Satya

Sanskrit satya (Ved. satyá, Avest. haithiia) most probably goes back to the weak form of sám (together) with the adjectival suffix -tyá (see Wright, 1988); the derivation fromsát, the present participle of the verb as “to be” (which has influenced medieval and modern usage), with the suffix -ya (e.g. Mayerhofer, 1976, 1996) is not convincing, since this suffix is never added to participle stems. Thus the word satyá is originally an adjective meaning, not “existent, real,” but “in accord, conformable, consistent (with),” denoting a relationship between two items, for example, a word, concept, or statement, and the corresponding fact or entity in (physical or metaphysical) reality. That satyá is basically to be distinguished from sát “real, existing” (in the ontological sense) is shown by the regular antonym ánṛta(false, untruthful), versus ásat (nonexisting).

The Use and Function of Satya in Relevant Ancient Indian Texts

Ṛgveda

In most of the attestations in the Ṛgveda (approx. 80%), satyá is used as an adjective, normally as an attribute, sometimes as a predicate, rarely as an adverb (the same is true for the few attestations in the Avesta). It seems that there was more than one meaning involved; this may be reflected also in compounds and in the later development. Translations of satya with “true” (which is partly synonymous with “real”) are often unsatisfactory, being either too vague or not actually covering some of the connotations in the Indian context. The notion of being consistent with a future reality might be better expressed by adjectives like “effectual, effective, efficient,” as can be shown in the Ṛgveda, where satyá is used to qualify the following:

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abstract nouns like manyú (zeal), mahitvá, mahimán (greatness), janimán (birth),mánas (mind, intellect), here satyá may be translated as “effectual” (i.e. potentially effective);

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a god (or another individual), either directly, mostly Indra, but also Agni (twice), the two Rodasī (heaven and earth), Uṣas, Soma, the ancestors (pitáraḥ), or else in a particular function, for example, as ṛṇayā́ or ṛṇayā́van “debt-collector” (Brahmaṇaspati, Agni), as king saṃrā́j (Indra), rā́jan (Soma), as dātṛ “bestower (of goods)” (Agni, Indra), as aratí “administrator” (Agni), as adhvará “sacrifice” (Soma), as hótā satyátaraḥ (Agni), etc.; here satyá may be best translated as “efficient”;

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in later strata, mental, verbal, or other activities (often connected with the sacrifice), for example, puróhiti (ministration of a priest), úpastuti (praise), āśír(mixture with milk), stóma (praise), śraddhā́ (confidence, faith), mántra (poem),dyumnáhūti, deváhūti (invocation of the gods), pītí (draught), ukthá (hymn of praise), ṛtavāká (statement of truth), which may be qualified as “effective,” and likewise Indra’s deeds (káraṇāni, kṛtébhiḥ), which can be regarded as the basis for his characterization as satyá. 

In predicative use, correspondence with a future reality is clearly expressed in sentences containing an imperative, like satyā́ bhavantu āśíṣo no (ṚV. 7.17.5), “let our prayers be effective (= be fulfilled)!” or the corresponding request, satyā́m āśíṣaṃ kṛṇutā (10.67.11), “make my prayer come true!” But it can also be found in statements referring to the present or past, as in satyā́ nṛṇām abhavad deváhūtiḥ, ”the men’s invocation of the gods was effective” (6.65.5), or in kṛṇván víśvāni ápāṃsi satyā, “making all (sacrificial) actions effective (= successful)” (Agni; ṚV. 1.70.8).

Whereas in all these cases, satyá qualifies, and agrees with, a specific noun, there are several instances where it agrees only with a pronoun, normally tád “it, that,” either qualified by a genitive or referring to a statement, where the translation with “true” is most natural, such as insatyáṃ tád índro ... sū́ryaṃ viveda, “that is true: Indra found the sun” (ṚV. 3.39.5). It is often emphasized by ít: satyám ít tán ná tvāvāṁ anyó asti, “this is indeed true: there is nobody else like you (i.e. Indra)” (ṚV. 6.30.4); utó tát satyám ít táva, “and that is also true of you, indeed” (Indra;ṚV. 8.93.5), távét tát satyám (Agni; ṚV. 1.1.6).

