ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEMS IN NYAYA, BUDDHISM AND JAINISM--
The term 'ontology' came to be used to indicate the most general part of metaphysics in seventeenth-century Europe, although for the origin of ontology as a general theory of real entities, or as a theory of being as being, one has to go back to Aristotle as well as to the pre-Socratic philosophers of ancient Greece. Aristotle did not use the term 'ontology' just as he did not use
the term 'logic' either. But the history of logic as well as ontology in the Western tradition seems to start with him. Aristotle talks about a 'first philosophy', which, he says, is about being as being, and this is taken in later Western tradition to be the nearest analogue of 'ontology'. For our present
discussion, I shall assume ontology to mean a general theory of 'what there is' and try to apply it to the Indian tradition. There are many other problems usually discussed in connection with ontology in the West, such as the doctrine of distinction of essence and existence, the theory of transcendental properties of all entities, but these questions will not directly concern us in this paper.
The Nyaya-Vaisesika ontological problem was connected with the Vaisesika doctrine of categories (padartha), and the category of substance was the focal point of this doctrine. The system of Vaisesika categories is generally regarded as a classification of real and fundamental entities. It is also possible to view it as an analysis of the 'concrete' objects of our experience into their
various parts in order to form a theoretical basis for our philosophical discussion. The Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers, however, believe that if we can analyse and classify the concrete object of our experience in this manner into substance, quality and action, we would achieve a satisfactory explanation of 'what there is', i.e., an explanation of what is meant when we say, 'that object
exists'.
The Buddhists, on the other hand, think that the so-called concrete object of our experience is at best a synthetic object and hence is analysable into a number of fundamental properties or elements called dharmas. The Buddhist conception of a dharma is that it is by nature a non-substance (anatman). ~
The question, 'What is there?' can be answered, according to the Buddhists, if we can prepare a satisfactory list of such non-substances or dharmas, which we can refer to while we are accounting for and analysing the objects of our experience. The dharmas are also in perpetual flux, 'in a beginningless state of commotion', and nirvana is posited as the ultimate cessation of this 'commotion' for a person. Nirvana is also said to be the ultimate reality, the ultimate nature of things, to be contrasted with the phenomenal existence of dharmas, but, as I have already indicated, this problem will not be our
concern in this context.
Our prephilosophical common-sense tells that there are around us things which somehow undergo change. Our philosophical worries start along with our recognition of the phenomenon of change vis-a-vis our feeling for continuity and sameness underlying change. In India this problem was reflected in the old dispute over Sat-cosmogony versus Asat-cosmogony (found in the .Rgveda as well as in the Upanishads). The philosophic resolution of this dispute is to be found in the two rival theories about causation and creation in ancient India: 1. sat-karya-vada 'the theory of pre-existence of the effect in
the cause' and 2. asat-karya-vada 'the theory of new creation of the effect which was non-existent before'. For those who prefer a comparative approach, it is significant to note that the so-called paradox of change and permanence, of being and becoming, was as much a live issue for the early Indian philosophers as it was for the Greeks, i.e., the pre-Socratics. Those who were indined toward permanence not only posited the notion of an enduring substance but also argued that change was only superficial transformation of the existent (the substantial) from one state to another. The Samkhya and the early Vedanta belonged to this group insofar as they gave prominence to Sat 'the existent'. The Vaisesikas belonged to the group of Asat cosmologist inasmuch as they admitted change to be real and the function of the cause to be the creation of new things, effects. But they also posited the doctrine of substance, in fact, plurality of substance, and their substantial elements were said to be persistent through changing states. The Buddhist Asat cosmologists were very radical, for they argued that change alone was real and the notion of continuity or persistence was illusory, and the notion of soul-substance was a myth. The Jaina theory, as we will see later on, was a compromise between the Buddhists and the Nyaya-Vaisesika.
