombrich has also used the 'no-soul' way of talking; for example his 1988 Theraväda Buddhism: A Social History from Ancient Benares to Modern Colombo states: ..

.the Buddha's teaching that beings have no soul, no abiding essence. This 'no-soul doctrine' (anatta-väda) he expounded in his second sermon, (p.63)

In his 1996 How Buddhism Began: The Conditioned Genesis of the Early Teachings, however, Gombrich points out that talk of'no-soul' overlooks the great difference between Indian and Christian concepts. He points out that for most Christians, the 'soul' is,
 some kind of disembodied mental, and above all, moral, agent, which survives the body at death. But none of this has anything to do with the Buddha's position. He was opposing the Upanisadic theory of the soul [sic]...âtman [which] is opposed to both the body and the mind... Once we see what the Buddha was arguing against, we realise that it was something very few westerners have ever believed in (pp. 15-16).

Here, one might comment that the Jain concept of a permanent jïva or Lifeprinciple, also opposed by Buddhism, is not beyond the mind, so is analogous to some Western beliefs. In a recent book, Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition, Paul Williams has also pointed out that, however Christian theologians differ over the nature of the 'soul', they agree in seeing it as 'that which gives life to the body , and that in describing many things as anatta, 'not Self, the Buddha was not 'concerned to deny whatever gave life to the body, whatever that is' (p.56). I agree. Building on the above, we can say that, just because the Buddha did not accept anything as an unchanging Self, I or essence does not mean that all talk of 'soul' needs to be banished from English-language discussion of Buddhism. It is simply that any 'soul' must be recognised as not being a fixed, permanent entity, which at least rules out any idea of an immortal 'soul'. On an analagous point between-lives gandhabba/gandharva could be seen as a kind of'spirit' (pp. 105-8). The word 'soul' in fact has a range of meanings in English, and 'no-soul' language has the effect of unnecessarily closing off some of these, or at least their implications. The Concise Oxford English Dictionary (6th edition, 1976, ed. J.B.Sykes) gives six aspects of the meaning of 'soul'. Respectively these, followed by reflections regarding the appropriateness of each for a Buddhist context, are:

i. Spiritual or immaterial part of man, held to survive death (immortality of the soul)... This is still problematic if the association with immortality remains - here, note that I have argued that early Buddhism can be seen to have accepted a jiva, or life-principle, so long as it is seen as a changing complex of states, not an unchanging self-essence (1995: 91-5).
ii. Moral and emotional part of man... This could be seen to correspond to citta, a term which covers both 'mind' and 'heart', in the sense of the centre of emotions.
 iii. Intellectual part of man, vital principle and mental powers of animals including man... This could be seen as close to the related viññana /vijnana, discriminative consciousness whose presence, with 'life' and 'heat' differentiates a live person from a dead body (M.I.296).
iv. Animating or essential part, person viewed as this {he was the (life and) soul of the enterprise, of the party). This is not a problem so long as 'essence' is not taken to mean some kind of unconditioned separate entity.
 V. Person viewed as embodying moral or intellectual qualities {the great souls of antiquity; left that to meaner souls). This is echoed in the Buddhist term mahattu, 'great selves' (It.28-9; see Harvey, 1995: 55-8), which resurfaced in recent times in the title mahatma, 'great soul', applied to Gandhi. vi. Emotional or intellectual energy e.g. as revealed in work of art {the fellow has no soul; his pictures lack soul)... This reminds one of the various positive qualities that the Buddhist path aims to develop. So - Buddhism does not 'lack soul'!


Is there any 'merit'(Punna) in Buddhism?
 After around two centuries of scholars translating Buddhist texts into English, and describing the behaviour of Buddhists, 'merit' has become an established and stable element in scholarly discourse on Buddhism. The fact that it has become familiar, though, does not mean that it is not a problematic translation, which obscures elements of meaning and brings in misleading connotations. Buddhists are said to be keen to 'make merit' by good actions such as donations to the Saiigha and to seek to act in a 'meritorious' way, and to avoid 'demerit'. What is being referred to here is puñña (Pali; Skt. punya) and its opposite, apuñña. In Buddhism, good actions are said to be, or have the quality of, puñña, which term is either a noun or an adjective. Is puñña actually what is meant in English by 'merit' or 'meritorious'? Here, one can look both at the ordinary use of these words in English, and their use in Christian Theology. The 1976 Concise Oxford English Dictionary (6th edition, ed. J.B.Sykes) gives the noun 'merit' as meaning:
 Quality of deserving well; excellence, worth; (Theol.) good deeds as entitling to future reward; (usu. in pi.) thing that entitles to reward or gratitude