In some of these instances, it may be argued that satyá actually functions as a noun (“this is the truth,” i.e. a true statement). The use as a noun is more obvious where satyá appears as an independent accusative object or in an oblique case. Examples are as follows: satyám ūcur náraḥ evā hí cakrúḥ, “the men (ṛbhus) had spoken true/the truth, for they did it (what they had announced)” (ṚV. 4.33.6); satyānṛté avapáśyañ jánānām, “surveying true and false [speech] of the people” (Varuṇa; ṚV. 7.49.3); satyáṃ dhū́rvantaṃ ... nyòṣa, ”burn him down who bends the truth” (Agni; ṚV. 10.87.12). In Ṛgveda 1.21.6, téna satyéna certainly refers to a spoken statement, “by means of this true speech,” in agreement with later solemn statements (satyakriyā) effecting a miraculous change (see also MBh. etc. below) where the effect conversely confirms the “truth” or validity of the statement (see also Soni, 2002).

Compounds formed with satyá as their first member are mostly bahuvrīhis reflecting the use ofsatyá as an adjective: satyárādha (said mostly of Indra, but also once of Mitra and Bhaga each),satyáśuṣma (mainly of Indra; once of Agni), satyádharman (viśvedevāḥ [“all gods”], Mitra and Varuṇa, Agni, Savitṛ, god “Ka”; Sūrya), satyáśavas (Marut; Savitṛ), satyávāc (Agni, heaven and earth), and satyámantra (poets, ṛbhus).

The compound satyáyoni (said of Indra; ṚV. 4.12.2) is the only one that seems to use satyá as a noun (“whose origin is the truth”). The compound satyókti (ṚV. 10.37.2) may also be translated as “utterance of truth,” corresponding to satyavāc (speaking the truth). Similar compounds, in which satyá appears as a noun, are satyaśrut and satyadhvṛt (infringing the truth).

In summary, in the Ṛgveda, satyá is used mainly as an adjective qualifying deities (especially Indra) and their functions and attributes (e.g. Agni) as “effectual,” but also qualifying human activities concerned with the worship of the gods, including “true” (and therefore “effective”) speech acts (see also mantras). A special use is a construction like “to become true,” mostly in wishes like “let my prayers come true (= be fulfilled)” and “to render effective, make come true” (of actions and prayers). Its negation is ánṛta (false, untruthful), derived from ṛtá, the noun “truth” (often understood as “cosmic order” in Western scholarship), which is eventually first paralleled, then replaced, by satyá (see also Lüders, 1951, 633).

Other Vedic Texts (Atharvaveda, Brāhmaṇas, Upaniṣads)

The parallel use of satya as an adjective and a noun, attested also in the compounds found in the Ṛgveda, can still be observed in later vedic texts, although it is now mainly used as a noun. As an adjective it is used in Atharvaveda 1.10.1, váśā hí satyā́ váruṇasya rājñaḥ (the wills of king Varuṇa [come] true), Taittirīyasaṃhitā 1.7.8.4 iyáṃ vaḥ sā́ satyā́ saṃdhā́bhūt (this compact that you made [with Indra] has become true). It often qualifies verbs of speaking, for example amántra (ŚBr. 1.3.128), and as a noun it is often used with verbs of speech, for example inAitareyabrāhmaṇa 1.6.6, “dīkṣā (consecration for a ritual) is verily ṛta, consecration is satya; therefore one who is consecrated must speak the truth only,” or in the Śatapathabrāhmaṇa:

"He who speaks the truth is like anointing the fire god with ghee, he who speaks falsehood is like anointing the fire god with water (i.e. extinguishing it); therefore one should only speak the truth" (ŚBr. 2.2.2.19).

The use of satya in the esoteric (and somewhat discordant) Upaniṣads is often difficult to interpret. In Uddālaka Āruṇi’s teaching to his son in Chāndogyopaniṣad 6.16, it seems to be identified as the ātman (universal self) after each of the parables illustrating this ātman (in the refrain tat satyam, sa ātmā, tat [=satyam] tvam [=ātmā] asi). The last of these parables adduces the example of an ordeal where the innocent person “makes himself true (= proves himself to speak the truth)” (satyam ātmānaṃ kurute) by not being burned by touching the heated axe. In the story of Satyakāma Jābāla (ChāU. 4.4) – who did not know his family clan (gotra), but was accepted as a disciple, since he disclosed the truth about this fact – satya is used as a noun in the profane meaning, “accordance with the facts.” In Chāndogyopaniṣad 3.11.2 (tena . . . satyena)satya is used as a “true statement” that is expected to have a magic effect (see also ṚV. 1.21.6 above).

In the Muṇḍakopaniṣad 3.1.5, satya appears, alongside tapas (ascetic practice), as a means to gain the universal self (satyena labhyas tapasā hy eṣa ātmā), whereas in the next stanza (possibly based on ChāU. 6.16 with its contrast of satya and anṛta), satya may be understood as an adjective qualifying this “true” universal self that the adept wins for himself (jayate) by means of satya “truth(fulness),” as explained in the previous verse (see also Mehendale, 1961). Here satya has often been (mis)understood as subject of the verb jayate, “truth alone wins” (satyam eva jayate; this has become the motto of the Indian Republic).

