Reinterpreting the Buddhist Jhanas

The jhanas, the stages of progressively deepening concentration that figure so prominently in Buddhist meditation theory, have recently been the subject of several excellent critical studies.1 Two such studies, those of Griffiths (1983) and Stuart-Fox (1989), have drawn attention to one problem in particular that is demonstrably crucial in any attempt to understand the jhana series. It has to do with the composition of the first jhana. The Pali Abhidhamma and classical meditation manuals, and with them most present-day accounts of Theravadin meditation theory, consistently state that the first jhana has mental onepointedness (cittass' ekaggata) as one of its component "factors." Yet the description which appears repeatedly in the first four Nikayas (and which, therefore, certainly antedates the Abhidhamma version) states that mental onepointedness becomes established in the second jhana, not in the first. Stuart-Fox, who discusses this matter in detail, concludes that the Abhidhamma description of the first jhana is a secondary development, a result of scholastic editing of the earlier Nikaya account. Both Griffiths (briefly and in passing) and Stuart-Fox (at length and explicitly) draw another closely related conclusion regarding the composition of the first jhana as described in the Nikayas: vitakka-vicara, the factor that particularly characterizes the first jhana, is probably nothing other than the normal process of discursive thought, the familiar but usually unnoticed stream of mental imagery and verbalization.2 These conclusions conflict with the widespread conception of the first jhana as a state of deep concentration, a profoundly altered state of con - sciousness attainable only after long and arduous practice.3 They can be shown also to challenge some long-held notions about the jhana series as a whole. To investigate the further implications of this revised understanding of the first jhana is a major objective of the present study. As to method, this study employs the kind of text-critical approach adopted by Griffiths and Stuart-Fox, while also taking into account what is known of the practical-experiential side of jhana meditation. It carefully distinguishes the earliest account of jhana, found throughout the Nikayas, from the historically later versions found in some late suttas, the Abhidhamma, and Buddhaghosa's Visuddmagga. Indeed, one of its specific aims is to clarify the relationship between the earlier and later accounts. The inclusion of meditative experience among the data to be used in the interpretive process raises some difficult methodological issues.4 For present purposes the central problem is that scholars who are non - meditators, and who are therefore in no position to check the accuracy of accounts of meditative experience, are naturally inclined to have reservations about interpretive procedures that draw on such accounts. Ade - quate discussion of this and related methodological issues is clearly beyond the scope of this paper, so it must suffice here to make just the following point. In the present case the account of meditative experience in question is shown to agree substantially with the relevant description given by Buddhaghosa in his Visuddmagga—a situation that should minimize possible concern on the part of non-meditator scholars. Whereas previous studies have focused on the first two jhanas, the present analysis covers the entire series, comprising the four basic jhanas (called, in the Abhidhamma and Visuddhimagga, rupa-jhanas, "material jhanas") and the four Aruppas (arupa-jhanas, "non-material jhanas").5 For convenience, the separate jhanas are henceforth referred to as "jhana 1," jhana 2" and so on up to "jhana 8" (neva sanna nasannayatana).6 The Nikaya account is examined first, followed by Buddhaghosa's more elaborate version. The two are then considered in the light of meditative experience. Finally, conclusions are drawn regarding the relationship between the two versions, and regarding the identities of the various stages in terms of meditative practices and attainments. These conclusions are seen as indicating a need to revise some long-established ideas about  jhanas.
 Analysis of the Nikaya Account
The often repeated jhana formula or "pericope" may be provisionally, and rather literally, translated as follows 
Jhana 1: Quite separated from sense desires, separated from unwholesome mental states, he [the meditator] attains and abides in the first jhana, in which are present initial thought (vitakka), sustained thought (yicara), and separation-born zest piti) and pleasure (sukha).
 Jhana 2: Through the suppression of initial thought and sustained thought, he attains and abides in the second jhana, in which there is inner tranquillity and oneness of mind, and in which initial thought and sustained thought are absent, and concentration-born zest and pleasure are present.
 Jhana 3: Through the fading away of zest, he abides equanimous, mindful and discerning; and experiencing pleasure with the body, he attains and abides in the third jhana, of which the Noble Ones say "equanimous, mindful, abiding in pleasure."
 Jhana 4: Through the relinquishing of pleasure, through the relinquishing of pain, through the previous disappearance of happiness and sorrow, he attains and abides in the fourth jhana, in which pleasure and pain are absent, and the purity of equanimity and mindfuless is present.
Jhana 5: Through the complete transcending of material perceptions, through the disappearance of impact-perceptions, through non-atten - tion to variety-perceptions, [aware] that space is endless, he attains and abides in the realm of endless space (akasancayatana).
Jhana 6: Through the complete transcending of the realm of endless space, [aware] that consciousness is endless, he attains and abides in the realm of endless consciousness (vinnanancayatana),
 Jhana 7: Through the complete transcending of the realm of endless consciousness, [aware] that there is nothing, he attains and abides in the realm of nothingness {akincannayatana).
 Jhana 8: Through the complete transcending of the realm of nothingness, he attains and abides in the realm of neither apperception nor non apperception (n 'eva sanna nasannayatana)

