THE RIDDLE OF THE JAINAS AND AJIVIKAS IN EARLY BUDDHIST LITERATURE
Early Buddhist literature is acquainted with both Jainas and Ajıvikas. It calls the former nirgrantha, Pali. nigantha, and the latter ajıvika or ajıvaka. The former are sometimes presented as followers of Nigan.tha Nataputta or Nathaputta, who has been identified as Vardhamana, better known as Mahavıra, the last tırthankara ˙ of the Jainas; the name Nataputta corresponds to Ardhamagadhı Nayaputta, known from the earliest surviving canonical texts of Jainism.The latter are presented in (Svetambara) Jaina canonical literature as the followers of Gosala Mankhaliputta, identified by modern scholars with the Makkhali Gosala whose views are reported in Buddhist literature. By combining data found in the Jaina and in the Buddhist canon, scholars have tried to reconstitute the ideas which belonged to the early Jainas and Ajıvikas. Scholars rarely seem to have addressed the question what picture arises if one bases oneself exclusively on Buddhist literature. What image did the early Buddhists have of the Jainas and Ajıvikas, or perhaps: what information about these movements did they preserve in their oldest texts? This question is legitimate, for there is no guarantee that the ideas current among the Buddhists were necessarily accurate; alternatively, they may preserve memories that are older than anything found in the Jaina canon. Either way they may deviate from the pictures preserved in the early Jaina texts. Consider first the Ajıvikas. The Pali canon repeatedly mentions one or several of them. Least informative are the passages that do not tell us anything about the life-style of the person or persons concerned. Among these we may count those that recount the encounter of the Buddha soon after his enlightenment with an Ajıvika called Upaka.They occur in almost identical form in the Majjhima Nikaya (MN I.170–171; II.93–94, fully printed NDPS vol. 2 pp. 336–337) and in the Mahavagga (Vin I.8), and tell us nothing beyond the fact that Upaka was, precisely, an Ajıvika. The same is true of the Ajıvika Panduputta (MN I.31–32), and of the Ajıvika carrying a mandara flower who informs Maha-Kassapa of the death of the Buddha (DN II.162; Vin II.284). The Suttanipata mentions Ajıvikas and Niganthas and qualifies them as “argumentative sectarians” (Sn 381: titthiya vadasıla¯; tr. Norman, 1984: 64), but leaves it at that. Other passages make clear that Ajıvikas could have followers. The term ajıvakasavaka ¯ “lay disciple of Ajıvikas / of the Ajıvikas” is used a few times (AN I.217; Vin II.130, 165; III.135 f.). The fact that a bloodrelation (n˜ati salohito ¯ ) of king Bimbisara is stated to have gone forth among (the) Ajıvikas (ajıvakesu pabbajito) confirms that the Ajıvikas constituted one or more groups of religious wanderers (Vin IV.74). A feature of the Ajıvikas that is repeatedly stressed is their nakedness. The Mahavagga (Vin I.290 f.) tells the charming story of disciples of the Buddha who, to refresh themselves, had taken off their clothes to let the rain cool their naked bodies. A servant girl, sent to invite Buddhists but seeing only naked men, mistakes them for Ajıvikas. In the Suttavibhanga (Vin III.211 f.) monks find themselves naked as a ˙ result of a robbery, but the outcome is the same: they are mistaken for Ajıvikas. The terms ajıvaka and acelaka seem occasionally used as synonyms. This appears to be the case in the Suttavibhanga (Vin ˙ IV.91–92) where the Buddha forbids giving food to naked ascetics (acelaka): the introductory story speaks of Ajıvikas instead. It is not surprising that the commentator Buddhaghosa more than once explains the term “Ajıvika” as “naked ascetics” (naggapabbajita, Mp III.334; naggasaman. a, Ps I.151). Passages like these do indeed create the impression that the expression is used to refer to naked ascetics in general, rather than to any particular movement.8 This raises the following important question. We know that at the time of the historical Buddha and of Mahavıra there were two kinds of Jainas: the followers of Par´sva, who wore clothes, and the followers of Mahavıra, who were naked. Is it possible that the early Buddhists included the naked Jainas in their general category of Ajıvikas, so that the Jainas mentioned in the Buddhist canon are primarily followers of Par´sva? Before trying to answer this question, it will be useful to consider the evidence which allows us to conclude that there were indeed two groups of Jainas at the time of Mahavıra. This evidence comes from the Jaina canon, which describes a few encounters between followers of P¯ar´sva and those of Mah¯av¯ıra.10 One of those encounters is described in Viy¯ahapannatti (Vy¯akhy¯aprajnapti) I.9, where K ˜ ¯al¯asa Vesiyaputta (K¯al¯asya Vai´sikaputra), a follower of P¯ar´sva, questions the Jaina Elders and subsequently “accepted the religion based on Five Vows, with pratikraman. a added,11 in place of [the] religion based on Four Vows, and practised it. He led for long years the life of a monk in the order;and as a monk, he remained nude ... ”.12 That five vows and nudity are the marks that distinguished the followers of Mah¯av¯ıra from those of P¯ar´sva is clear from the 23rd chapter of the Uttar¯adhyayana. In this chapter Ke´sin,13 a follower of P¯ar´sva, and Gautama, a pupil of Vardham¯ana, engage in the following shared reflection:14 Is our Law the right one, or is the other Law the right one? are our conduct and doctrines right, or the other? (11) The Law as taught by the great sage P¯ar´sva, which recognises but four vows, or the Law taught by Vardham¯ana, which enjoins five vows? (12) The Law which forbids clothes [for a monk], or