In the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad, satyam is analyzed either as sat and tyad/tyam (an obsolete rgvedic pronoun), said to be the two forms of the brahman (the “shaped, mortal, firm sat” and the “unshaped, immortal, elusive [lit. ‘moving’] tyad” [BĀU. 2.3.1]), or as sa + ti + ya (BĀU. 5.5.1), of which the first and last syllables, constituting satya (truth), incapsulate the middle, meaninganṛta (untruth). Both suggestions seem to end up with the same conclusion that satya, equated with brahman or the universe as a whole, must also include its opposite. Thus, the “real” (sat) and the “unreal” (tyad or ti) are interwoven in a higher “reality” (as satya is often translated, see e.g. Olivelle, 1996). This equation of satya with (the highest) “reality” is further developed in later philosophical systems (like the Advaita Vedānta of Śaṅkara).

Whereas Chāndogyopaniṣad and Muṇḍakopaniṣad seem to identify satya with the ātman, or as a means leading to it, the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad (1.4.14) equates it also, on the basis of common parlance, with dharma : “who speaks the truth is said to speak dharma (i.e. “what is right”), and vice versa, for both are one and the same” (Deussen, 1897, 397). That satya and dharma belong closely together is borne out also in the epics, although a statement like “that is not dharma, where there is not also truth(fulness)” (MBh. 5.35.49; Rām. 7.59.3, 33) rather proves that both concepts are different.

Epics

With about 1,450 occurrences in the Mahābhārata and about 275 in the Rāmāyaṇa , satya is well attested in the epics. This number includes a considerable number of epithets consisting of compounds with satya as their first member, some of them in formulaic use (e.g. Sātyaki is always called Satyavikrama, Rāma often Satyaparākrama), which seem to reflect the older meaning “effectual.” Whereas these compounds normally occur in the narrative texts (and thus proportionally more often in the Rāmāyaṇa), satya appears as a noun or adjective mainly in direct speeches. Very frequent are formulaic expressions like satyam (etad) bravīmi te, “I tell you (this to be) the truth” (if the statement concerns a fact) or “I utter this as a promise/vow” (more than 50 times in the Mahābhārata, three times in the Uttarakāṇḍa of the Rāmāyaṇa), satyena ... śape/śape satyena (eight times in Mahābhārata; seven times in Rāmāyaṇa, including satyena ... śapāmi), satyam astu vacas tava/satyam vaco ’stu me (four times in Rāmāyaṇa), and similar phrases. From these formulaic expressions, as well as the many epithets whose second members contain a term for speech, promise, vow, and other verbal affirmations, one can see how closelysatya is related to speech acts in the epics. It still occurs also as an adjective, often qualifying terms of speech, as well as moral principles (e.g. dharma), personal dispositions (e.g. manas, mind), and sometimes even persons (e.g. the Pāṇḍavas, especially Yudhiṣṭhira; in substories Rāma, Satyavat, Divodāsa, Indrāṇī, and Agni). But far more frequently it occurs as a noun, either referring to an individual true statement or denoting the principle of agreement between speech and (future) behavior, which becomes one of the main moral values in the epics, extolled in some didactic discourses as the highest moral principle. This agrees in general with the rules of correct behaviour that are valid for all castes (sāmānyadharma), as for instance in the Manusmṛti: “Abstention from injuring (ahiṃsā), truthfulness (satya), refraining from anger (akrodha), purification (śauca), and mastering the sense organs (indriyanigraha) – this, Manu has declared, is the gist of the Law (sāmāsikadharma) for the four classes.” (MaSm. 10.63, trans. Olivelle 2005).