The ontological positions of Nyaya-Vaisesika, Buddhists and Jainas were necessarily influenced by their respective stands on the problem of change and continuity. The Buddhists, for example, were pre-eminently anti-substantialists in the Indian tradition. This anti-substantialism culminates in their 'flux' doctrine, according to which the components of every object, all dharmas, change completely from moment to moment. A comparativist might be reminded here of the anti-substantialism of Heraclitus of Ephesus, who held, contrary to Parmenides' denial of change, that change was incessantly
occurring. But it is not certain that the Heraclitean acceptance of change as reality amounted to the 'flux' doctrine, as it was understood by both Plato and Aristotle. The 'flux' doctrine may be due to an interpretation of the Heraclitean position by the philosopher Cratylus. This would at least give
credence to the anecdote related by Aristotle about the 'river' example of Heraclitus. Aristotle says that Cratylus "rebuked Heraclitus for saying that you could not step twice into the same river; he (Cratylus) thought you could not even do so once. '' Thus, probably Cratylus was much closer to the
Buddhists in this regard.
The Nyaya-Vaisesikas, on the other hand, were substantialists while they accepted also change much in the same manner as Aristotle. But we need not proceed in this comparative vein any further. It is important to understand now the Nyaya-Vaisesika doctrine of existence as well as their notion of sub-
stance. Vaisesika-sutra 8.14 asserts that what exists can be analysed into three categories, substance quality and action, s Existence in this system is regarded as a generic property common to the members of the three classes, substance, quality and action. Each of these classes has a class-property or generic property, viz., substance-ness, quality-ness and action-ness; but these generic properties are to be distinguished from 'existence' as a generic property. Candramati, in fact, regarded existence as a separate category (padartha) altogether while class-properties like substance-ness were included under the category of 'generality' (. samanya or samanya-visesa). But Prasastapda interpreted 'existence' as the highest generic property and thus brought both existence, on the one hand, and other class-properties like substance-ness and quality-ness, on the other hand, under one category (padartha) called generality. But still a special place was accorded to existence as the all- inclusive generic property which should be distinct from the included (vyapya) generic properties such as substance-ness and quality-ness. A particular substance is characterized by the being of substance or substance-hess much as it is also characterized by many qualities and probably by some actions. But it is also characterized by 'existence' (inasmuch as it exists) which is not to be identified with its substance-ness or with any of its quality.
The best way to explain the notion of existence in this system is to contrast it with the notion of 'real' as well as with that of the non-existent.
Existence along with other included generic properties are themselves REAL but not EXISTENT. For, otherwise, we will have to indulge in talking about the existence of existence and so on ad infinitum. Similarly, the important relation called samavaya that combines the generic property existence with
the particular existents, such as a substance or a quality or an action, is also regarded as REAL but not EXISTENT. Thus, the generic properties and their inseparable relation with the particulars are posited as real, as means of explicating the notion of existence. Hence they themselves should not be construed as 'existents' to avoid the problem of self-dependence and regress but nevertheless, these notions, existence, generalities and samavdya, are claimed in this system to be real in the sense of their being independent of our thought or mind and thus being distinct from a non-entity. A non-entity is NON- EXISTENT and hence unreal, for example, the sky flower, the son of a barren woman, the rabbit's horn and the unicorn.
Briefly stated, the 'Existents' in this system (early Vaisesika) are equivalent to the particulars, such as a chair, a particular color, a particular action. The class of existents is a sub-class of the class of reals. Universals (including relations) are not thus EXISTENTS but REALS. Prasastapada used two signi-
ficant notions in order to separate the class of existents from that of universals: satta-sambandha and svatmasattva. The first notion characterizes each existent, for it means that EXISTENCE resides in the particular entity by samavaya relation. The second notion became a bit puzzling for the later commentators.
Udayana explains it as 'lacking existence' (satta-viraha). Sridhara gives almost the same interpretation but also points out that 'existence' could be ascribed to the universals only by mistake. Vyomasiva says that while the first notion means that EXISTENCE is correctly applied to the class of particulars, the
second notion means that EXISTENCE is only metaphorically applied to the class of universals.