The derivation is from the Latin meritum, 'price, value, neut. P.p. (as n.) of mereri earn, deserve'. As a verb, 'merit' means: 'Deserve, be worthy of (reward, punishment, consideration etc.)', while 'meritorious' means: 'having merit, deserving reward, praise or gratitude; deserving commendation for thoroughness etc'. Thus the main thrust of'merit' implies: deservingness, which earns or entitles a reward, and sometimes punishment. Is this what puñña is about? No - it is about a quality or potency of good actions to naturally bring about beneficial consequences, happy results (cf. Cousins, 1996: 155). Acts of puñña are not seen, as such, as entitling their doer to a 'reward' from any agent; they do not 'deserve' future benefit, in the hope that some agent will provide it, but are seen as themselves setting in train a causal sequence which will bring about future benefit. As an adjective, Cousins sees 'puñña/punya' as referring to the 'fortune bringing or auspicious quality of an action' (1996: 153), while as a noun 'it is applied either to an act which brings good fortune or to the happy result in the future of such an act' (1996: 155). McDermott also sees a puñña action as 'auspicious', 'fortunate' or 'fruitful', since it leads to future good fortune (1984: 31- 58). These kinds of meaning are seen in the first two meanings for punya given by Monier-Williams in his 1899 Sanskrit-English Dictionary: 'auspicious, propitious, fair, pleasant, good, right, virtuous, meritorious, pure, holy, sacred'. MonierWilliams suggests that the word may derive from the root pus, which he gives as 'to thrive, flourish, prosper', or pu, which he gives as 'to make clean or clear or pure or bright'. When Dhammapäla explains the "Pali puñña by saying 'it cleanses and purifies the life-continuity (santänam punäti visodhetí)' (VvA.10), the PaliEnglish Dictionary sees it as fanciful etymology, deriving puñña from the root pu, but Dhammapäla gives a good clue to how the term is understood in Buddhism, as a purifying, uplifting potency. Through other Indo-European languages it may be related to the English words 'boon' and 'bounty' (cf. the Thai word for puñña is bun). Thus we see:

Monks, do not be afraid of puññas; this, monks, is a designation for happiness, for what is pleasant, charming, dear and delightful (sukhassa-  étam bhikkhave adhivacanam, itthassa kantassa piyassa manäpassa), that is to say, puññas. I myself know that the ripening (vipäkam) of punñas done for a long time are experienced for a long time as pleasant, charming, dear and delightful. After developing a heart of loving-kindness for seven years, for seven eons of evolution and devolution, I did not come back to this world...[being reborn in a delightful heaven for that time] (It. 14-15, cf. A.IV.88-89).

So, puñña is an auspicious, fruitful act, its potency and result. A further reservation on 'merit' for 'puñña' is that, in normal English usage, to say something 'has merit' is often to damn it with faint praise, while in Buddhism, acts of puñña are seen as uplifting and admirable. As with 'no-soul' for anatta, the effect is to produce a flattened, despirited image of Buddhism. Now here, someone might object that Buddhism sees puñña as something that the Arahat is said to have 'passed beyond' (Sn.636), and to have 'abandoned' (Sn.520), generating neither puñña nor its opposite (S.II.82). As the Ennobling Eightfold Path leads to an end of producing karmic results, puñña is clearly seen to have some limitations. Thus it is sometimes said that a monk may think of returning to the lay life because he can then enjoy life's pleasures and still perform puñña acts (Vin.1.182). Also relevant is a distinction between 'ordinary' and Noble right view. The first, concerning belief in karma and rebirth is said to have 'cankers, it is on the side oí puñña, it ripens in cleaving (to another rebirth)1 . The second, wisdom or direct insight, is said to be "Noble, cankerless, transcendent, a factor of the path' (M.III.72). The point, here, seems to be that puñña actions, while they have the beneficial result of leading to good rebirths, have limitations in that they cannot, unaided, lead to Nirvana, which transcends all rebirths, whether bad or good. To attain Nirvana, wisdom or insight is also needed. While puñña actions strengthen character-traits which facilitate the development of wisdom, the latter is an extra step. Yet none of this implies that puñña is only middling in its good qualities, it is simply that its uplifting nature is best used as a basis for something different that can bring the process of moral and spiritual development to perfection. It is like a booster rocket: excellent at its job, but an aid to something further.
Until a few years ago, I had just got used to 'merit' as part of 'Buddhist English' and had not realised that the term had a long history in Christian Theology, and thus many subliminal connotations for Western people. No doubt the partial similarity of Buddhist ideas on puñña to Christian ideas on 'merit' strongly influenced the choice of the latter to translate the former. The item on 'Merit (Christian)' by Robert S. Franks in J. Hasting's Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (Vol.8, 1910, pp.561-5) says that merit:
implies the existence of at least three things: (1) a moral law under which man is placed, (2) a free will which enables him to obey it, and (3) a system of rewards and punishments by which obedience or disobedience to the law is sanctioned. Meritorious conduct is such as is agreeable to the law, and
is at the same time voluntary; as meritorious, it claims honour or reward. Demerit, on the other hand... demands punishment... In Christian theology, the idea is closely connected with that of good works... Catholicism views good works, with certain limitations, as meritorious of eternal salvation (561b).