that which [allows] an under and upper garment? ... (13) The ensuing discussion confirms that P¯ar´sva recognises four vows, Vardham¯ana five (Utt 23.23), and specifies that “the Law taught by Vardham¯ana forbids clothes, but that of the great sage P¯ar´sva allows an under and upper garment”.15 We learn from this that there were two, and perhaps only two, differences between the teachings of P¯ar´sva and Mah¯av¯ıra: the followers of the former recognised four restraints and wore clothes, while the followers of the latter recognised five restraints and wore no clothes. The nakedness of Mah¯av¯ıra and his followers finds further confirmation in some other passages of their canon. The Ac ¯ ¯ar¯anga ˙ Sutra describes how the Venerable Ascetic ( ¯ saman. e bhagavam. ), i.e. presumably Mah¯av¯ıra, decided not to wear “that piece of cloth”. The lines concerned read:16 “ ‘I shall not cover myself with that robe in that winter’. He had crossed [the sam. sara ¯ ] for the rest of his life. This [refusing of dress] is in accordance with his doctrine. ... For a year and a month he did not leave off his robe. Since that time the Venerable One, giving up his robe, was a naked, world-relinquishing, houseless [sage].” And the so-called17 Kalpa-Sutra states: ¯ 18 “The Venerable Ascetic Mah¯av¯ıra for a year and a month wore clothes; after that time he walked about naked, and accepted the alms in the hollow of his hand.” The Jainas in the Buddhist canon are never presented as being naked.19 As a rule nothing is said about their outward appearance, but at least one passage contrasts them with naked Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas. It occurs in the Anguttara Nik ˙ ¯aya and reads:20 Puran ¯ . a Kassapa has made known six classes (abhijati ¯ ) of mankind: a black one, a blue one, a red one, a green one, a white one, and a supremely white one. The black class: butchers of sheep, butchers of pigs, fowlers, deerstalkers, hunters, fishermen, thieves, executioners, prison-keepers, and others who follow a cruel occupation. The blue class: Buddhist monks who live as thieves, and believers in karma and [the efficiency of] works.21 The red class: Jainas (nigan. t .ha) who wear a single garment. The green class: house-holders who wear white cloths and are lay disciples of naked [ascetics] (acelaka). The white class: Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas of both sexes. The supremely white class: Nanda Vaccha, Kisa Sankicca, Makkhali Gos ˙ ¯ala.
This passage is interesting for various reasons. It confirms our earlier observation concerning the strong link between Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas and nakedness. The development that can be discerned from class two to class five is one of increasing nakedness, or respect for nakedness. Buddhist monks are in this respect exceeded by Jainas who wear just one garment;22 these by Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas who wear no clothes at all. Lay disciples of naked monks rank between Jainas and Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas, i.e., higher than Jainas. It seems likely that in this passage, too, acelaka is to be understood as a synonym of aj ¯ ¯ıvaka. Interestingly, the same three individuals characterised here as constituting the supremely white class, are presented as naked in the Mah¯asaccaka Sutta of the Majjhima Nik¯aya, in the following passage which is put in the mouth of Saccaka the Nigan.t .ha’s son:23 Well, there are, for example, Nanda Vaccha, Kisa Sankicca, Makkhali Gos ˙ ¯ala. They go naked, rejecting conventions, licking their hands, not coming when asked, not stopping when asked; they do not accept food brought or food specially made or an invitation to a meal; they receive nothing from a pot, from a bowl, across a threshold, across a stick, across a pestle, from two eating together, from a pregnant woman, from a woman giving suck, from a woman lying with a man, from where food is advertised to be distributed, from where a dog is waiting, from where flies are buzzing; they accept no fish or meat, they drink no liquor, wine or fermented brew. They keep to one house, to one morsel; they keep to two houses, to two morsels ... they keep to seven houses, to seven morsels. They live on one saucerful a day, on two saucerfuls a day ... on seven saucerfuls a day. They take food once a day, once every two days ... once every seven days, and so on up to once every fortnight; they dwell pursuing the practice of taking food at stated intervals. For our present purposes it is particularly interesting to see that the Jainas are described in the above passage from the Anguttara Nik ˙ ¯aya as “wearing a single garment” and therefore as not being naked.24 This supports our conjecture that the Jainas mentioned in the early Buddhist texts are primarily the followers of P¯ar´sva. The followers of Mah¯av¯ıra, if this conjecture is correct, might then be included among the Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas. The fact that the lay disciples of the naked ascetics are described as wearing white clothes (odatavasan ¯ a¯) does not conflict with this hypothesis: exactly the same term is elsewhere used to describe the lay followers of Nigan.t .ha N¯ataputta (e.g. MN II.244), as it is to describe the lay followers of the Buddha (e.g. DN III.37). If we wish to check our hypothesis to the extent possible we have to keep in mind that the followers of P¯ar´sva distinguished themselves not just on one, but on two counts from the followers of Mah¯av¯ıra: they wore clothes and followed four rather than five vows or restraints. What was the position of the Jainas depicted in the Buddhist canon?