The above standard description of the jhanas will now be examined critically within a purely linguistic-textual-doctrinal framework, i. e. without at this stage making any attempt to link it to meditative practice. Since it is the Nikaya description that is in question, the later interpretations and explanations found in the Abhidhamma and the Visuddhimagga will be referred to only sparingly and with caution. Attention focuses first on the four rupa-jhanas (jhanas 1 to 4). Each of the first four paragraphs consists essentially in a statement of (a) the mental factors that are present or absent in each jhana, and (b) the factors that are developed or eliminated in making the transition to that jhana from the one preceding it. The mental condition of the monk or meditator before beginning the jhana practice is not described directly. Indirectly, however, the account does indicate that this pre-jhana condition is characterized by the presence of sense desires (kama) and other unwholesome mental states (akusala dhammas), for it is by becoming separated or isolated (vivicca) from these that the meditator attains jhana 1. It is stated that in jhana 1 there exist initial thought (vitakka) and sustained thought (vicara), together with zest (piti) and pleasure (sukha), both of which are "separation-born" (viveka-ja).% The adjective "separation-born" amounts to a reiteration of the statement that the meditator attains this jhana through becoming separated (vivicca)—i. e. separated from sense desires and unwholesome states. Its application to "zest" and "pleasure" (which immediately follow it in the sentence) and not to "initial thought" and "sustained thought" (which immediately precede it) indicates that it is above all this separation, with resulting zest and pleasure, that distinguishes jhana 1 from the pre-jhana condition. It indicates that the presence of initial and sustained thought in jhana 1 is not a consequence of the separation from sense desires and unwholesome states; that is, initial and sustained thought are present already in the pre-jhana condition and merely persist through the transition. The essence of the transition from normal consciousness to jhana 1 consists, therefore, in (a) the elimination of sense desires and other unwholesome states, and (b) the arising of zest and pleasure.9 The transition from jhana 1 to jhana 2 is achieved through the suppression or stilling (vupasama) of initial and sustained thought, and the establishing of inner tranquillity (ajjhattam sampasadanam) and oneness of mind (cetaso ekodibhavam). This is reiterated in the statement that jhana 2 is without initial thought and sustained thought (avitakka, avkara). Zest and pleasure, already established in the preceding jhana, are still present but are now described as "concentration-born" (samadhi-ja). "Concentration," "inner tranquillity," and "oneness of mind" are evidently synonyms.10 The essence of the transition to jhana 2 is, then, the elimination of initial and sustained thought and the establishing of concentration. The transition to jhana 3 comes about through the fading away of zest ipiti), as the meditator becomes equanimous or conatively neutral (upekhako or upekkhako) and also mindful and self-possessed (sato, sampajano). Pleasure continues, but is now, for the first time, said to be experienced with the body (kayena). As Gunaratana points out, the term "upekkha," though having many different applications, always signifies a midpoint or point of neutrality between extremes.ll In the present case the reference is clearly to neutrality in the domain of conation, i. e. to a
state of affective detachment. The meditator becomes upekhako through the disappearance of piti, a conative factor (placed under sahkharakhandha in the Abhidhamma classification).12 Thus, the essence of the transition from jhana 2 to jhana 3 is the replacement of pi ti (zest) by the conatively neutral sati-sampajanna (mindfulness and selfpossession). That the pleasure {sukha) is now explicitly physical appears to represent another significant development. In the transition to jhana 4, pleasure (sukha) is relinquished or allowed to disappear. The description states that pain (dukkha) disappears also, though it was not mentioned as present in earlier jhanas. Since jhanas 1, 2, and 3 are all described as pleasurable, this disappearance of pain makes sense only if understood as having been entailed in the establishing of jhana 1. Such a meaning is the more likely because the next two factors mentioned, happiness (somanassa) and sorrow (domanassa), are explicitly stated to have disappeared previously or earlier (pubbeva). As Gunaratana points out, analysis of the description is complicated by the existence of two different Nikaya usages of the terms sukha and dukkha- u
 First usage: sukha: physical and mental pleasure dukkha: physical and mental pain
Second usage: sukha: physical pleasure dukkha: physical pain somanassa: mental pleasure (happiness) domanassa: mental pain (sorrow)
 In the description of jhana 4 all four terms occur, whence it is clear that the second usage is being followed. Thus the sukha that is relinquished in attaining jhana 4 is physical or bodily pleasure, which is in keeping with the fact that the sukha present in jhana 3 is experienced "with the body." The description is not explicit regarding the type of sukha present in jhanas 1 and 2. In the final string of adjectives describing jhana 4, the pair asukham adukkham (without pleasure, without pain) is followed by upekkha-sati- parisuddhim (having purity of equanimity and mindfulness).14 Since upekkha and sati were already present in the preceding jhana, the addition of the word parisuddhim ("purity") evidently signifies that upekkha and sati are now no longer associated with sukha; that is, parisuddhi signifies absence of sukha, just as (in jhana 3) upekkha signifies absence of/?///. The account of the four rupa-jhanas exhibits a stylistic feature typical of the Pali canon in general: frequent reiteration through the use of synonyms and (in negations) antonyms. For example, the statement that jhana 2 is attained through suppression of initial thought and sustained thought (vitakka-vicaranam vupasama) is reiterated in the further statements that that jhana is without initial and sustained thought (avitakkam avicaram), that it is characterized by inner tranquility (ajjhattam sampasadanam) and oneness of mind (cetaso ekodibhavam), and that the associated zest and pleasure are born of concentration (samadhijam). Accordingly the above analysis has, in large part, consisted in identifying such sets of synonyms and antonyms, a procedure that greatly simplifies the description.. One evident characteristic is inconsistency in mentioning the continued existence of a factor in jhanas subsequent to the one in which that factor first becomes established. For example, equanimity (upekkha), which becomes established in jhana 3, is stated to be present also in jhana 4. On the other hand, the quality "without initial and sustained thought" (avitakkam, avicaram)—otherwise "having tranquillity" (sampasadanam), and "having oneness of mind" (cetaso ekodibhavam) —which is attributed to jhana 2, is not similarly applied to jhanas 3 and 4, though it is clearly to be understood to apply to them, and indeed always has been by commentators classical and modern.15 \ ekodibhava is the negation of vitakka-vicara.. The practice of summarizing the composition of the jhanas by listing the relevant jhana factors appears sporadically in a few late suttas, and becomes well established in the Abhidhamma.] 7 The odd development whereby the factor ekaggata (= ekodibhava) came to be attributed to jhana 1 is among the problems dealt with by Stuart-Fox. The analysis can now move on to the arupa-jhanas, the non-material jhanas. The first of these (in our terminology, jhana 5) is the realm of endless space (akasanancayatana). It is attained "through the complete transcending of material perceptions (rupa-sanna), through the disappearance of impact-perceptions (patigha-saflna), through non-attention to variety-perceptions" (nanatta-safina), and it entails the awareness that "space is endless" (ananto akaso). Of the three terms ending in -saniia, the first, rupa-sanna, is familiar as denoting perception of visual forms, the first of six recognized classes of sense perception.18 However, in the present context it clearly has a wider scope, justifying the usual translation "material perceptions" or "perceptions of matter."19 (Buddhaghosa explains it as perceptions of the rupa-jhanas and of their objects—presumably the kasina disks, the breathing, etc.)20 This ambiguity of rupa-sanha corresponds to an ambiguity in the word rupa: rupa is sometimes "visible form" (the object of visual perception) and sometimes "matter, materiality" (as when contrasted with noma or with ariipa).21 In the present context, then, riipa-sanna covers all but the sixth class of sanna, i. e. all but dhammasafffia, the type that has mental images (dhammas) as its objects. The second of the three terms, patigha-sanna ("impact-perception"), is explained in the Vibhahga as denoting perceptions of visual forms, sounds, odors, tastes, and tangible objects.22 This indicates that patigha-sanna is identical with the preceding item, rupa-sanfia. The third term, nanatta-sanna, ("variety-perception") contains in its literal meaning little indication just what type of perception is being referred to. However, the pattern established by rupa-sanha and patigha-sanna makes it likely that nanatta-sahha is a further synonym, i. e. that it too signifies "sense-perception," an interpretation explicitly affirmed by Buddhaghosa