In Buddhism, one may more or less have the first two of the above 'three things'- though 'under which man is placed' is debatable-but the third is inappropriate, as karmic results are not 'rewards' or 'punishments' and the Buddhist response to the Dhamma and moral precepts is not thought of in terms of 'obedience' and 'disobedience'. What do we find on 'merit' in the more recent 1987 Encyclopedia of Religion edited by Mircea Eliade? Michael's Pye's 'Merit: An Overview' (Vol.9, pp.38O-83) says: The terms merit and merit making are used in connection with religious practices that have the calculated aim of improving the future spiritual welfare of oneself or others (p.380). Given that he sees Christianity and Buddhism as standing out from other religions in having developed merit-based ways of thinking, Recent years have seen a smooth and indeed justifiable transfer of the English term merit ... to that area of Buddhist practice and interpretation covered by the Sanskrit termpunya and its equivalents (p.380). He first says that the latter term is an 'analogue' to Christian 'merit (Lat. meritum)', but then, having referred to Indian ideas on karma, qualifies this by saying: Thus loose analogies exist with other religious teachings on reward and punishment, religious works and spiritual development (p.380) (emphasis mine). He then goes on to say: The concept of karman should not in itself... be regarded as amounting to a doctrine of merit. This would be to push the analogy beyond its limits (p.381). Thus the 'justifiable' use of'merit for punya/puñña turns out to be based on a loose and limited analogy. In his article on 'Merit: Christian Concepts' (pp.386-88), Pye goes on to say that the Christian concept grew out of a response to New Testament ideas of 'judgement, reward, and punishment' (p.386), being first semi-formalised as a doctrine by Tertullian (1607-225?) and becoming an increasingly defined and consistent doctrine in medieval Latin Christendom (p.387): works were regarded as meritorious in the sense that they contributed, within the overall economy of divine grace, to the ensuring of salvation... Widespread in the Middle Ages was the distinction between acts that ensure divine recognition and acts that merely qualify for it at divine discretion (p.387). Aquinas emphasised that even the first of these depended ultimately on grace, and Dun Scotus 'emphasized the crucial role of the divine acceptance of merit over against the value inherent in the work itself (p.387). The Reformation emphasis of grace over against works has meant that the continuing role of 'merit' in Catholicism is set in a context which also emphasises grace (p.388). Given the importance of a graceful but judging God in the language of Christian 'merit', we can see why only a loose analogy to it exists in Buddhism - even when something akin to 'grace' comes into Buddhism, it is thought of in terms not of a contrast to 'merit /punya but as punya transferred from a heavenly Buddha or Bodhisattva, who themselves had to first generate it by their past good deeds. How might one better translate puñña/punya, then, in a more accurate, but also usable and workable way? The Pali-English Dictionary includes 'virtue' among its meanings, but we already have this as a translation for sïla, and it overlooks the potential for future benefit inherent in the term. The Pali Tripitakam Concordance includes 'good, goodness' among its meanings, but this has the same limitations, with 'good', at least also having many variant uses. As the noun form refers to the auspicious, uplifting, purifying power of good actions to produce future happy results, one might translate it as 'goodness-power', as I did in my three entries on Buddhism in Pinter's 1994 Themes in Religious Studies series, edited by Jean Holm and John Bowker. However, 'goodness-power' offers no convenient related adjective, and suggests the odd-sounding 'badness-power' for apuñña. A better translation would be '(an act of) karmic fruitfulness1 , with 'karmically fruitful' as the adjective, which I have used in my recent Introduction to Buddhist Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 2000). This translation makes a connection with the fact that actions (karmas) are often likened to 'seeds' (e.g. A.I. 134-5) and their results are known as 'fruits' (phalas) or 'ripenings' (vipäkas) (see Collins, 1982: 218-24; Harvey, 1995: 67-8). While such phalas can be the results of either good or bad actions, and puñña relates only to good actions, the English word 'fruit' can also mean only edible, pleasant fruit such as apples, without referring to inedible, unpleasant ones. The link to 'fruitfulness' is also seen in the fact that the Sañgha is described as the best 'field of punna, i.e. the best group of people to 'plant' a gift 'in' in terms of karmically beneficial results of the gift. Accordingly, it is said:
like fields are the Arahats; the givers are like farmers. The gift is like the seed, (and) from this arises the fruit (Pv.I.l).
Alternatively, sometimes karma is seen as like a field in which the 'seed' of consciousness is planted so as to lead to future rebirth (A.I.223). The opposite of puñña is apuñña, which one can accordingly see as meaning '(an act of) karmic unfruitfulness' or 'karmically unfruitful', i.e. producing no pleasant fruits, but only bitter ones. As an alternative to 'karmic fruitfulness' /'karmically fruitful', Sue Hamilton has suggested 'karmic benefit/karmically beneficial' for puñña. This can be seen to avoid the possibility of anyone thinking that puñña might relate to bad ('karmically harmful') as well as good karmic acts. It has the disadvantage, though, of lacking any link to the analogy of 'seed' and 'fruit' that runs through much talk related to karma. It also, I think, puts too much emphasis on the element of 'payoff in puñña.


Is there any 'sin'in Buddhism?