Thus, the story of Śakuntalā (MBh. 1.62–69) culminates in her insistence on Duḥṣanta keeping his promise to acknowledge her son as his legitimate heir; she emphasizes her claim by lecturing him on satya as the highest “dharma,” with its merit being worth more than a thousand horse sacrifices (see yajña ). In the Nala story (MBh. 3.50–78), Nala proves his integrity by fulfilling a promise given to the gods before he knew its implications (i.e. to woo for them the bride he intended to woo for himself), in spite of its incompatibility with his own intentions; whereas Damayantī secures Nala for herself by means of a true statement forcing the gods, who had assumed Nala’s shape at her svayaṃvara (ceremony of choosing a husband), to show their divine nature. In the Sāvitrī story (MBh. 3.277–283), satya becomes important in three different conceptualizations: once she has chosen her husband Satyavat, Sāvitrī does not desist from her choice, even when she learns that hers will be the deplorable fate of a widow (satī) after only one year. When Satyavat’s soul is taken away by Yama, the god of death, she follows him and impresses him with general true statements of wisdom, which induce him to grant her boons, except for restoring her husband’s life. In the end he is entrapped by granting her a hundred sons, a promise that cannot be achieved without her husband coming back to life. The happy outcome is later ascertained by more true statements resembling the satyakriyā variety (see below). An example for an unfulfilled promise based on the ineffective truth-claim of the speaker is Duryodhana’s speech to his father Dhṛtarāṣṭra in Mahābhārata 5.60 (see Malinar, 2010). In this speech Duryodhana depicts himself as a mighty king who even overpowers the gods and therefore thinks he cannot be defeated by his enemies. He speaks “truth” and whatever he wishes will come true:

"Whatever good or evil I have ever wished upon friends and enemies alike has never failed to come true. So, when I say: 'This will happen,' has never turned out to be otherwise. Therefore I am known as 'the speaker of truth' (satyavāk)" (MBh. 5.60.21–22).

The Mahābhārata’s main story is not less influenced by satya in its different applications. This starts with the terrible vow of Śantanu’s son (known afterwards as Bhīṣma) to remain celibate all his life, for the sake of his father’s happy union with Satyavatī, the fisherman’s daughter. According to the strict satya ideal, he does not give up this vow when the situation has changed completely and his widowed stepmother urges him to beget sons with the widows of his deceased half brother. In the next generation, it is Yudhiṣṭhira, the eldest son of Bhīṣma’s nephew Pāṇḍu, who is especially associated with satya (e.g. MBh. 2.60.41; “Yudhiṣṭhira may give up all earth with her riches, before he would give up the truth”). His renown becomes problematic when his words, taken to be true, do not conform with the circumstances. In the famous game of dice, this leads to the insoluble question of Draupadī’s status, since, according to the rules, he ought not have staked her after losing himself, but neither would he admit that his words were wrong, nor would anyone else wish to question their validity (thus implying that Yudhiṣṭhira is a liar; see Hiltebeitel, 2001, 259). Another important incident where Yudhiṣṭhira’s truthfulness is at stake is found in the Droṇaparvan, where Droṇa’s son, Aśvatthāman, is reported to be dead in order to break Droṇa’s resistance, and Yudhiṣṭhira is asked to confirm the truth of this message, since he is known for his truthfulness. Being told that an elephant of the same name had died, he does not really deviate from the truth when he repeats the message, adding “the elephant” before the name Aśvatthāman, under his breath. Nevertheless, in this instance he cannot delude himself about his responsibility for the effect of his half-true statement; it remains a source of remorse for him and is explained to him to be the reason for his “visit to hell for a short period” (Sarma, 1978, 32).

Whereas the protagonists of the Mahābhārata are involved with satya (truth, truthfulness) in various ways, the Rāmāyaṇa centers predominantly on one point: Rāma’s fulfilment of a promise made by his father in ignorance of what it would entail. Like Bhīṣma in theMahābhārata, Rāma does not deviate from it, even when the circumstances have changed and it turns out that the fulfilment of the promise is not (or no longer) wanted. There are hardly any didactic sections in the Rāmāyaṇa, but it is interesting that there are two lectures on satya in the Ayodhyākāṇḍa: one by Kaikeyī, demanding (like Śakuntalā) the fulfillment of the promise given to her, and one by Rāma in his discussion with Bharata at the end of the second book, where, in answer to the nihilist argument nāsti param (there is no beyond), he retorts, “there is nothing beyond satya” (i.e. abiding by a given word).

Similar statements can also be found in the didactic chapters on satya in the Mahābhārata, spread over several books (1.69; 3.178; 5.43; 8.49; 13.74), but accumulating in the Śāntiparvan (chs. 110, 156, 169, 192, 288). In these chapters satya is extolled as the highest principle of dharma, as the basis of everything, valued higher than thousands of horse sacrifices and so on; but there is a noticeable exception in 8.49, where Kṛṣṇa, instructing Arjuna, questions the strict adherence to a vow or intention and advises a more prudent attitude, depending on circumstances (which may even allow a “lie”).

Apart from that, satya appears in many longer or shorter lists of values or characteristics of exemplary behavior, most frequently together with dāna (generosity; see gift and gift giving), or principles of self-control (dama), for-bearance (kṣamā), nonviolence ( ahiṃsā ), noncruelty (ānṛśaṃsya), and asceticism (tapas).