We therefore have here a thrice uttered statement that the transition from jhana 4 to jhana 5 entails the cessation of physical sense perceptions. It is appropriate that this cessation of physical or material perception {rupa-lpatigha-lnanatta-sanna) coincides with the transition out of the physical or material (rupa) jhanas. The first arupa-jhana {jhana 5) can, therefore, be readily incorporated into the condensed table of the jhanas by adding a further column, headed "Sense Perception" (see Table 4). Jhana 5 is further characterized by the awareness or realization that "Space (akasa) is endless." In the Nikayas, akasa is occasionally appended to the list of four elements or mahabhutas, and in later times it assumes the status of a fifth element.24 The four—earth, water, fire, and air—are together equated with rupa, i. e. materiality or physicality, sometimes more specifically the human body. Akasa is what remains when these four are removed. Thus the awareness that "akasa is endless" amounts to the awareness that "rupa is non-existent"; and this again is an appropriate concomitant to the transition from the material or rupa jhanas to the non-material or arupa jhanas. The contrast between rupa as earth, water, fire, and air, and arupa as the realms of endless space, endless consciousness, etc., is apparent in the well known Udana passage: "There exists, monks, a realm in which there is not earth, nor water, nor fire, nor air, nor realm of endless space, nor realm of endless consciousness, nor realm of nothingness, nor realm of neither perception nor non-perception.. ..',25 The transition to jhana 6, the realm of infinite consciousness (vinnanancayatana), is achieved by transcending the realm of endless space and realizing that consciousness (vinnana) is endless. The type of analysis applied in earlier jhanas is hardly applicable here. By this stage in the series the information given has become so meager that nothing remains to be considered except the significance of the term vinnana.
That is itself a daunting problem, discussion of which will be deferred until later in the paper. The situation becomes even more difficult with the two remaining jhanas, the realm of nothingness and the realm of neither perception nor non-perception, each of which is attained by "transcending" the realm that precedes it. The possibilities of the text-analytical approach, as it can be applied to the Nikaya account, have, therefore, been exhausted for the present. Accordingly, we now turn to other sources, sources that provide information on the techniques and experiences associated with attaining jhanas in practice. The Nikaya account of the jhanas provides little information for the practicing meditator. Suttas such as the Anapana-sati Sutta do give some guidance; however, the standard source of practical information is the post-canonical manuals, particularly Buddhaghosa's Visuddhimagga (5th century CE), to which we now turn.