The S¯aman˜naphala Sutta of the D ˜ ¯ıgha Nik¯aya attributes the following views to Nigan.t .ha N¯ataputta:25 ... a Nigan.t .ha is bound by a fourfold restraint. What four? He is curbed by all curbs (var¯ ¯ı), enclosed by all curbs, cleared by all curbs, and claimed by all curbs. And as far as a Nigan.t .ha is bound by this fourfold restraint, thus the Nigan.t .ha is called self-perfected, self-controlled, self-established. A Sutta of the Sam. yutta Nik¯aya, too, characterises Nigan.t .ha N¯ataputta as well bound by a fourfold restraint (catuy ¯ amasusam ¯ . vuta; SN I.66). Hermann Jacobi noticed, already in 1880 (p. 160 (799)), that the fourfold restraint here attributed to Mah¯av¯ıra and his followers really belonged to Mah¯av¯ıra’s predecessor P¯ar´sva. It is true that the specification of these restraints in the S¯aman˜naphala Sutta does not agree with what ˜ we learn from the Jaina canonical texts; T. W. Rhys Davids (1899: 75 n. 1) concluded from this that these restraints were not intended to represent the four vows kept by the followers of P¯ar´sva. It seems however safer to agree with Maurice Walshe where he states (1987: 545 n. 115): “[The four restraints of the S¯aman˜naphala Sutta] do not ˜ represent the genuine Jain teaching but seem to parody it in punning form.” How are the four restraints of P¯ar´sva enumerated in the Jaina texts? The T. h¯an. am. ga (which qualifies them as taught by “the twenty-two arhats in the middle except for the first and the last one” enumerates them as follows:26 [1] savvao p ¯ an¯. ativ ¯ ay¯ ao veraman ¯ . am. “Abstaining from all killing” [2] savvao mus ¯ av¯ ay¯ ao veraman ¯ . am. “Abstaining from all lying” [3] savvao adin ¯ . n. ad¯ an¯. ao veraman ¯ . am. “Abstaining from all taking what has not been given” [4] savvao bahiddh ¯ ad¯ an¯. ao veraman ¯ . am. . Regarding the meaning of bahiddhad¯ an¯. a there is some difference of opinion. Schubring (1962: 30) resumes the situation as follows: “The ... word [bahiddhad¯ ana ¯ ] by [Abhayadeva’s Sth¯an¯angavr ˙ .tti] 202 a is taken as bahirdhad¯ ana ¯ and commented as ‘accepting (ad¯ ana ¯ ) from outside’, i.e. the accepting of things not belonging to the monk’s standard outfit. This prohibition is said to include the ‘possession’ of a female individual. Thus, as Abhayadeva adds, P¯asa’s (= P¯ar´sva’s) fourth commandment would correspond with Mah¯av¯ıra’s both fourth and fifth (sexual abstention and non-possession ... ).27 The former of these two Leumann sees expressed in bahiddha-d ¯ an¯. a (sic), ‘a decent term for copulation (the delivery of sperm)’.28 Thus it is P¯asa’s third vow that corresponds with both the third and fifth of Mah¯av¯ıra’s including
prohibition of any appropriation other than by gift as well as by acquisition.” Rather than concentrating on the possible explanations of the problematic expression bahiddhad¯ an¯. a, 29 it will be useful to draw some other passages from the Buddhist canon into the picture. The Buddhist Sankha Sutta of the Sam ˙ . yutta Nik¯aya attributes the following doctrine (dhamma) to Nigan.t .ha N¯ataputta:30 [a] Whosoever slayeth a living creature, – all such go to the Woeful Lot, to Purgatory. [b] Whosoever taketh what is not given, [c] whosoever acts wrongly in respect of sensual passion, [d] whoseover tells lies, – all such go to the Woeful Lot, to Purgatory. This agrees with the four restraints of P¯ar´sva, with the proviso however that one of P¯ar´sva’s restraints – the one that uses the expression bahiddhad¯ an¯. a – be interpreted in a sexual sense. Against this the following objection might be raised. The Sankha ˙ Sutta enumerates the above four points for the benefit of a lay follower of the Nigan.t .has, viz. Asibandhakaputta. It might be maintained that they are really the five vows of Mah¯av¯ıra, with the exception of the one that can only be kept by a monk: apariggaha “possessionlessness”.31 This objection, which is not strong in itself, looses most of its force in the light of another Buddhist passage. The Udumbarika-S¯ıhan¯ada Sutta of the D¯ıgha Nik¯aya uses the expression catuy ¯ amasam ¯ . varasam. vuto “restrained by the four restraints” in connection with a hypothetical ideal ascetic, who follows the path of the Buddha. The four restraints are specified thus:32 (i) na pan¯. am atipapeti, na p ¯ an¯. am atipatayati, na p ¯ an¯. am atipatayato ¯ samanun˜no hoti ˜ ; (ii) na adinnam. adiyati, na adinnam ¯ . adiy ¯ apeti, na adinnam ¯ . adiyato ¯ samanun˜no hoti ˜ ; (iii) na musa bhan ¯ . ati, na musa bhan ¯ . apeti, na mus ¯ a bhan ¯ . ato samanun˜nato hoti ˜ ; (iv) na bhavitam ¯ asim ¯ . sati, na bhavitam ¯ asim ¯ . sapeti, na bh ¯ avitam ¯ asim ¯ . sato samanun˜no hoti ˜ . This has been translated (Walshe, 1987: 390): (i) he does not harm a living being, does not cause a living being to be harmed, does not approve of such harming; (ii) he does not take what is not given, or cause it to be taken, or approve of such taking;
(iii) he does not tell a lie, or cause a lie to be told, or approve of such lying; (iv) he does not crave for sense-pleasures, cause others to do so, or approve of such craving. This, too, is obviously a variant of the four restraints of P¯ar´sva. Once again, it is the last item on the list that causes difficulties of interpretation.33 However, it allows of the interpretation given in the translation. We may therefore conclude, not only that bahiddhad¯ an¯. a in the Jaina texts is (also?) to be understood in the sense “sexual intercourse”, but that the early Buddhists were aware of the exact meaning of the four restraints of the followers of P¯ar´sva. We can conclude from what precedes that the early Buddhists knew P¯ar´sva’s four restraints but attributed them to Nigan.t .ha N¯ataputta and his disciples. This may be a mistake on the part of the Buddhists.34 Alternatively, one might consider the possibility – suggested by Mette (1991: 134) – that N¯ataputta and Mah¯av¯ıra were not one and the same person, and only came to be looked upon as such in relatively later parts of the Jaina canon.35 [The question whether Mah¯av¯ıra died before the Buddha may be considered relevant in this context. After all, if he didn’t, we may then be led to believe that he was, though contemporary with the Buddha, a younger contemporary, whose views had not yet reached their final form, or had not yet gained currency, during the latter’s life time.36 At first sight this conjecture – that Mah¯av¯ıra survived the Buddha for some time – has little to recommend itself, for several Buddhist Suttas mention N¯ataputta’s death and the Buddha’s comments upon it.37 In spite of this, this point of view has been maintained by some modern scholars.38 Whatever the truth in this matter, we do not need this hypothesis to explain the teachings of P¯ar´sva in association with the Nirgranthas, if it can be accepted – as has been argued so far – that the followers of Mah¯av¯ıra were