 A synonym for apuñña is papa, which is generally translated as 'evil'. The PaliEnglish Dictionary, though, says, '(adj.) evil, bad, wicked, sinful... 2. Unfertile (of soil)... 3. (nt.) evil, wrongdoing, sin'. Here, it is worth questioning the 'sinful...sin' aspects. Richard Gombrich's 1971 Precept and Practice, for example, occasionally uses the term 'sin', e.g. as a translation for the Sinhalese pava (p.257), which I take to be derived from Pali/Sanskrit päpa, but the term 'sin' is surely out of place for discussions of most forms of Buddhism. The Concise Oxford English Dictionary (6th edition, 1976, ed. J.B.Sykes) defines 'sin' as 1. n. (Act of) transgression against divine law or principles of morality... 2. Offence against good taste, propriety etc. For Buddhism, the second of these is too weak for päpa and the allusion in the first to 'divine law' is hard to shake off the term. The article on 'Sin (Christian)' in Hastings Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics (Vol.11,1920, pp.53 8-544) says: Sin may be defined as indifference or opposition to the will of God, the refusal of faith and love. ...mistrust or rebellion against a love measured by the Cross... In a moral aspect this fundamental god-lessness or Godforgetfulness appears as selfishness and sensuality. But sin not itself same as selfishness or sensuality: At bottom sin is a religious idea, which for that reason cannot be properly defined otherwise than by putting it expressly in relation to God' (p.541b). A closely related concept is that of guilt (p.542). Now however much Buddhism may value genuine remorse, it does not - certainly in its Theraväda form - encourage feelings of guilt; for such a heavy feeling, with its attendant anguish and self-dislike, is not seen as a good state of mind to develop, being unconducive to calm and clarity of mind. Indeed, it can be seen as an aspect of the fourth spiritual hindrance, of agitated 'restlessness and worry uddhacca-kukkucca (e.g., D.I.73). Such a feeling might arise as part of the natural karmic result of an action, but is not to be actively indulged in. It may help lead on to improving one's ways, but is not itself a skilful state. The article in Hastings' Encyclopaedia of religion and Ethics (pp.533-34) on 'Sin (Buddhist)', by T.W. and C.A.F. Rhys Davids, is surely right, in its main thrust: The doctrine of sin, as held in Europe, is a complex idea of many strands.... the doctrine as a whole, in any one of its various forms, is antagonistic to the Indian, and especially to the Buddhist, view of life. ... No one holding the doctrine of karma ... could accept the doctrine of sin. What the Europeans call "sin" he would call "folly", a result of ignorance ... Again, another implication in the European use of the word "sin" is that of an offence against a personal deity. This a Buddhist believer in karma would find even difficult to understand' (533). Of course, once one gets to the extreme devotionalism of the Japanese Jodo-shin school, talk of man as 'weak and sinful' perhaps becomes appropriate - but precisely in a context when the power of humans to generate good karma has been all but denied. To return to the specific term papa, it does not, then, mean 'sin'. While 'evil' is an acceptable translation in many respects, an important aspect of its meaning is that which is 'infertile, 'barren', 'harmful' (Cousins, 1996: 156) or 'ill-fortuned' (Cousins, 1996: 148). Given that pupa is often a synonym of apuñña, a good way of rendering these meanings would be to see päpa as an adjective as meaning '(karmically) deadening', and as a noun as '(karmic) deadness1 , meaning that what is so described has a deadening effect on the psyche, making it more constricted and lifeless, rather than having an uplifting, fruitful effect.

Misconceptions 

An actions moral quality does not depend on its karmic result, but determines this
Alongside the language of puñña and papa for good and bad actions, Buddhism also uses the terms kusala, 'wholesome/skilful' and akusala, 'unwholesome/unskilful', these being more particular to Buddhism than the first terms, which are pan-Indian. Now it is important to note that, for Buddhism, an action's being wholesome does not consist in its having pleasant karmic results, as is sometimes implied. Rather, it is seen as having pleasant results because it is itself wholesome (see Keown, 1992: 178). It is thus said that good actions are those which are themselves 'bright (sukkam)' as well as being 'with bright result' (M.I.390). Why is the moral tone of an action seen to cause certain results? It is said that wrong view leads on to wrong thought, and this to wrong speech and thus wrong action, while right view has the opposite effect (A.V.211-12). As wrong actions thus come from the misperception of reality, they can be seen to be 'out of tune1 with the real nature of things. As they thus 'go against the grain' of reality, they are seen to naturally lead to unpleasant results. Thus it is said to be impossible that wrong conduct of body, speech or mind could result in a 'result that was agreeable, pleasant, liked', or for right conduct to lead to a 'result that was disagreeable, unpleasant, not liked' (M.III.66). One can further say, here, that, given that unwholesome actions are said to be those 'rooted in', i.e. motivated by, greed, hatred or delusion (M.I.47), and a key delusion is the sense of one being or having a permanent Self or I, the selfishness that this is seen to lead to is so 'out of tune' with the nature of reality that unpleasant results are seen to naturally follow.

All is not due to karma
In his article on 'Merit: Buddhist Concepts' in M.Eliade's Encyclopaedia of Religion (Vol.9, p.383), John S. Strong says that according to the Buddhist theory of'merit', every situation in which an individual finds himself is the result of his own deeds in this or a previous lifetime... Thus present felicity, wealth, physical beauty, or social prestige may be explained as the karmic reward of past deeds of merit This raises the issue of whether Buddhism truly sees all good and bad fortune as due to past karma. Two parallel canonical passages clearly contradict this view, as they say that either any unpleasant feelings or illnesses that one has can arise from a variety of causes: originating from bile, phlegm, or wind, from union (of bodily humours), born from seasonal changes, born from disruptive circumstances, arriving suddenly [due to the action of another person], or born of the result of karma (S.IV.230-31&A.V.10).