The riddle of existence and non-existence is further complicated in the later Nyaya-Vaisesika by the acceptance of negative properties as real. Our negative statements, according to the later Nyaya-Vaisesika, are expressions of something, some negative facts. The affirmative-negative dichotomy among
judgments is interpreted differently in this system. Thus, just as a positive judgment attributes a positive property to a thing so also a negative judgment attributes another property, a negative one, to the thing denoted by the subject-term. Just as a positive property predicated by a judgment can be construed as a real property, so also a negative property, absence of some positive property, predicated by a judgment can be construed as a real property. Thus, 'the room is dark' can be interpreted as expressing the room that is characterized by the property of absence of light. Now, this property, absence of light, and the like, are regarded by the Nyaya-Vaigesika as REAL inasmuch as they are to be distinguished from the unreal such as the round square, and unicornhood. But again, care should be taken to note that the absence of light is not however EXISTENT in this system in the sense a substance or a quality or an action is existent. It may also be noted that although
the negation of an entity is construed in this system as expressing absence of that entity, a so-called negative property, no non-entity like the sky flower or the unicorn can be negated (in other words, absence of such non-entities will not be an acceptable negative property in this system). Leaving aside the riddle of existence and non-existence, let us concentrate on the Nyaya-Vaisesika doctrine of substance and quality, which was at the focal point of their ontology. Several notions of substance have been emphasized in the Vaisesika at some time or other: 1. substance as the locus of
qualities and actions, 2. substance as the substratum of change, and 3. substance as capable of independent existence. It is difficult to say whether the concept of substance as the logical subject was at all implied in early Nyaya-Vaisesika doctrine, for it was never thoroughly worked out. Later
Nyaya and Buddhist logicians (notably Dinnaga) developed the concept of dharmin 'property-possessor' which was the nearest Indian analogue for 'logical subject'. But this concept was regarded as neutral to the ontological beliefs of the logicians. The concept of substance as the unchanging 'essence' was prevalent in the Samkya school as well as in the early Vedanta ( the spiritual substance), but this concept was not treated seriously in the Vaisesika school. It is also to be noted that the Madhyamika Buddhists were uncompromising critics of the doctrine of sva-bhava 'own-nature' which was analogous to the notion of essence or inner immutable core of things.
The doctrine of substance as the substratum of change needs further elaboration in the present context, for this will throw much light on the Vaisesika theory of causation and change. For any effect, the Nyaya-Vaisesika will identify a particular substratum cause (samavayi-karana) in which that
particular effect is supposed to inhere. If the physical conjunction of two material bodies are taken to be the effect in question, its substratum cause will be the two bodies themselves. If the taste of a fruit is regarded as the effect, its substratum cause will be the fruit-stuff itself. But when the effect is
nothing but a concrete individual like a pot, its substratum cause will be the pot parts, or in final analysis, the atomic constituents of the pot material.
Thus, the substratum cause of an effect need not be an ever unchanging substratum. We do not have to posit an unchanging substantial core as the locus of change. What is needed is only the temporal stability, persistence through a period of time, of the substance which acts as the locus of the effect.
The substances are, according to the Nyaya-Vaisesika, either impermanent (having origin, stability and decay) or permanent (without origin or decay).
Material bodies of intermediate size (called avayavin 'whole' in this system) like a pot or a table are of the first type. They have temporal stability and can be the loci of qualitative change. These substances are breakable into parts and those parts into further parts. But the atomic constituents of these substances along with other non-material substances such as soul, sky, time and space are of the second type, i.e., permanent. An important part of this doctrine of substance is the ontology of the 'whole' (avayavin) as distinct from the assemblage of parts. A material body, e.g., a piece of chalk, is a whole which is a distinctly existent entity to be distinguished from the integration of its parts or combination of its atomic constituents. It is a new entity that is created as soon as the parts or atoms are put together. Moreover, draw a line on the board with this piece of chalk and you have created a new piece, for some parts of the old one are lost. The seeming identity of the new one with the old piece works for all our practical purposes, but ontologically the two
are distinguishable.