included under the more general denomination of Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas.]39 Our hypothesis to the extent that the early Buddhists used the term Aj ¯ ¯ıvika to refer to all naked religious wanderers, including the Jainas who followed Mah¯av¯ıra, does not exclude that there may have been “real” Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas, wanderers who used this expression to refer to themselves, and who may have followed one or more specific teachers and shared among themselves a specific school doctrine.40 The passage studied above mentions the names of three individuals who together constituted the “supremely white class”: Nanda Vaccha, Kisa Sankicca, Makkhali ˙ Gos¯ala. It is at least conceivable that these were the recognized saints of the “real” Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas. This seems confirmed by the concluding remarks of the Sandaka-Sutta of the Majjhima Nik¯aya (no. 76). Here the wanderer (paribbajaka ¯ ) 41 Sandaka is reported as stating:42 These Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas, those mothers’ dead sons, laud themselves and disparage others, and they recognise only three emancipated ones, namely, Nanda Vaccha, Kisa Sankicca, ˙ and Makkhali Gosala ¯ . A further confirmation may – but this is much less certain – be found in the Tevijja-Vacchagotta-Sutta of the Majjhima Nik¯aya (no. 71). This sermon (as do some other sermons) presents a wandering ascetic (paribbajaka ¯ ) 43 belonging to the Vaccha clan (vacchagotta) whose personal name is not given but who is addressed as Vaccha. Vaccha asks whether there is any Aj ¯ ¯ıvika who, on the dissolution of the body, has made an end to suffering or has gone to heaven; the answer is, of course, negative (MN I.483). It is tempting to identify this paribbajaka ¯ Vaccha who is so obviously concerned with the fate of the Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas with Nanda Vaccha. This particular Sutta would then have to be understood as an attempt by the Buddhists to claim for themselves (Vaccha is converted in the very next Sutta) one of the leaders of the Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas. It is not, however, certain that the Sutta has to be understood in this manner. The Sandaka Sutta, mentioned above, merits further attention. It contains a sermon addressed by Ananda to the wanderer Sandaka. ¯ At Sandaka’s request Ananda enumerates four “ways that negate the ¯ living of the holy life” (abrahmacariyavasa ¯ ) and four “kinds of holy life without consolation” (anassasik ¯ ani brahmacariy ¯ ani ¯ ).44 The four “ways that negate the living of the holy life” are each followed by these comments:45 “But it is superfluous for this good teacher to go about naked, to be bald, to exert himself in the squatting posture, and to pull out his hair and beard.” Nakedness, as we have seen, is in the Buddhist texts primarily, or even exclusively, associated with the Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas, and never with the Jainas; the remaining characteristics – baldness, squatting, pulling out hair and beard – are found among the latter as well. The then following four “kinds of holy life without consolation” are not commented upon in this manner. It is yet among these that we find a position that is elsewhere in the canon attributed to Nigan.t .ha N¯ataputta. That is to say, from among the eight positions described by Ananda, ¯ four are attributed to naked ascetics, the remaining four are not. In combination with the fact that Sandaka, as we have seen, mentions the Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas at the end of this Sutta, it seems justified to think that the four “ways that negate the living of the holy life” (abrahmacariyavasa ¯ ) are here presented as positions belonging to Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas; this does not necessarily mean that they all belonged to the “real” Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas. These positions are identical with the positions attributed in the S¯aman˜naphala ˜ Sutta of the D¯ıgha Nik¯aya to Ajita Kesakambalin, Puran ¯ . a Kassapa, Makkhali Gos¯ala46 and Pakudha Kacc¯ayana respectively. The Sandaka Sutta does not attribute them to anyone in particular; it introduces each of them with the words:47 “Here some teacher holds such a doctrine and view as this”. Among the then following four “kinds of holy life without consolation” (anassasik ¯ ani brahmacariy ¯ ani ¯ ) we find a position that is elsewhere explicitly associated with the Jaina leader Nigan.t .ha N¯ataputta.48 This confirms our earlier conclusion that the Jainas are not counted among the naked ascetics. Ananda begins the second part of his exposition ¯ with the words:49 Here, Sandaka, some teacher claims to be omniscient and all-seeing, to have complete knowledge and vision thus: ‘Whether I am walking or standing or sleeping or awake, knowledge and vision are continuously and uninterruptedly present to me.’ This passage literally repeats the words attributed to Nigan.t .ha N¯ataputta by his disciples in the Cul ¯ adukkhakkhandha Sutta of the Majjhima Nik¯aya.50 Omniscience is, of course, an important theme in the Jaina canonical texts.51 However, the first “kind of holy life without consolation” is followed by a sequel that is particularly interesting. Ananda ¯ first criticises the claim to omniscience of the anonymous teacher by saying:52 He enters an empty house, he gets no almsfood, a dog bites him, he meets with a wild elephant, a wild horse, a wild bull, he asks the name and clan of a woman or a man, he asks the name of a village or a town, and the way to go there. This cannot but be meant as a criticism of the claimed omniscience, which should be able to avoid all these futile or disagreeable events. Interestingly, the teacher concerned is allowed to reply to this criticism, in the following passage:53 When he is questioned: ‘How is this?’ he replies: ‘I had to enter an empty house, that is why I entered it. I had to get no almsfood, that is why I did not get any. I had to be bitten by a dog, that is why I was bitten. I had to meet with a wild elephant, a wild horse, a wild bull, that is why I met with them. I had to ask the name and clan of a woman or a man, that is why I asked. I had to ask the name of a villager or a town and the way to go there, that is why I asked.’ It does not require much reflection to see that for someone who claims omniscience there can hardly be another way but this to explain his misadventures to a sceptical critic. A self-proclaimed omniscient person who enters an empty house for alms should have known beforehand that the house is empty, so why does he enter it? The only justification possible would be to maintain that this particular excursion had not been inspired by the incorrect belief that there were people in the house, but was rather determined by a pre-existing set of rules. The omniscient person entered the empty house because he had to enter it. Strict determinism makes even an omniscient person behave like an ordinary one. Ananda does not react to the reply of the omniscient teacher, leaving ¯ the impression that he finds this reply totally unconvincing and ridiculous. However, it is no more ridiculous than the idea of omniscience. It might even be maintained that it is practically impossible for a human teacher to seriously claim omniscience without at the same time maintaining that human behaviour, including his own, is subject to deterministic rules. How else would he account for his mishaps, whether in the form of absence of almsfood and biting dogs, or elephants and other wild animals that cross his way? Strict determinism is not normally associated with Jainism. It is a feature of the teachings of Makkhali Gos¯ala, probably one of the saints of “real” Aj ¯ ¯ıvikism, as we have seen. It is not commonly associated with the Jainas, but the present passage from the Sandaka Sutta shows that it may very well have been part of the early teachings of this religion. One might conjecture that determinism had an important role to play in the days when Mah¯av¯ıra was still alive and in the then following period during which the human behaviour, including errors, of the omniscient leaders of Jainism were still part of collective memory. With the subsequent idealisation of the omniscient sages of Jainism, elements of behaviour that might be taken to be in conflict with their omniscience disappeared, and with them the need for determinism as a means to explain them. What is more, determinism may have started to be felt as a limitation to the power of a Jina. Determinism, if it did indeed characterise early Jainism, would not be the only feature it shared with Aj ¯ ¯ıvikism. The similarity between the six “colours of the soul” (lesy´ a¯) of the Jainas and the six abhijatis ¯ of the Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas has often been commented upon.54 It does not really matter here whether Jainism borrowed these notions from Aj ¯ ¯ıvikism (as has often been maintained), or vice-versa, or both from a common source. This shared feature can be taken as an indication that there may have been others. Determinism may have been one of them, and again it is not necessary (nor indeed possible, it would seem) to resolve the question who borrowed from whom. The link between omniscience and determinism, suggested above, may have made the latter doctrine particularly attractive for all self-proclaimed Jinas. Our reflections lead us to the following tentative two-fold conclusion. It seems likely that the Jainas (nirgrantha) and Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas mentioned in the Buddhist canon are not simply two distinct and clearly delineated religious movements that existed at the time of the historical Buddha. The situation may have been more complicated. The term Aj ¯ ¯ıvika may have been used for more than just one religious movement, and may indeed have covered the followers of Mah¯av¯ıra beside “real” Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas and various other religious wanderers. The feature they all shared was nakedness, but this may have been the only feature they all had in common. On the other hand, one passage in the Buddhist canon suggests that the doctrinal position of the early Jainas may have been less distinct from that of the “real” Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas than has often been supposed. Both may have adhered to a strict determinism, a position which was eminently useful to explain the human shortcomings of their “omniscient” leaders.
This passage is interesting for various reasons. It confirms our earlier observation concerning the strong link between Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas and nakedness. The development that can be discerned from class two to class five is one of increasing nakedness, or respect for nakedness. Buddhist monks are in this respect exceeded by Jainas who wear just one garment;22 these by Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas who wear no clothes at all. Lay disciples of naked monks rank between Jainas and Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas, i.e., higher than Jainas. It seems likely that in this passage, too, acelaka is to be understood as a synonym of aj ¯ ¯ıvaka. Interestingly, the same three individuals characterised here as constituting the supremely white class, are presented as naked in the Mah¯asaccaka Sutta of the Majjhima Nik¯aya, in the following passage which is put in the mouth of Saccaka the Nigan.t .ha’s son:23 Well, there are, for example, Nanda Vaccha, Kisa Sankicca, Makkhali Gos ˙ ¯ala. They go naked, rejecting conventions, licking their hands, not coming when asked, not stopping when asked; they do not accept food brought or food specially made or an invitation to a meal; they receive nothing from a pot, from a bowl, across a threshold, across a stick, across a pestle, from two eating together, from a pregnant woman, from a woman giving suck, from a woman lying with a man, from where food is advertised to be distributed, from where a dog is waiting, from where flies are buzzing; they accept no fish or meat, they drink no liquor, wine or fermented brew. They keep to one house, to one morsel; they keep to two houses, to two morsels ... they keep to seven houses, to seven morsels. They live on one saucerful a day, on two saucerfuls a day ... on seven saucerfuls a day. They take food once a day, once every two days ... once every seven days, and so on up to once every fortnight; they dwell pursuing the practice of taking food at stated intervals. For our present purposes it is particularly interesting to see that the Jainas are described in the above passage from the Anguttara Nik ˙ ¯aya as “wearing a single garment” and therefore as not being naked.24 This supports our conjecture that the Jainas mentioned in the early Buddhist texts are primarily the followers of P¯ar´sva. The followers of Mah¯av¯ıra, if this conjecture is correct, might then be included among the Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas. The fact that the lay disciples of the naked ascetics are described as wearing white clothes (odatavasan ¯ a¯) does not conflict with this hypothesis: exactly the same term is elsewhere used to describe the lay followers of Nigan.t .ha N¯ataputta (e.g. MN II.244), as it is to describe the lay followers of the Buddha (e.g. DN III.37). If we wish to check our hypothesis to the extent possible we have to keep in mind that the followers of P¯ar´sva distinguished themselves not just on one, but on two counts from the followers of Mah¯av¯ıra: they wore clothes and followed four rather than five vows or restraints. What was the position of the Jainas depicted in the Buddhist canon?