Thus it is wrong to say:
 Whatever this person experiences, whether pleasant or painful or neither painful nor pleasant, all that is due to what was done earlier (at M.II.214, this view is said to be that of the Jains).

These passages are discussed at Milindapañha 134-38 in relation to illnesses and injuries that the Buddha suffered. King Milinda puts to the monk Nägasena that the Buddha is seen as beyond the results of past bad karma (unlike even other Arahats), and that this contradicts his suffering illnesses and injuries, as (Milinda thinks) 'all that is experienced is rooted in karma'. Nägasena points out the various causes of feelings, as above, and denies that karma underlies them all. Bodily winds, for example, can arise from a number of physical causes, though some do also arise due to past karma. On feelings in general, he says 'small is what is born of the maturing of karma, greater is the remainder' (p. 135). The Buddha criticized theories which saw all experiences (pleasant, unpleasant or neutral) and associated actions as due either to past karma, the diktat of a God, or to pure chance (A.I.173-5; M.II.214). At A.I.173-5, he sees any such view as leading to a person being a 'denier of effective action (akriyävädin)', i.e., one who denies that what one does can have any positive or negative effect on one's destiny, thus paralysing the will to act in a wholesome, and not unwholesome way. The above implies that human welfare has a variety of causes besides past karma.

The justice of economic distribution
An interesting area to track this into is that of the justice of economic distribution. Russell Sizemore and Donald Swearer, in Ethics, Wealth and Salvation: A Study in Buddhist Social Ethics, make the point that in Buddhism, there is more concern with the mode of acquisition and use of wealth than on the question of the justice of its distribution (1990: 2). For them, in Buddhism, moral virtue is seen to lead to wealth, and wealth is seen to be the result, and proof, of previous generosity (p.3- 4). Nevertheless, they acknowledge that to help the poor is seen to generate good karma, and the receipt of such help will also be karmically 'deserved' (p. 12). Thus: when the doctrine of kammatic [i.e. based on karma] retribution is understood as an exceptionless moral explanation and justification for the present distribution of wealth and poverty in society, it undercuts moral criticism of the distribution per se. Consequently, Buddhists concerned with how to make their present society more just appeal not to a distribution of wealth corresponding more adequately to moral desert, but to the principles of non-attachment and virtues such as compassion and generosity (p. 12) (cf Ornatowski, 1996:202). Thus 'duna and not some concept of structural justice is the central concept in Buddhist social and political philosophy' (p. 13) and 'There are norms for redistributing wealth and visions of the well-ordered society which serve as moral strictures about the use of wealth' (p. 19). While the above is in the main true to how many Buddhists think, it includes some unwarranted assumptions, at least as regards how true such readings are to the texts of Buddhism. While these certainly hold that moral virtue, especially generosity, leads to wealth as a karmic result, and stinginess leads to being poor (e.g. M.III.203-6), it is not said anywhere that these are the only causes of wealth or poverty. The fact that it is said that karmic causes are only one among a variety of possible causes for illnesses suggests that such a view would not be warranted in the texts. Thus while a person's wealth and poverty may be due to past karma, this is only one possibility. Thus it is not right to assume that all poverty and wealth are karmically caused. To assume that karma is an 'exceptionless moral explanation' is, indeed, to come close to karmic fatalism, which is not true to the original Buddhist vision. While belief in the law of karma can sometimes degenerate into a form of fatalism, the Buddha emphasized that deterministic fate (niyati) and karma are very different. The idea of karma emphasizes the importance of human action and its effects: people help make their own 'destiny' by their actions, past and present. Humans have freedom of choice; their present actions are not the karmic results of previous actions, though karmic results may influence the type of action that a person tends to think of doing, due to the character he has developed. Thus, while an appeal to generosity, non-attachment and compassion certainly are key persuaders for Buddhists in working for a more just society, this need not be at odds with an appeal to justice per se. Mavis Fenn has pointed out that, in the Cakkavatti-sïhamda Sutta's description of the ideal ruler as ensuring that poverty does not develop in his realm (D.III.58-77), there is no reference to poverty being karmically caused (1996: 102, 121), and that a king reacting to poverty with sporadic personal giving is seen as ineffective: he must act more systematically and effectively by preventing poverty becoming systemic (Fenn, 1996: 107). Moreover, this and the Kutadanta Sutta, in its counseling a ruler to end a rebellion by acting to end its economic causes (D.I. 134-6), express
views that correspond to simple notions of social justice - everyone should have sufficient resources to care for themselves and others, and to make religious life possible - and the notion that these values should be incorporated into the political system (Fenn, 1996:108).
Nevertheless, ideas of distributive justice may be muted by the idea that at least some poverty and wealth is a result of karma. The notion of karmically caused riches is seen in the fourteenth century Thai work, The Three Worlds According to King Ruang, where it is said that, at the time of the Buddha, the rich man Jotika could not have his riches forcibly removed by the jealous king Ajätasattu, as his riches were due to his great karmic fruitfulness of the past (Reynolds & Reynolds, 1982: 197-99). Moreover, at least in Theraväda lands, those who seek to persuade others of the legitimacy of their wealth do so by reference to some or all of: a) the idea that it is due to their past karmically fruitful actions, b) that it was morally made, c) that it is not the result of self-indulgent craving, by demonstrating present generosity (Reynolds, 1990: 73). In fact, a rich person is seen as having a greater opportunity to do karmically fruitful actions by giving liberally to the Sañgha and the community. As Phra Rajavaramuni (also known as Phra Payutto) says