The description of jhana practice that Buddhaghosa presents in his Visuddhimagga is widely regarded, rightly or wrongly, as authoritative on Theravadin meditation. It undoubtedly represents an already well established tradition, for essentially the same description is found in the less well known Vimuttimagga of Upatissa, dated a few centuries earlier.26 (I shall nevertheless, for convenience, refer to this description as "Buddhaghosa's.") Buddhaghosa's account has been largely responsible for the widespread understanding of jhana 1 as a state of deep concentration. In it he indicates that attainment of jhana 1 entails a long and difficult progression through a series of sub-stages, of which the more advanced clearly do involve deep concentration. His portrayal of jhana 1 as a deeply concentrated state therefore affirms the Abhidhamma account (which ascribes ekaggata to jhana 1), while conflicting with the earlier Nikaya account. The task of sorting out the relationship between these two accounts, and discovering how the differences may have come about, has already been tackled in a preliminary way by Griffiths and Stuart-Fox. Here it will be dealt with more thoroughly, by first considering certain problems that arise out of the series of sub-stages which Buddhaghosa describes   as leading up to jhana 1 (and to each subsequent jhana.) This series is not mentioned in the Nikayas, nor even in the canonical Abhidhamma texts. Its appearance in the post-canonical Vimuttimagga and Visuddhimagga is evidently associated with the revision whereby ekaggata was ascribed to jhana 1. Consequently, any elucidation of the significance of Buddhaghosa's sub-stages may be expected to contribute to an improved understanding of the entire jhana series. To that end a summary of Buddhaghosa's account is now provided.27 In the example given by Buddhaghosa the meditation object is a specially prepared "earth kasina," a disk of clay about two spans in diame - ter. The meditating monk begins by gazing with concentrated attention at this disk, which therefore serves as the "preliminary sign" {parikamma-nimitta). After long and persistent effort, he becomes able not only to keep his attention firmly fixed on the disk itself, but also to retain an accurate mental image of it, i. e. to "see" inwardly a clear mental replica of the disk when he closes his eyes. This replica image is the "acquired sign" (uggaha-nimitta). The monk thereafter gives up gazing at the original disk and concentrates on the replica image instead. Through this exercise the replica image is progressively stabilized and reinforced until eventually it gives way to a different type of image, the "counterpart sign" (patibhaga-nimitta). This is an abstract derivative of the preceding image, bearing a general resemblance to it but lacking its "faults" and its specific identifying features. Whereas the acquired sign was a near-perfect mental replica of the original clay disk, the counterpart sign is likely to appear as a pure disk of light, for example resembling the full moon or a well polished mirror. The meditator now focuses on this counterpart sign, seeking to "extend" it progressively. This exercise is carried out in two stages: "access concentration" (upacarasamadhi) and "fixed concentration" (appana-samadhi). With the perfection of appana-samadhi, the meditator attains the first jhana. Once he has fully mastered these practices, the meditator may go on to develop the second jhana. This entails, according to Buddhaghosa, the same series of sub-stages, but preceded by practice of five "masteries" (vast). These include reflection on the grossness and undesirability of the jhana factor to be eliminated next, which in this case is vitakka (Buddhaghosa here follows the Abhidhamma division of jhana 1 into two separate jhanas: vitakka and vicara are eliminated successively.)

Much the same procedure applies for each of the remaining jhanas in turn. Thus, for every one of the jhanas, rupa and arupa, the meditator passes through the same series of sub-stages: concentration on the chosen physical object (parikamma-nimitta), development of the acquired sign (uggaha-nimitta), development of the counterpart sign (patibhaga-nimitta), access concentration (upacara-samadhi), and finally fixed concentration (appana-samadhi). On each occasion, the perfection of appana-samadhi marks attainment of the relevant jhana. It can be fairly readily confirmed that Buddhaghosa's account is generally accurate as a description of the meditative practice. Numerous practicing meditators, particularly in the Buddhist countries of southeast Asia, routinely experience many of the stages Buddhaghosa describes. They are well able—though not always very willing—to discuss the process as far as they have experienced it.28 Such meditators and their teachers do not necessarily use Buddhaghosa's terminology; however, some of the stages they describe can be readily recognized and correlated with his account. In particular, a sequence of three meditation objects— the original physical object, a replica image of it, and an abstract image derived from the replica image—is well attested. And for competent meditators the process culminates in attainment of an imageless state barely distinguishable from total unconsciousness, which masters iden tify as "entry into;jhana "29 Researchers wishing to investigate the matter at first hand can do so by taking up intensive meditation themselves. Such experimentation will support the claim that all meditators pass through essentially the same sequence of stages, provided they pursue the practice intensively and persistently enough, in a suitable environment, and with competent guid-ance.30 That kasina disks are rarely if ever used nowadays is unimportant, because the sequence is largely the same, whether the concentration object is a clay disk, a chanted mantra, or the sensation of the breath at the nostril. (Details are given in the next section.) Buddhaghosa's account therefore deserves acceptance as a reliable description of the stages in jhana practice as far as the attainment of what he calls "the first jhana," However, as an interpretation of those stages in terms of Buddhist doctrine, Buddhaghosa* s account presents several problems. One obvi - ous problem has to do with the above-noted question concerning the nature of the first jhana. Development of a stable mental image as the object of concentration—whether a replica image (uggaha-nimitta) or an abstract derived image (patibhaga-nimitta)—implies well established mental onepointedness. The final stage, appana-samadhi (which Buddhaghosa identifies with jhana 1—subsequently also jhana 2, etc.) is portrayed as an even more advanced stage of samadhi. It follows that Buddhaghosa's account is in conflict with the Nikaya account; because, as the Stuart-Fox study makes clear, the jhana 1 of the Nikaya account is a rather preliminary stage in which mental onepointedness has not yet been established. The condition attained by the meditator who has mastered appana-samadhi cannot be identical with the stage which the Nikayas call "the first jhana" (pathamam jhanam). It could be suggested, in Buddhaghosa's defense, that perfect correspondence is not to be expected: in his account of kasina meditation Buddhaghosa is referring to the first jhana of the Abhidhamma, not the first jhana of the Nikayas. (The Abhidhamma version states that the first jhana has mental onepointedness as a factor; the Nikaya version does not.) But such an argument would carry no weight, because Buddhaghosa understands the Abhidhamma and Nikaya descriptions of "the first jhana" to be referring to one and the same meditative attain - ment. He maintains that the verbal discrepancies between the two descriptions are of no consequence, but merely reflect differing perceptions about what was worth mentioning
Another problem with Buddhaghosa's account is that such details as the uggaha- and patibhaga-nimittas, and upacara-and appana-samctdhi are nowhere explicitly mentioned in the Nikayas. There is not even any indication in the Nikayas that attainment of jhana 1 entails a lengthy sequence of sub-stages such as Buddhaghosa describes. This raises questions concerning the transmission of the teaching. If this very basic information is genuine, why was it not recorded in the Nikayas? And how did commentators like Upatissa and Buddhaghosa manage to come by it? It is now evident that the interpretation implicit in Buddhaghosa's account of kasina meditation is problematic. As a description, Buddhaghosa's account of the sequence of meditative stages as far as appana-samadhi appears to be accurate; it corresponds with meditative experience. However, as an interpretation, it is demonstrably in conflict with the Nikaya account. We therefore confront the question: How does Buddhaghosa's description, with its detailed series of sub-stages, relate to the much simpler Nikaya account of the jhanas? This question will be approached initially by considering in greater detail the techniques and experiences actually involved in the practice of jhana meditation.