The S¯aman˜naphala Sutta of the D ˜ ¯ıgha Nik¯aya attributes the following views to Nigan.t .ha N¯ataputta:25 ... a Nigan.t .ha is bound by a fourfold restraint. What four? He is curbed by all curbs (var¯ ¯ı), enclosed by all curbs, cleared by all curbs, and claimed by all curbs. And as far as a Nigan.t .ha is bound by this fourfold restraint, thus the Nigan.t .ha is called self-perfected, self-controlled, self-established. A Sutta of the Sam. yutta Nik¯aya, too, characterises Nigan.t .ha N¯ataputta as well bound by a fourfold restraint (catuy ¯ amasusam ¯ . vuta; SN I.66). Hermann Jacobi noticed, already in 1880 (p. 160 (799)), that the fourfold restraint here attributed to Mah¯av¯ıra and his followers really belonged to Mah¯av¯ıra’s predecessor P¯ar´sva. It is true that the specification of these restraints in the S¯aman˜naphala Sutta does not agree with what ˜ we learn from the Jaina canonical texts; T. W. Rhys Davids (1899: 75 n. 1) concluded from this that these restraints were not intended to represent the four vows kept by the followers of P¯ar´sva. It seems however safer to agree with Maurice Walshe where he states (1987: 545 n. 115): “[The four restraints of the S¯aman˜naphala Sutta] do not ˜ represent the genuine Jain teaching but seem to parody it in punning form.” How are the four restraints of P¯ar´sva enumerated in the Jaina texts? The T. h¯an. am. ga (which qualifies them as taught by “the twenty-two arhats in the middle except for the first and the last one” enumerates them as follows:26 [1] savvao p ¯ an¯. ativ ¯ ay¯ ao veraman ¯ . am. “Abstaining from all killing” [2] savvao mus ¯ av¯ ay¯ ao veraman ¯ . am. “Abstaining from all lying” [3] savvao adin ¯ . n. ad¯ an¯. ao veraman ¯ . am. “Abstaining from all taking what has not been given” [4] savvao bahiddh ¯ ad¯ an¯. ao veraman ¯ . am. . Regarding the meaning of bahiddhad¯ an¯. a there is some difference of opinion. Schubring (1962: 30) resumes the situation as follows: “The ... word [bahiddhad¯ ana ¯ ] by [Abhayadeva’s Sth¯an¯angavr ˙ .tti] 202 a is taken as bahirdhad¯ ana ¯ and commented as ‘accepting (ad¯ ana ¯ ) from outside’, i.e. the accepting of things not belonging to the monk’s standard outfit. This prohibition is said to include the ‘possession’ of a female individual. Thus, as Abhayadeva adds, P¯asa’s (= P¯ar´sva’s) fourth commandment would correspond with Mah¯av¯ıra’s both fourth and fifth (sexual abstention and non-possession ... ).27 The former of these two Leumann sees expressed in bahiddha-d ¯ an¯. a (sic), ‘a decent term for copulation (the delivery of sperm)’.28 Thus it is P¯asa’s third vow that corresponds with both the third and fifth of Mah¯av¯ıra’s including
prohibition of any appropriation other than by gift as well as by acquisition.” Rather than concentrating on the possible explanations of the problematic expression bahiddhad¯ an¯. a, 29 it will be useful to draw some other passages from the Buddhist canon into the picture. The Buddhist Sankha Sutta of the Sam ˙ . yutta Nik¯aya attributes the following doctrine (dhamma) to Nigan.t .ha N¯ataputta:30 [a] Whosoever slayeth a living creature, – all such go to the Woeful Lot, to Purgatory. [b] Whosoever taketh what is not given, [c] whosoever acts wrongly in respect of sensual passion, [d] whoseover tells lies, – all such go to the Woeful Lot, to Purgatory. This agrees with the four restraints of P¯ar´sva, with the proviso however that one of P¯ar´sva’s restraints – the one that uses the expression bahiddhad¯ an¯. a – be interpreted in a sexual sense. Against this the following objection might be raised. The Sankha ˙ Sutta enumerates the above four points for the benefit of a lay follower of the Nigan.t .has, viz. Asibandhakaputta. It might be maintained that they are really the five vows of Mah¯av¯ıra, with the exception of the one that can only be kept by a monk: apariggaha “possessionlessness”.31 This objection, which is not strong in itself, looses most of its force in the light of another Buddhist passage. The Udumbarika-S¯ıhan¯ada Sutta of the D¯ıgha Nik¯aya uses the expression catuy ¯ amasam ¯ . varasam. vuto “restrained by the four restraints” in connection with a hypothetical ideal ascetic, who follows the path of the Buddha. The four restraints are specified thus:32 (i) na pan¯. am atipapeti, na p ¯ an¯. am atipatayati, na p ¯ an¯. am atipatayato ¯ samanun˜no hoti ˜ ; (ii) na adinnam. adiyati, na adinnam ¯ . adiy ¯ apeti, na adinnam ¯ . adiyato ¯ samanun˜no hoti ˜ ; (iii) na musa bhan ¯ . ati, na musa bhan ¯ . apeti, na mus ¯ a bhan ¯ . ato samanun˜nato hoti ˜ ; (iv) na bhavitam ¯ asim ¯ . sati, na bhavitam ¯ asim ¯ . sapeti, na bh ¯ avitam ¯ asim ¯ . sato samanun˜no hoti ˜ . This has been translated (Walshe, 1987: 390): (i) he does not harm a living being, does not cause a living being to be harmed, does not approve of such harming; (ii) he does not take what is not given, or cause it to be taken, or approve of such taking;
(iii) he does not tell a lie, or cause a lie to be told, or approve of such lying; (iv) he does not crave for sense-pleasures, cause others to do so, or approve of such craving. This, too, is obviously a variant of the four restraints of P¯ar´sva. Once again, it is the last item on the list that causes difficulties of interpretation.33 However, it allows of the interpretation given in the translation. We may therefore conclude, not only that bahiddhad¯ an¯. a in the Jaina texts is (also?) to be understood in the sense “sexual intercourse”, but that the early Buddhists were aware of the exact meaning of the four restraints of the followers of P¯ar´sva. We can conclude from what precedes that the early Buddhists knew P¯ar´sva’s four restraints but attributed them to Nigan.t .ha N¯ataputta and his disciples. This may be a mistake on the part of the Buddhists.34 Alternatively, one might consider the