A wealthy man can do much more either for the better or for the worse of the social good than a poor man... acquiring wealth is acceptable if, at the same time, it promotes the well-being of a community or society (1990:45). Räjavaramuni holds that as long as wealth is used for the well-being of all members of society, 'it does not matter to whom it belongs, whether the individual, community or society' (Räjavaramuni, 1990: 53).
Thus, while Buddhism has no central drive towards economic equality per se, the well-off have an obligation to be generous to other members of the community, and rulers have an obligation to seek to avoid poverty among their people. While the Sañgha's relationship to the state has been typically one of 'cooperation and an amelioratory approach to social change, along with support for the status quo distribution of wealth' (Ornatowski, 1996: 213), monasteries have themselves traditionally had a redistributive effect (Harvey, 2000: 204). Today, Räjavaramuni suggests that it is desirable 'to improve or modify this tradition to suit the current circumstances' (Räjavaramuni, 1990: 38).

Is the law of karma 'unforgiving'?
In citing the Rhys Davids's encyclopaedia entry on 'Sin (Buddhist)', above, I purposely missed something out that I want to take up now, for it says of the Buddhist: And there cannot be, in his view, any forgiveness of sin; it must work out to the bitter end, and of itself, its own fruit (p.533). How accurate a summary is this? Is there no analogy to 'forgiveness' in the law of karma, i.e. the ability to cancel or at least lessen the results of past karma by a subsequent change of heart, irrespective of the absence of a 'forgiving' God? The most obvious way in which this can take place is by the attainment of stream-entry, the experience of 'seeing Dhamma' which entails no further rebirths at less than a human level, and Nirvana within seven lives at most (A.I.235). This implies that past bad karma that would otherwise have led to rebirth as an animal, ghost or in hell will no longer have this effect, but can only have modified results within human or divine rebirths. Admittedly, some past karma still catches up with Arahats, but in an attenuated form. We should also note the concept of 'ahosi karma: 'has been' or lapsed past karma that will now never produce any result: There has been karma, there has been no karma-result, there will be no karma-result (Ps.II.78). The Visuddhimagga explains this as karmas which were due to have their results only in the present, or in the next rebirth, but get no opportunity to do so, and so become lapsed (Vism.601). Such time-limited karma is explained as arising from the volition associated with the first and last of the seven moments oijavana or 'impulsion' consciounesses that actively respond to sense and mind objects. The volition associated with the five in between, on the other hand, generates karma which never lapses 'however long the round of rebirths continues'. The commentary to the Visuddhimagga explains lapsed karma thus: karma's giving of results comes about only through the due concurrence of conditions consisting of (suitable) essentials of becoming, means, etc., failing which it is unable to give its results (Pm.769). In his A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma: The Abhidhammattha Sangaha, Bhikkhu Bodhi adds:
 In the case of Arahants, all their accumulated kamma from the past which was due to ripen in future lives becomes defunct with their final passing away (p.205).

The Sarvästivädins also have the notion of 'indeterminate' karma, which may never bring its result (AKB.IV.50a-d).

An important way in which the karmic result of a bad action can be lessened is by a person regretting it, thinking 'that evil deed cannot be undone by me' and resolving not to do it again (S.IV.320). This can be seen to lessen the psychological impact of the act, so as to reduce its karmic fruit. In the Sarvästivädin view, an action is not 'accumulated' (upacita), with a full karmic result, if it is not repeated (the number of times is dependent on the nature of the action), so as to be 'complete', or is regretted or confessed (AKB.IV.120; cf McDermott, 1984:141-2):
When remorse.. .is absent, or when opposition, - confession, etc., - is absent, action is termed 'accumulated' (AKB.IV.120)