Kasina disks are rarely, if ever, used by present day meditators. The account that follows therefore describes, instead, the practice of mindfulness of breathing (anapana-sati), which is probably the most widely used, and certainly the best documented, Buddhist technique for jhana. ^ The description is based on the standard Theravadin style of practice, but in respect of the resulting experiences and attainments it is probably valid for all styles. The meditator, having found a quiet spot in which to practice, and having adopted the approved sitting posture, begins by developing an appropriate mental attitude. This may entail reflecting for a few minutes on the value and purpose of the practice he or she is about to undertake, on the virtues of Buddha, Dhamma, and Sangha, or on any similarly up-lifting topic. Thus prepared, he or she then closes the eyes and begins concentrating on the breathing. This involves focusing attention on the fine tactile sensation experienced at the rim of one nostril as the breath passes in and out. That sensation is the concentration object. At each sitting attention must be fo - cused on it and restrained from wandering. Invariably, however, attention does wander. After only a few breaths the meditator realizes that instead of concentrating on the sensation at the nostril rim, he or she is involved in a train of thought having no apparent connection with the practice. He or she immediately returns attention to the concentration object and begins again, but before long the same thing happens. Repeatedly, despite all efforts to keep the mind fixed on the concentration object, thoughts arise; and the trains of mental imagery and inner speech sometimes continue for a minute or more before the meditator realizes the digression and is able to cut them short. Only after long and persistent effort—over weeks or months, depending on individual temperament and the intensity of the practice—does success come. Finally, however, the dedicated meditator does succeed in keeping attention fixed on the concentration object for up to a minute without any thoughts intervening. With further practice the periods of full concentration and freedom from thought grow longer and more intense. The meditator becomes able to sit fully concentrated for several minutes together. With thought totally absent, there is no sense of boredom; the practice, which had formerly seemed dull and tiresome in the extreme, has now become irresistibly interesting. During this phase of the practice the meditator often finds the body making strange involuntary movements, for example a pronounced trembling, intermittent jerking, or creeping goose-flesh. The meditation master reassures the student that reactions of this kind are common. They are by-products of the high level of mental energy being developed, and have no importance other than as signs that progress is being made. The meditator must merely note their presence and resume the concentration practice. Following this advice, the meditator finds that the strange movements do soon cease, and facility in concentration improves accordingly. But now a new effect appears, in the form of various delightful bodily feel - ings: a feeling of lightness as if the body were floating some distance above the seat, or a pervading warmth as if the body were glowing. The meditator may find it possible to bring about an intensification of these effects; however, the master warns against this. The pleasant feelings are once again unimportant by-products of the practice; the meditator must merely acknowledge their existence and return to the concentration object With further practice the delightful feelings subside in their turn, leaving nothing in consciousness but the concentration object. Formerly faint and barely discernible, the sensation at the nostril rim is now experienced vividly as a zone of intense tactile sensation. There is now nothing else in consciousness. As far as the meditator is concerned the rest of the body is non-existent. Further prolonged concentration eventually results in a strange transformation of the object. The zone of intense tactile sensation is replaced by a glowing patch of light of similar shape and orientation, experienced inwardly as a vivid mental image. (The eyes remain closed throughout these exercises.) For example, if the zone of sensation at the nostril was experienced as crescent-shaped, the glowing patch of light that takes its place is likely to be similarly crescent-shaped. This abstract image is of variable color, indeed the meditator may find that its color and brightness can to some extent be modified at will. Its size seems indeterminate, there being no other content of consciousness with which it might be compared. Having once developed such an abstract image, the meditator is instructed to adopt it as the new concentration object. At each sitting he or she must begin by concentrating on the breath as usual; but as soon as the abstract image appears, that must be made the concentration object instead. This has the effect of causing the abstract image to arise more rapidly each time, and, once arisen, to become progressively more vivid and stable. The meditator continues practicing in this way, until one day, without warning, the abstract image suddenly disappears. Thus deprived of the only content of consciousness, the meditator has the sense of confronting an infinite black vacuum. This strange experience may lead to a loss of composure, with a consequent abrupt return to normal consciousness. However, the master gives reassurance and advises the student to cultivate this state of mental emptiness, entering it at every opportunity. In addition, the master advocates prolonging its duration by making a resolution to that effect at the beginning of each meditation session. Following these instructions, the meditator finds that the state of emptiness stabilizes and, as promised, lasts progressively longer
In this state of emptiness, as at all previous stages of the practice, the meditator remains conscious of the condition, retaining a detached awareness of the state of zero mental content However, there eventually comes a time when even this residual consciousness abruptly ceases. The effect is as if the meditator had suddenly gone under total anesthetic, or fallen into deep dreamless sleep. It cannot be said of this state that the meditator experiences it; rather, he or she infers it after the event, perhaps by referring to a clock or some other indicator of the passage of time. It is said that particularly competent meditators develop the ability to sit in this state of unconsciousness for as long as seven days together. Some masters set up the less ambitious goal of twenty-four hours, and tell their students that when they have achieved that they will have gone as far as this style of practice can take them. The above account, based on mindfulness of breathing, is broadly applicable for all forms of concentration meditation {samatha-bhavana\ though with some variations in detail depending on the type of object used. For example, concentration on the sound of a clock ticking natu - rally differs in the early stages. (Some meditators find an auditory object easier to concentrate on than a tactile one; others find it more difficult.) The abstract image develops in much the same way as with mindfulness of breathing, though it is likely to be different in appearance, e. g. exhibiting a rhythmic movement in time with the ticking. Thereafter the sequence of events is identical. A substantial difference from the course of events described above exists in the case of a visual object or a chanted mantra. With a visual object, the meditator begins with the eyes open, but closes them once the object has so imprinted itself on the memory that it can be visualized clearly "in the mind's eye." With a mantra, the meditator begins by repeating the phrase softly, and continues doing so until he or she can "hear" it inwardly after the voice stops. In either case, the mental replica —the image of the visual object or the internalized sound of the mantra —becomes the new concentration object, and in time yields an abstract image as before. Practice based on a visual object or a mantra therefore differs from practice based on the types of object described earlier (e. g. the breathing) in having a distinct extra stage, that in which the original object is replaced by a mental replica. However, this difference is perhaps more apparent than real. It may well be that concentration on the breathingdoes actually give rise to a mental replica of the original tactile sensation; for such a mental replica would naturally be masked by the original sensation, which itself continues. With a visual object, the original sensation can be terminated at any time by shutting the eyes, which makes the replica image clearly distinguishable from it; but one cannot simply stop breathing at will, whence the apparent skipping of one stage. It is the fuller sequence of stages that is presented by Buddhaghosa in his account of the kasina practice.