possibility – suggested by Mette (1991: 134) – that N¯ataputta and Mah¯av¯ıra were not one and the same person, and only came to be looked upon as such in relatively later parts of the Jaina canon.35 [The question whether Mah¯av¯ıra died before the Buddha may be considered relevant in this context. After all, if he didn’t, we may then be led to believe that he was, though contemporary with the Buddha, a younger contemporary, whose views had not yet reached their final form, or had not yet gained currency, during the latter’s life time.36 At first sight this conjecture – that Mah¯av¯ıra survived the Buddha for some time – has little to recommend itself, for several Buddhist Suttas mention N¯ataputta’s death and the Buddha’s comments upon it.37 In spite of this, this point of view has been maintained by some modern scholars.38 Whatever the truth in this matter, we do not need this hypothesis to explain the teachings of P¯ar´sva in association with the Nirgranthas, if it can be accepted – as has been argued so far – that the followers of Mah¯av¯ıra were included under the more general denomination of Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas.]39 Our hypothesis to the extent that the early Buddhists used the term Aj ¯ ¯ıvika to refer to all naked religious wanderers, including the Jainas who followed Mah¯av¯ıra, does not exclude that there may have been “real” Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas, wanderers who used this expression to refer to themselves, and who may have followed one or more specific teachers and shared among themselves a specific school doctrine.40 The passage studied above mentions the names of three individuals who together constituted the “supremely white class”: Nanda Vaccha, Kisa Sankicca, Makkhali ˙ Gos¯ala. It is at least conceivable that these were the recognized saints of the “real” Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas. This seems confirmed by the concluding remarks of the Sandaka-Sutta of the Majjhima Nik¯aya (no. 76). Here the wanderer (paribbajaka ¯ ) 41 Sandaka is reported as stating:42 These Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas, those mothers’ dead sons, laud themselves and disparage others, and they recognise only three emancipated ones, namely, Nanda Vaccha, Kisa Sankicca, ˙ and Makkhali Gosala ¯ . A further confirmation may – but this is much less certain – be found in the Tevijja-Vacchagotta-Sutta of the Majjhima Nik¯aya (no. 71). This sermon (as do some other sermons) presents a wandering ascetic (paribbajaka ¯ ) 43 belonging to the Vaccha clan (vacchagotta) whose personal name is not given but who is addressed as Vaccha. Vaccha asks whether there is any Aj ¯ ¯ıvika who, on the dissolution of the body, has made an end to suffering or has gone to heaven; the answer is, of course, negative (MN I.483). It is tempting to identify this paribbajaka ¯ Vaccha who is so obviously concerned with the fate of the Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas with Nanda Vaccha. This particular Sutta would then have to be understood as an attempt by the Buddhists to claim for themselves (Vaccha is converted in the very next Sutta) one of the leaders of the Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas. It is not, however, certain that the Sutta has to be understood in this manner. The Sandaka Sutta, mentioned above, merits further attention. It contains a sermon addressed by Ananda to the wanderer Sandaka. ¯ At Sandaka’s request Ananda enumerates four “ways that negate the ¯ living of the holy life” (abrahmacariyavasa ¯ ) and four “kinds of holy life without consolation” (anassasik ¯ ani brahmacariy ¯ ani ¯ ).44 The four “ways that negate the living of the holy life” are each followed by these comments:45 “But it is superfluous for this good teacher to go about naked, to be bald, to exert himself in the squatting posture, and to pull out his hair and beard.” Nakedness, as we have seen, is in the Buddhist texts primarily, or even exclusively, associated with the Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas, and never with the Jainas; the remaining characteristics – baldness, squatting, pulling out hair and beard – are found among the latter as well. The then following four “kinds of holy life without consolation” are not commented upon in this manner. It is yet among these that we find a position that is elsewhere in the canon attributed to Nigan.t .ha N¯ataputta. That is to say, from among the eight positions described by Ananda, ¯ four are attributed to naked ascetics, the remaining four are not. In combination with the fact that Sandaka, as we have seen, mentions the Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas at the end of this Sutta, it seems justified to think that the four “ways that negate the living of the holy life” (abrahmacariyavasa ¯ ) are here presented as positions belonging to Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas; this does not necessarily mean that they all belonged to the “real” Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas. These positions are identical with the positions attributed in the S¯aman˜naphala ˜ Sutta of the D¯ıgha Nik¯aya to Ajita Kesakambalin, Puran ¯ . a Kassapa, Makkhali Gos¯ala46 and Pakudha Kacc¯ayana respectively. The Sandaka Sutta does not attribute them to anyone in particular; it introduces each of them with the words:47 “Here some teacher holds such a doctrine and view as this”. Among the then following four “kinds of holy life without consolation” (anassasik ¯ ani brahmacariy ¯ ani ¯ ) we find a position that is elsewhere explicitly associated with the Jaina leader Nigan.t .ha N¯ataputta.48 This confirms our earlier conclusion that the Jainas are not counted among the naked ascetics. Ananda begins the second part of his exposition ¯ with the words:49 Here, Sandaka, some teacher claims to be omniscient and all-seeing, to have complete knowledge and vision thus: ‘Whether I am walking or standing or sleeping or awake, knowledge and vision are continuously and uninterruptedly present to me.’ This passage literally repeats the words attributed to Nigan.t .ha N¯ataputta by his disciples in the Cul ¯ adukkhakkhandha Sutta of the Majjhima Nik¯aya.50 Omniscience is, of course, an important theme in the Jaina canonical texts.51 However, the first “kind of holy life without consolation” is followed by a sequel that is particularly interesting. Ananda ¯ first criticises the claim to omniscience of the anonymous teacher by saying:52 He enters an empty house, he gets no almsfood, a dog bites him, he meets with a wild elephant, a wild horse, a wild bull, he asks the name and clan of a woman or a man, he asks the name of a village or a town, and the way to go there. This cannot but be meant as a criticism of the claimed omniscience, which should be able to avoid all these futile or disagreeable events. Interestingly, the teacher concerned is allowed to reply to this criticism, in the following passage:53 When he is questioned: ‘How is this?’ he replies: ‘I had to enter an empty house, that is why I entered it. I had to get no almsfood, that is why I did not get any. I had to be bitten by a dog, that is why I was bitten. I had to meet with a wild elephant, a wild horse, a wild bull, that is why I met with them. I had to ask the name and clan of a woman or a man, that is why I asked. I had to ask the name of a villager or a town and the way to go there, that is why I asked.’ It does not require much reflection to see that for someone who claims omniscience there can hardly be another way but this to explain his misadventures to a sceptical critic. A self-proclaimed omniscient person who enters an empty house for alms should have known beforehand that the house is empty, so why does he enter it? The only justification possible would be to maintain that this particular excursion had not been inspired by the incorrect belief that there were people in the house, but was rather determined by a pre-existing set of rules. The omniscient person entered the empty house because he had to enter it. Strict determinism makes even an omniscient person behave like an ordinary one. Ananda does not react to the reply of the omniscient teacher, leaving ¯ the impression that he finds this reply totally unconvincing and ridiculous. However, it is no more ridiculous than the idea of omniscience. It might even be maintained that it is practically impossible for a human teacher to seriously claim omniscience without at the same time maintaining that human behaviour, including his own, is subject to deterministic rules. How else would he account for his mishaps, whether in the form of absence of almsfood and biting dogs, or elephants and other wild animals that cross his way? Strict determinism is not normally associated with Jainism. It is a feature of the teachings of Makkhali Gos¯ala, probably one of the saints of “real” Aj ¯ ¯ıvikism, as we have seen. It is not commonly associated with the Jainas, but the present passage from the Sandaka Sutta shows that it may very well have been part of the early teachings of this religion. One might conjecture that determinism had an important role to play in the days when Mah¯av¯ıra was still alive and in the then following period during which the human behaviour, including errors, of the omniscient leaders of Jainism were still part of collective memory. With the subsequent idealisation of the omniscient sages of Jainism, elements of behaviour that might be taken to be in conflict with their omniscience disappeared, and with them the need for determinism as a means to explain them. What is more, determinism may have started to be felt as a limitation to the power of a Jina. Determinism, if it did indeed characterise early Jainism, would not be the only feature it shared with Aj ¯ ¯ıvikism. The similarity between the six “colours of the soul” (lesy´ a¯) of the Jainas and the six abhijatis ¯ of the Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas has often been commented upon.54 It does not really matter here whether Jainism borrowed these notions from Aj ¯ ¯ıvikism (as has often been maintained), or vice-versa, or both from a common source. This shared feature can be taken as an indication that there may have been others. Determinism may have been one of them, and again it is not necessary (nor indeed possible, it would seem) to resolve the question who borrowed from whom. The link between omniscience and determinism, suggested above, may have made the latter doctrine particularly attractive for all self-proclaimed Jinas. Our reflections lead us to the following tentative two-fold conclusion. It seems likely that the Jainas (nirgrantha) and Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas mentioned in the Buddhist canon are not simply two distinct and clearly delineated religious movements that existed at the time of the historical Buddha. The situation may have been more complicated. The term Aj ¯ ¯ıvika may have been used for more than just one religious movement, and may indeed have covered the followers of Mah¯av¯ıra beside “real” Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas and various other religious wanderers. The feature they all shared was nakedness, but this may have been the only feature they all had in common. On the other hand, one passage in the Buddhist canon suggests that the doctrinal position of the early Jainas may have been less distinct from that of the “real” Aj ¯ ¯ıvikas than has often been supposed. Both may have adhered to a strict determinism, a position which was eminently useful to explain the human shortcomings of their “omniscient” leaders.
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