The notion of regret, or acknowledgement of fault, as lessening the karmic result of an action, is also affirmed in the Mahäyäna (Ss.147 & 59). In a recent Tibetan account, based on canonical sources, it is said that to confess, with regret, even to the actions of killing one's father and an Arahat, will lessen - to some extent - the terrible bad karma of such grave acts (Tharchin, 1984: 47). The same text says that, while the death of the Arahat Udrayana was due to his having killed an enlightened ascetic in a past life, his being able to become an Arahat was due to his immediate regret at this deed, followed by building a shrine to the ascetic and making offerings there, with continual confession of his evil deed (Tharchin, 1984: 77). Regret has an impact on karmic results even in the case of good actions. Thus it is said that a man who, in a past life, had given alms to an enlightened ascetic, but then regretted doing so, was born as a rich man - due to his giving - but as a miser unable to enjoy his wealth, due to his regret (S.I.91-2). Thus regret, whether of bad or good acts, can 'take the edge off their karmic results. The importance of regretting a bad action is seen in the refrain, It is a mark of progress in the discipline of the Noble Ones, if anyone recognises the nature of his transgression and makes amends as is right, restraining himself for the future (Vin.II.192; Vin.IV.18-19; D.III.55; S.U. 127-8,205). Among monks and nuns, the acknowledgement, to another monk or nun, that one has broken a monastic rule, is a vital part of monastic discipline. Likewise, in the Mahäyäna, Bodhisattvas, whether monastic or lay, should conceal their good points as well as acknowledge their faults (Ss. 100-101). Indeed the Mahäyäna makes much of the power of acknowledgement of past evil, particularly when done to heavenly Buddhas or Bodhisattvas (Bca.II). In this tradition, such actions, if sincere and devout, are seen as able to actually remove past bad karma rather than simply modify it. The Astasahasrikä Perfection of Wisdom Sutra (ch.24) says that a Bodhisattva who quarrels with another Bodhisattva but who then confesses this fault and promises future restraint then escapes from the consequences of that action (Conze, 1968: 52). Chapter 8 of aäntideva's eiksä-samuccaya describes how to purify oneself from evil deeds . It cites the Catur-dharmaka Sutra as saying that, to overcome the accumulation of evil, the Bodhisattva should:
i) practise self-reproach, by immediately regretting any bad action;
 ii) follow any bad action by counteractive good ones;
iii) resolve to abstain from such bad actions, and
iv) take refuge in the three refuges, and not neglect the compassionate aspiration for Buddhahood (the bodhi-citta) (Ss.159).

áantideva sees counteractive good actions as the development of deep insight, or clearly understanding the difference between evil and good action, with the latter stopping the effect of bad karma. It is also said that reciting a certain hundred syllable mantra 8000 times, while meditating on Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, makes one's evil pass away (Ss. 168-69). On self-reproach, Ss.160 cites the Suvarna-prabhäsottama Sutra's chapter on acknowledging faults, which says that one should call on all Buddhas to look on with compassion, acknowledge all the evil deeds one has done, and say:

On account of the evil done by me previously even in hundreds of aeons, I have a troubled mind oppressed with wretchedness, trouble and fear. With an unhappy mind I continually fear evil acts. Wherever I go there is no enjoyment for me anywhere. All the Buddhas are compassionate. They remove the fear of all beings. May they forgive my sin and may they deliver me from fear. May the Tathägatas [Buddhas] take away for me the defilement of impurities (and) acts. And may the Buddhas bath me with surging waters of compassion (Svb.31).

This passage seems to come pretty close to asking the heavenly Buddhas to grant forgiveness, and the word 'sin' in the translation may not be completely inappropriate, here, given the talk of being 'oppressed with wretchedness, trouble and fear'. There is some continuity, then, with later Jôdo-shin attitudes. In line with the above, East Asian Buddhism contains a rite in which a person repeatedly bows before an image in a spirit of repentance for any past evil deeds that have been committed. Even in the Theravâda tradition, while the Buddha is generally seen as no longer contactable by humans, there is a chant from Sri Lanka in which a person, expressing reverence to the Buddha, Dhamma and Sañgha, asks each to 'forgive' or 'be patient' (khamatu) if they have been wronged in any way (Saddhatissa & Webb, 1976: 10-13). Likewise, a chant from Thailand asks the Buddha, Dhamma and Sañgha to 'accept' (patigganhätu) any wrong actions done towards them, using the same sort of wording as used by monks when acknowledging, to another monk, monastic transgressions (Mahämakut, 1990:72-5). The seeming tension of these with Theraväda doctrinal orthodoxy can perhaps be resolved by saying that the mere expression of the sentiments has a cleansing effect, without the need for any response from the non-contactable Buddha, the impersonal Dhamma or the dispersed Sañgha of Noble Ones.