Despite the overall correspondence between the above description and Buddhaghosa's account, there are some evident differences. One that deserves mention here has to do with the phenomenon of goose-flesh, trembling, and other involuntary bodily movements, which meditators commonly experience early in the practice. Present day meditation mas - ters identify these effects as piti, a component "factor" (anga) of jhanas 1 and 2. The main basis for this identification is a vivid description given by Buddhaghosa.33 However, that description occurs not in his account of the sub-stages leading to jhana, but rather in his description of jhana itself. Before discussing the significance of this discrepancy, let us note the potential usefulness of piti as a landmark for correlating the practical sequence of meditative stages with the textual sequence of jhanas. All accounts of the jhanas agree in stating that the jhana factor piti is present in jhanas 1 and 2, but ceases with the attainment of jhana 3. If piti is correctly identified with the goose-flesh and similar reactions, then the ceasing of those reactions in the course of meditation should correspond to the transition from jhana 2 to jhana 3. In considering such apparent correspondences, one has to be prepared to put aside long-held notions about the nature of the jhanas. The old understanding of jhana 1 as a deeply concentrated state has already been rendered dubious, and that means that both scholars and meditators now have to be ready to re-think the entire jhana series. In such an enterprise intellectual flexibility is naturally essential.  

Another potentially useful landmark for correlating meditative stages with jhanas is provided by the classification of the jhanas into two categories: rupa and arupa, material and non-material. Common sense indicates that this classification would appropriately be applied to the meditative stages as follows: Those stages in which attention is directed to a physical object—the actual kasina disk, the breathing, a chanted mantra, etc.—are rupa, material; and those in which it is directed to a mental image, or in which there is no specifiable object at all, are arupa, nonmaterial. w On this basis, the arising of the mental replica of the medita - tion object would mark the transition from;jhana 4 (the last rupa-jhana) to jhana 5 (the first arupa-jhana). Here a further conflict with Buddhaghosa's account becomes apparent. We have already noted that one of the earlier sub-stages listed in his account, namely the arising of the uggaha-nimitta, clearly corresponds to the arising of the replica image in the medi tation practice. Yet now we have grounds for inferring that the transition from jhana 4 to jhana 5 corresponds to that same meditative event. This is another problem that will be deferred until later. For the present, the discussion will focus on possible correspondences between the meditative series and the Nikaya jhana series, independently of any connection with Buddhaghosa's substages. Two points of correspondence between the meditative series and the jhana series have already been tentatively identified. Application of similar reasoning elsewhere in the two series yields the following tentative pattern of correspondence.


Comparison of Meditative Stages and Jhanas
MEDITATIVE STAGES/JHANA STAGES Stage 1: The meditator's efforts at concentrating on the assigned object fail to stop the flow of thought, but do bring a pleasant freedom from affective involvement.  JHANA 1: Vitakka and vicara are present, along with piti nd sukha, both of which are born of separation from sense desires and unwholesome states.'
 Stage 2: The flow of thought ceases, yielding a pleasant stillness. Trembling, gooseflesh, etc. occur. Jhana 2: Vitakka and vicara cease with the attaining of ekodibhava. Piti. and sukfia are now samadhi born

 Stage 3: The trembling, etc. cease, as the power of attention becomes more balanced. Pleasant bodily feelings of warmth etc. are experienced. Jhana 3: Piti ceases, as upekkha and sati-sampajanna are established. Sukh is now felt with the body
Stage 4: The pleasant bodily feelings cease. Balanced attention to the concentration object continues.  Jhana 4: Sukha ceases, leaving pure upekkha and sati
Stage 5: Physical sensation ceases, giving way to a mental image which is a replica of the original concentration object Jhana 5: Rupa-patigha-anattasanna ceases. There comes the awareness that akasa is endless..
 Stage 6: There develops a derived image, an abstract counterpart of the preceding replica image.
\Jhatia 6: Endless akasa is transcended and there comes the awareness that vinnana is endless.
 Stage 7: This abstract image disappears, giving way to mental emptiness, and leaving a sense of being suspended in an endless black vacuum..Jhana 7: Endless vinnana is transcended and there comes the awareness that nothing whatever exists.

