Soul Theory Of

In order to understand the concept and the theory of the soul ('psychology': λόγος/lógos, 'theory', from ψυχή/psychḗ, 'soul') in Graeco-Roman Antiquity, it is important to distinguish between two ways of perceiving the soul: the soul as an essential component of a human being, as the subject of thinking and feeling, which controls one's behaviour, and the soul as the general quality that infuses a living thing with life. The first view is based on the perception of the soul (psychḗ) as an individual's shadowy doppelgänger, which separates itself from the body at the time of death, as found in the works of Homer (Hom. Il. 23,72; 104; Hom. Od. 11,83). Under the influence of religious movements such as Orphism, this led to the concept of the soul (psychḗ) as the true self that determines human behaviour (Socrates, Plato). This concept presupposes that the various psychological functions, such as those of the intellect (nóos, nous), the heart (kēr) or spiritedness (thymós), which are quite separate in Homer's works, are integrated into a system whose functioning provides an explanation for human behaviour. This sort of integrated concept of the soul is evident for the first time in the works of Socrates [2], at any rate as he is depicted in Plato's Protagoras.

Among the Pre-Socratics (for example in Empedocles [1], Anaxagoras [2] and Democritus [1]) we find a different view, namely that all living creatures have a soul. In Greek, living beings in general are referred to as 'having a soul' (ἔμψυχα, émpsycha). This appears originally to have presupposed a certain conception of life, which is that life - at least in the case of animated bodies - implies cognition and desire; accordingly, these qualities were also attributed to plants (Pl. Ti. 77a-c; [Aristot.] De plantis 815a 10-15). It was not until Aristotle gained influence that a clear distinction was made between plants and animals. According to Aristotle, plants have a soul, but they have no cognition and hence no desire (Aristot. An. 411b 27-30). The Stoics (Stoicism), by contrast, believed that plants do not have a soul because they have no cognition (Ps.-Plut. Placita 5,26,3). Plato, Aristotle and many philosophers who followed them believed that not only plants, animals and human beings have a soul, but all creatures, at least all animated bodies, such as the stars. Thus Plato [1] attributes a soul to the world in his Timaeus, and the Platonics and Stoics did so later as well.

The distinction between two concepts of the soul is blurred by the fact that with human beings the life principle and the self are seen as one; and in the teachings of the migration of the soul also by the fact that there is a presumption of a certain kind of soul (the human soul), which can animate different types of bodies (Soul, migration of the). It is only the human soul with which we are concerned below.

B. Plato and Aristotle

Central to the ancient theory of the soul is the belief that the soul is the basis for human awareness of, and desire for, things. Awareness (actual or supposed) and desire determine human behaviour. Indeed, according to Socrates, as he is depicted in Plato's Protagoras (Pl. Prt. 358b-d), it is opinion (dóxa) itself that determines one's behaviour: We regard something as good, and for that very reason we desire it. No one acts voluntarily if he does not ultimately consider that action to be good. Joy and suffering, desire and fear depend on one's opinions, if indeed they are not themselves a form of opinion (ibid. 358d-359a). In his Republic (Pl. Resp. 437b-441c), Plato argues against this view that human behaviour is consistently governed by reason and distinguishes between a rational and a non-rational part of the soul, each of which has its own forms of desire (desire/epithymía and thymós) that come into conflict with reason (nous, logistikón) and may in fact win out. He was followed in this view by Aristotle [6], particularly in his moral psychology, but also by later Platonism and Aristotelianism. It is important to note that the division of the soul is not based on assigning cognitive abilities to reason and forms of desire to a non-rational part of the soul. Instead, all parts of the soul have both their own form of desire and their own specific form of cognitivity. Even the non-rational parts form their own opinion (dóxa in Plato's Republic) or at least their own conception (Phantasia).

C. Stoicism

The Stoics returned to the view contained in Plato's Protagoras which held that reason (Logos, Lat. ratio) always prevails, because the soul in a narrower sense is nothing other than reason. Under the influence of objects on our senses, for example, reason produces conceptions and thoughts that it assesses and either agrees or disagrees with. Opinions (dóxai) constitute agreement with conceptions: emotions, wants and desires are all based on agreement with a certain kind of conception, namely an impulsive or emotive conception (hormētikaí, Stob. Ecl. 2,86,17-87,13 W.; cf. Sen. Ep. 113,18; Cic. Tusc. 4,14-15). What appears to be emotional conflict is nothing other than the wavering of reason in its agreement. This view of the soul leads to the development of a concept of the will (prohaíresis, boúlēsis, thélēsis; Lat. voluntas; Will) as reason's disposition to agree with conceptions (particularly impulsive conceptions) or not, and to adhere to them. This concept of the will was taken up in particular by Christian authors beginning in the mid 2nd cent. AD (Iustinus [6], Tatian, above all Origenes [2], De principiis, bk. 6).

D. Late Antiquity

During the late antique period the distinction between the intellect and the non-rational part of the soul was emphasized so strongly that the division between body and soul was often replaced by a tripartite division among body, soul and intellect (sṓma - psychḗ - nous), with emphasis on the dependence of the soul on the body (cf. e.g. Galen's treatise Quod animi mores corporis temperamento sequantur, 'That the qualities of the soul depend on the temperament of the body'). In orthodox Christian and Gnostic texts, the intellect is often replaced by the spirit (Pneuma). Instead of distinguishing between the soul and the intellect or spirit, one might distinguish between two souls, one rational, the other irrational (for example in Numenius or the Manichaeans; Mani).

E. Metaphysics

The metaphysics of the soul is considered by the Presocratics to be a material that animates the body, for example in the form of small, round, fire-like atoms (according to Democritus in Aristot. An. 405a 8-13; Atomism). It is in Plato that we find for the first time the conception of the soul as an immaterial substance with its own life (internal life), which enters into the body to animate it, although it is itself immortal, since it is immaterial. This kind of dualism is also found in the early works of Aristotle and in the entire Platonic tradition. In later Aristotelian works (e.g. De anima) this idea is replaced by a view of the soul as the immaterial form of the animated body - which, however, exists only in its embodied form. This theory is not widely accepted in the Hellenistic Peripatos, but during the Imperial Period it was taken up particularly by Alexander [26] of Aphrodisias. According to this view it is not the soul, but merely the active intellect within the soul that is immortal. The Stoics returned to a material conception of the soul. Christian doctrine, particularly in the West, shows some fluctuation: the soul (psychḗ, Lat. anima) is often seen as immortal not because of its nature, but owing to God's grace, since it was created; this was in part influenced by the doctrine that everything that has come into being naturally dies, but also by Plato's Timaeus (Iren. Adv. haereses 2,34,2-4). Moreover, the soul is often regarded as material - because it was created, or because of Stoic influence (Tert. De anima 6-9; Faustus of Riez, Ep. 3; Maximus Homologetes, Ep. 6, PG 91, 424-433).