Neglected territory
The Suttas refer to three 'bases for effecting karmically fruitful actions (puññakiriya-vatthus: däna, sïla and bhävanä (D.III.218, A.IV.214), or generosity, moral virtue and the 'cultivation' or 'development' of skilful or wholesome qualities and undermining negative traits which hinder these. The third of these, bhavana, is what is rendered in English as 'meditation' . On the whole, there is much interest in Buddhist 'meditation' but much less in Buddhist chanting, yet a case can be made that chanting is the most widely practised form of citta-bhävanä, 'mental development' or 'cultivation of the heart/mind' - even 'cultivation of the soul' - in the various forms of Buddhism. While this may be easy to see for something like Nichiren or Tibetan Buddhism, it is also true of Theraväda, where more classical forms of meditation such as mindfulness of breathing are not widely practised by the laity. Here one should note that Buddhaghosa, in his classical meditation manual the Visuddhimagga, includes among forty possible meditation topics the six recollections (anussati), involving mindfulness focused on the special qualities of the Buddha, Dhamma, Sañgha, sïla, däna and devas (pp. 197-228), using formulae that are identical to or close to the wording of common Pali chants. Moreover, chanting the Karamyametta Sutta may indeed be the most common way of practising metta-bhavana, the cultivation of loving-kindness. When monks chant for the laity, it could be  seen as a form of 'broadcast meditation', whose effect on the laity will depend the quality of attention in both themselves and the chanters. Chanting is an effective vehicle for cultivating skilful spiritual states. At its best, it engages body (especially breathing), speech and mind in focusing on and thus enhancing skilful qualities. The mind is involved both at the level of the emotions, through the sound quality of a chant, and thought, in relation to the chant's meaning. Chanting can work in various ways. At the very least, it develops the first two of the five spiritual faculties, these being: faith or trustful confidence, energy, mindfulness, concentration and wisdom. Chanting engages faith through its expression of commitment, and rouses energy. Doing it in anything but a distracted, habitual way requires mindfulness, to enable a steady emerging of the words of the chant, e.g. in Pali, from the memory. Full attention to the process of chanting and to at least elements of its meaning can develop a very focused, unified, concentrated state. Wisdom can be enhanced by mindful awareness of the fluid nature of mind in the process of chanting, as in all else, and in times when the chanting is observed to lift to a level where there is chanting but the sense of there being a 'chanter' drops away. Chanting is certainly calming, as well as energising, and develops the five factors of jhäna: mental application, examination, joy, happiness and onepointedness (though chanting may not take the mind all the way to jhäna). Onepointedness comes from the good concentration that can arise, and joy and happiness can also be developed by chanting. Mental application and examining, vitakka and vicära, are also involved as the mind repeatedly contacts and engages with the words and enunciation of the chant. Of the factors of the Eightfold Path, the three that are classed under meditation (here, samädhi) are certainly involved: right effort, mindfulness and concentration. Chanting can be seen as a particularly potent form of right speech, particularly as vitakka and vicära are also seen as the basis of speech. One can certainly see chanting as enacting right resolve (sammâ sañkappa), which directs thought and emotion in skilful channels. While the use of chants in Tibetan Buddhism has had a reasonable amount of study, the study of Theraväda chanting seems to be in its infancy. There is an incredible range of chants, both drawn from Canon and later compositions. There are sometimes many different ways of doing the same chant- at least ten different ways of doing Namo tassa bhagavato, arahato, sammä-sambuddhassa, for example. There is no way of notating the rhythm of chants that I know of. The potential of CDs for recording, comparing and analysing chants, e.g. electronically, has yet to be explored. The full range of uses to which chants are put needs charting. Mantrayäna, 'Esoteric' or 'Tantric' Theraväda makes particular use of complex symbolic chants, but this traditional form of Southeast Asian Theraväda became sidelined in 19th century reforms, and is only just being uncovered, especially by Francois Bizot, writing mainly in French. Useful overviews of his work are Cousins (1997) and Crosby (2000), detailing complex systems of correspondences between elements of the cosmos, the human being, and the texts of the Tipitaka, alluded to by abbreviated forms of their titles, e.g. 'Sam Vi Dhä Pu Ka Ya Pa' for the seven books of the Abhidhamma (Cousins, 1997: 196-7). To return to Walpola Rähula's What the Buddha Taught : he tells us near the start of his chapter on '"Meditation" or Mental Culture: Bhävanä' that: in later times, the way of 'meditation' had deteriorated or degenerated into a kind of ritual or ceremony almost technical in his routine (p.67) and cites the Yogävcara's Manual (translated by T.W.Rhys Davids in 1896), an 18* century Sri Lankan text which is in fact a manifestation of 'Tantric' Theraväda

Abbreviations
These are to Pali Text Society works, other than to:
AKB. Abhidharma-koEa-bhäsyam; (tr. from Louis de La Vallée Poussin's French translation by Leo M. Prüden, Abhldharmako&abhäsyam) Asian Humanities Press, Berkeley, Cal., 1988-90. References are to chapter and section numbers in original text.

 Bca. Bodhi-caryävatära; translations as in: Shantideva, 1979, A Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life (Bodhisattvacharyavatara), transi, from Tibetan by S.Batchelor, Dharamsala, India, Library of Tibetan Works and Archives. References to chapter and verse. Other translations are: Crosby, K. and Skilton, A., 1996, Säntideva: The Bodhicaryävatära, World's Classics series, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press. Matics, M.L., 1971, transi., Entering the Path of Enlightenment: the Bodhicaryävatära of the Buddhist Poet Säntideva (from Sanskrit), London, George Allen & Unwin.

Ss. Siksu-samuccaya (My.); (tr. Bendall and W.H.D. Rouse, Siksä Samuccaya: a Compendium of Buddhist Doctrine, Compiled by Eäntideva Chiefly from the Early Mahäyäna Sutras, 1971 (first edition was in 1922) Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass. References are to translation pagination.

 Svb. Swarna-bhasottama Sutra (My.); (tr.R.E.Emmerick), The Sutra of Golden Light, London, Luzac and Co. Ltd., 1970. Reference to Sanskrit pagination, as indicated in Emmerick's translation.