Stage 8: Even the sense of experi encing mental emptiness ceases, as total unconsciousness supervenes; however, the meditator is aware of this only in retrospect
Jhana 8: Nothingness is transcended and the realm of neither sanna nor non-sanna is attained

The reasoning behind this proposed pattern of correspondences will now be spelled out by considering, in order of their occurrence, those Pali terms whose meanings are of significance in defining the different jhanas. Vitakka-vicara, The meaning of these paired terms is a key issue in Stuart-Fox's analysis of jhanas 1 and 2. Outside of the jhana context, vitakka and vicara together mean, as Rhys Davids and Stede note, "just thought, thinking." ^ The evidence adduced by Stuart-Fox indicates that this is also what they mean in the standard jhana formula as we find it in the Nikayas: vitakka-vicara simply denotes the normal flow of thought, the stream of imagery and verbalizing which, like a television program that is rarely switched off, provides a persistent though vague and unobtrusive background to our everyday waking consciousness.36 Rarely noticed under normal circumstances, the thought-stream becomes only too obvious to the meditator when he or she tries to bring it to a halt and keep all attention focused on the concentration object. Indeed, as practitioners of concentration meditation well know, stopping the flow of thought is one of the most difficult aspects of the practice. Success in this task represents a major breakthrough; and the resulting state of prolonged freedom from thought (cittass' ekaggata) constitutes a radicallyaltered state of consciousness, a most satisfying and encouraging attainment It is, therefore, to be expected that the thought-stream, and the task of suppressing it, should figure prominently in the textual account of jhana practice. This expectation is fulfilled once one allows that vitakka-vicara in the jhana description has the same meaning it has in other more general contexts in the Nikayas. These various considerations support the identification of vitakka-vicara with the normal flow of thought; the suppression of vitakka-vicara in the transition from jhana 1 to jhana 2 is the meditative achievement of bringing the flow of thought to a standstill. Piti. The jhana description indicates two different varieties of piti: separation-born and concentration-born (viveka-ja and samadhi-ja).*7 Accordingly, the "Conation" column of Table 1 presents the following series:
 prejhana sense desires and unwholesome states
jhana 1: separation-born piti
jhana2: concentration-born piTI
 JHANA3 equanimous mindfulness and self-possession

Concentration-born piti, the phenomenon of trembling, gooseflesh, etc., is easy to identify; and indeed for an experienced meditator, particularly one who has also done some insight meditation, the progression through the entire series is fairly readily perceived, as follows. The practice can begin only if the meditator is able to curb for a time the mind's habit of reacting emotionally to the contents of consciousness, i. e. to external sense objects and mental images. Such affective reaction—endless in its variety but adequately covered by the broad opposing categories "liking" and "disliking"—represents a pointless squandering of the energy that is indispensable for attentive focusing, and thus for the establishing of mental onepointedness. The beginning meditator, struggling to block the flow of thought and keep attention fixed on the prescribed concentration object, applies considerable mental effort, sometimes so much as to cause sweat to stream from the body. This blocking and fixing, once achieved, can be maintained with a much lower level of effort; however, inexperienced meditators usually fail to make the appropriate adjustment Having achieved onepointedness, they continue to put out the same high level of effort, with the result that the excess manifests in the form of un-controlled physical movements. With practice, meditators learn to diminish the intensity of the attentive focusing, yielding a state of equilibrium which, because it entails no wasteful loss of energy, can be maintained for long periods. ^ This view of the process indicates that the relevant jhana terms are to be understood as follows: "Sense desires and unwholesome states" are the varied affective reactions that characterize the prQ-jhana condition, i. e. ordinary consciousness. "Separation-bornpiti" is the high-powered attentive focusing on the concentration object which the meditator brings to bear by redeploying the energy normally expended in affective reaction. "Concentration-born piti" is the phenomenon whose outward maifestation is physical trembling, etc., and whose cause is the maintaining of this high level of attentive focusing after it is no longer needed, i. e. after onepointedness has been established. And "mindfulness and self-possession" is the condition of balanced attention that is ultimately achieved by reducing the intensity of the focusing and establishing the appropriate equilibrium (upekklia). Sukha. As noted in the textual analysis, sukha is said to be present in jhanas 1, 2, and 3, but is stated to be felt with the body only in jhana 3. This tallies with the meditator's experience of delightful bodily feelings following the cessation of the physical forms of piti. In addition it suggests, though not unequivocally, that the sukha of jhanas 1 and 2 is to be understood as purely mental pleasure (i. e. somanassa). This again is in keeping with experience: freedom from affective involvement {jhana 1) is a pleasurable state of mind, and so too is steady mental onepointedness {jhana 2). It is doubtful, however, if a phenomenological distinction between "separation-born sukha" (jhana1) and "samadhi-born sukha" (Jhana 2) can really be drawn. Akasa. We have already noted the appropriateness of the term akasa ("space") in the title of the first arupa-jhana: space is all that remains following cessation of the four material elements (earth, water, fire, and air), i. e. following the cessation of rupa. "Realm of endless space" is therefore appropriate as a term for the meditative state in which all input from the five physical sense organs hasceased. For the meditator in this state there exists only the replica image  Here it is well to recall that akasa is not emptiness or nothingness, a fact emphasized by the contrast with the "realm of nothingness" (jhana 7).
 , any attempt at interpreting the term vinanna in the jhana context is necessarily speculative.39 Nevertheless, some useful observations are possible, especially as regards the distinction between vinnana and sanna. Buddhaghosa likens sanna  a child's perception of a coin (awareness of its color, shape, texture, etc.), and vinnana to an adult's perception of the same coin (awareness of its purchasing power and usefulness).40 This explanation, if valid, indicates that vinnana is a processed, more abstract derivative of sannaSuch an understanding of the relationship between sanna and vinnana makes good sense in the case of jhanas 5 and 6, for those two stages can now be interpreted as follows. The awareness of the replica image (Jhana 5) is an example of the sixth class of sanna the the awareness of the derived abstract image {jhana 6) is. an example of the sixth class of vinnana (mano-vinnana).41 The steady persistence of each type of image, as the only content of the meditator's consciousness, makes good sense of the phrases "[aware] that akasa is endless" (Jhana 5) and "[aware] that vinnana is endless" (jhana 6). Akinacanna. This word, meaning "nothingness," indicates a meditative state having zero content. The description of jhana 7 includes the statement "n'atthi kinici ti, [aware] that there is nothing," which, like the parallel "ti"' clauses for jhana 5 and 6, implies that the meditator is con-scious of the condition. This is, therefore, an accurate description of the meditative state in which, following the disappearance of the abstract image, consciousness is empty of all content and the meditator is left only with a sense of an endless void.42 Neva sanna nasanna. Buddhaghosa states that "neither sanna nor non-sanna" implies also "neither vedana nor non-vedana" "neither citta nor non- cilia," and "neither phassa nor non-phassa'"° If he is right, then the expression "neva sanna nasanna," though specifying only sanna, actually covers all mental components. Now, this expression ("neither sanna nor non-sanna") has the form of the fourth member of the Indian tetralemma. To the question "Is there sanna iNdian logic allows not only for "There is" and "There is not," but also for "There both is and is not" and "There neither is nor is not." A connection with the meditative practice can now be made. In the eighth and final stage the meditator becomes totally unconscious, but can know this only by inference after the event. Consequently, it can be argued, the presence of consciousness, or of any specified menial factor, can be neither affirmed nor denied. Any question about whether there is consciousness can be answered, strictly speaking, only with "There neither is nor is not." But to non-Indian minds this is philosophical hair-splitting; by generally accepted standards of logicality and phenomenological accuracy, the final meditative stage would be quite correctly described as a state of total unconsciousness. It is therefore noteworthy that there does exist (in the Potthapada-sutta, belonging to the earliest stratum of the Nikayas) a single variant version of the account of the eight jhanas in which the eighth stage is described straight-forwardly in terms of cessation of sanna (sanna nirujjanti)