Thus, satya is not only a decisive element of the plot, when used as “given word, promise, vow,” but also, in the sense of “truthfulness, integrity,” one of the most important ethical principles and constituents of dharma.

These two important areas of application of satya have, however, hardly attracted the attention of scholars (not even of translators of the epics, like Goldman and van Buitenen in their introductions), much less than a third one, the “truth spell” motif (see Burlingame, 1917; Lüders, 1959; Brown, 1972; Thompson, 1998; and others): working a miracle by means of a solemn true (and therefore efficient) statement, often used in desperate situations as a last resort. It normally consists of two parts: a “true” statement, and the effect that is hoped for (see Soni, 2002). The content of the statement is not essential, except that it has to be true, but it often refers to the speaker himself or may be known only by him. Since women usually refer to their devotion to their husbands (e.g. Damayantī, when she is assaulted by a hunter), some scholars connected it with “duty” (e.g. Brown in several publications), but there are many examples in Buddhist literature where this does not apply (see also Söhnen-Thieme, 1995). In theMahābhārata it mainly occurs in substories (Nala, Sāvitrī), but also at one decisive point in the main story: it is only by means of a “truth spell” that Kṛṣṇa is able to bring back to life Arjuna’s grandson, Parikṣit, in his mother’s womb. A somewhat strange use is made of it in the last book of the Rāmāyaṇa, where Sītā, repudiated in spite of the fire ordeal that proved her purity at the end of the Yuddhakāṇḍa, uses a true statement about her purity in order not to be united with Rāma again; this evidently corresponds to the hopelessness of her situation in the later (stricter) tradition, which cannot tolerate that she should ever have been in the power of another man.

The great emphasis that is put on satya in its various aspects in the epics seems not to be maintained in postepic Sanskrit (Hindu) literature, except for the “truth spell” motif that is still occasionally used in tales (sometimes parodied, as in the story told by Viśruta in theDaśakumāracarita). With the new religious movements, other values and attitudes, especially those pertaining to bhakti , become prevalent (a process that starts already in the Bhagavadgītā, where satya is hardly mentioned).

Other Indian Religions

The motif of the “truth act” (Pal. saccakiriyā), which can be traced back to the Ṛgveda (see Lüders, 505), has become especially popular in Buddhist and Jaina literature (see Burlingame, 1917; Lüders, 1959, 486; Soni, 2002). Many stories in the Jātaka collection make use of it, and there are many more examples in Pali commentaries (Burlingame, 1921; Kong, 2005).

Apart from the truth-act motif, sacca is used in the meaning of a theorem, a formulation of an insight, thus the four statements of the Buddha’s findings at his enlightenment are termedariyasacca, usually translated as “the four noble truths.”

It does not seem to be used in the meaning “promise, vow” or as the principle of truthfulness, but may refer in compounds to the content of the Buddha’s findings as object of knowledge (e.g.saccānubodha, “awakening to truth”).

Modern Hinduism

In more modern times, the term satya came to be reestablished as a specific Indian ideal in two different contexts: the rediscovery of the Upaniṣads in the Hindu reform movements of the 19th century, which interpreted the term as corresponding to the “ultimate reality,” identifying it with the brahman (which can occasionally also be found in the Mahābhārata); in the 20th century this conception is presumably best represented by Radhakrishnan.

The other context is the more practically oriented message of Mahatma Gandhi, who essentially bases himself not only on the concept of satya as presented in the epics, especially in the figure of Rāma, but also in the general attitude towards satya in the Mahābhārata. In the introduction to his autobiography, Gandhi explains that for him,

"truth is the sovereign principle, which includes numerous other principles [such as non-violence, celibacy and other principles of conduct believed to be different from truth]. This truth is not only truthfulness in word, but truthfulness in thought also, and not only the relative truth of our conception, but the Absolute Truth ... But as long as I have not realized this Absolute Truth, so long must I hold by the relative truth as I have conceived it" (Gandhi, 2007, 15).

From the autobiography itself it becomes clear that the basis of his “experiments” is indeed the problem of “truthfulness in word,” that is, not telling lies and not committing any fraud, whereas his satyāgraha concept, “holding on to” or “insisting on truth,” is based on the adherence to a vow taken, or an intention decided upon, even if only in the mind, that has to be carried out against all obstacles. An instructive little example is his “domestic satyāgraha,” whereby he convinced his sick wife to abstain from salt and pulse by taking this vow himself for one year, even after she had given in (Gandhi, 2007, 298) – an attitude that is reminiscent of Bhīṣma and Rāma in the epics.