The above discussion has shown that the series of eight jhanas described at numerous places in the Nikayas, correlates well with the series of eight stages experienced by practitioners of concentration meditation. One can hardly escape the conclusion that the eight jhanas are the eight meditative stages. This conclusion has serious implications for Buddhaghosa's series of sub-stages. That series is said to precede attainment of each jhana\ but, as already noted, some of the sub-stages appear to be identical with cer-tain of the jhanas. For example, Buddhaghosa's sub-stage characterized by the patibhaga-nimitta clearly corresponds to the meditative stage in which an abstract image becomes established; and that meditative stage has been shown to correspond also to jhana 6. The first three of Buddhaghosa's sub-stages can be fairly positively equated with jhanas in this way,Thus, Buddhaghosa's series of sub-stages duplicates the series of jhanas. What Buddhaghosa portrays as steps on the way to the first jhana (and to each subsequent jhana) arc in fact steps on the way to the lost jhana. It is now evident that Buddhaghosa's account is not, as generally supposed, merely a more detailed and precise formulation of the account found throughout the Nikayas. Rather, it is a fundamentally different version which is in serious conflict with the Nikaya account. By Buddhaghosa's day the jhana doctrine had been drastically modified. The first and crucial modification, already introduced, it seems, by the earliest Abhidhammikas, consisted in equating the final stage of the meditative sequence (i. e. the state of total unconsciousness) with attainment of the first jhana rather than the last {jhana 8). Once this new equation had been set up, two further things became necessary: (1) a set of terms for the meditative stages passed through on the way to this new "first jhana"\ and (2) a description of a series of further meditative prac - tices whereby the remaining jhanas could (allegedly) be attained. Accordingly, the new set of terms, uggaha-nimitta, etc., was created and brought into association with a practice consisting in systematic reflec-tion on the need to eliminate the next jliana factor, or (in the case of the arupa-jhanas) to move on to the next, more subtle object. These developments must have been fairly directly linked with the developments discussed by Stuart-Fox, whereby ekaggata was attributed to jhana 1, and vitakka-vicara was reinterpreted as some kind of attentive focusing. Only on the basis of such a revised description of jhana 1 would it have been plausible, and therefore possible, to identify that jhana with a deeply concentrated meditative state. Indeed, it may well be that the seemingly minor step of attributing ekaggata to jhana 1 was what initiated the entire process. That such modification of the jhana doctrine could come about may seem to raise doubts about the meditative credentials of those responsible for it; it suggests that the authors of the Vimuttimagga and Visuddhimagga had little practical acquaintance with meditation. However, this does not necessarily follow, because it is only the interpretation of the jhana doctrine that is at fault in Buddhaghosa's account; the description of the practice (as far as the first attainment of appana-samadhi) is gen - erally satisfactory. Indeed, the fact that a new set of names for the meditative stages was developed, centuries after the correspondences with the original set of jhanas had been lost sight of, indicates rather that the tradition of jhana practice had survived intact down to Buddhaghosa's day, and that he at least knew about the stages it entailed. That the original correspondences between jhana practice and jhana doctrine were lost sight of in the first place is in keeping with the now widely acknowledged development of an early split, within the Sangha, between meditator-monks and scholar-monks.47 The Abhidhamma-like statements about the jhanas contained in the Sahgiti, Dasuttara, and other late suttas, are consistent with this split having begun to develop not long after the founder's death.48 Already in the early days of the Sangha meditators and Dhamma-expounders were going their separate ways; a serious communication gap was developing.

One negative consequence of Buddhaghosa's complex account of jhana was that mastery of the higher jhanas was made to seem a superhuman attainment. With the entire series multiplied by itself, as it were, the total number of stages was greatly increased; and no genuine instructions were available for the attainment of any jhana beyond the supposed first one. This effect continues to the present day. To most Buddhist meditators, even "the second jhana" seems hardly a realistic goal, while "the ariipa-jhanas" appear impossibly remote. The present revised understanding of the jhanas should, therefore, give encouragement to practicing meditators. The path of concentration practice is not nearly as long and arduous as Buddhaghosa made it seem.