The Buddhist anti-substantialism finds its extreme expression in the Sautrantika doctrine of momentariness. According to this doctrine, a seemingly stable object like a chair is dissolved into a cluster of continuously fluctuating chair-moments or chair-stages. The real entity is a point-instant, an exclusive particular, an essentially unqualifiable, ineffable 'here-now' subject. Everything else in this system is only a conceptual construction - an interplay of the commonly shared imagination. In what sense does a moment exist? A moment exists insofar as it functions in some way or other. Thus,
Dharmakirti has argued that to be means to be capable of functioning in some way or other. ~s If a thing does not have causal efficacy, it does not exist. Starting from this initial position, Dharmakirti and his followers have formulated a proof of their 'flux' doctrine. It will be interesting to note the crucial steps taken by the Buddhists in proving the 'flux' doctrine
1. To be is to do something, i.e., to function or to have causal potency.
2. To have causal potency means to be actually doing what is supposed to be done.
3. If something has causal potency at a particular moment it must do its work at that moment. (This is a rephrasing of 2.)
4. If something does not do a work at a given moment, it must be causally impotent to do that work. (This i., a contraposition of 3.)
5. The same thing cannot be both causally potent at one moment and impotent at another (next) moment, for potency and impotency are contradictory properties, mutually incompatible.
6. Therefore, the thing at the moment of its potency must be held ontologically different from the thing at the moment of its impotency. A difference in qualities implies difference in the thing itself!
7. Everything, in this manner, can be shown to be in perpetual flux. We cannot step twice into the same river!
The most crucial step is taken by the Buddhist here when he identifies causal potency with actuality or actual doing. In other words, the notion of potentiality is completely rejected. If a thing exists and it is capable, it must function without lying in wait for anything to come and help. If we posit two different functionings at two different moments, we have to construe them as belonging to two different things or objects. In each moment a new object (bhava) emerges when a new functioning sets in and the old functioning perishes. Thus, what exists is the ever fluctuating here-and-now. Even the ontology of stages or moments is not quite satisfactory to the Buddhists. For moments or stages are also hypothetical abstractions in the face of continuum.
Thus, we have to say that there is only process, only flux, without something being there to fluctuate. There is only transmigration without there being any transmigrating soul (. the 'non-soul' doctrine).
Udayana, setting forth a defence for the Nyaya-Vaisesika doctrine of substance, has criticized the above argument of the Buddhist by pointing out that it is essentially dependent upon the total rejection of the notion of potentiality. Why, asks Udayana, is it to be assumed that the causally potent cannot
(and should not) 'wait' for its accessories. Causality operates with two mutually compatible notions: svarupayogyata 'potentiality' and phalopadhayakata 'actuality'; the former relates to the general while the latter relates to the particular. If the Buddhist equates potentiality with actuality then,Udayana argues, part of the Buddhist argument is reduced to tautology, for he would have to say that x is actually functioning because it actually functions. And tautology is not a good philosophic argument. In fact, potentiality is explained by Udayana not as an essential constituent of the thing, but as the mere presence of the thing coupled with the absence of some accessory or other and the consequent absence (or non-arising) of the effect Y Thus, Udayana argues, if x does not cause y when and only when z is absent then it follows that when z is present x produces y. This is only another way saying that z is an accessory to x in bringing about y. Besides, the properties of causing y and not causing y are not two mutually incompatible characters like cow-ness and horse-ness. A cow, of course, can never be a horse. But a thing, if it is not just a flux, can cause y at time t1 and may not cause y at time t2. la
In fact, what Udayana says is reminiscent of Aristotle's rejection of potentiality:
There are some who say, the Megaric school does, that a thing 'can act only when it is acting, and when it is not acting it 'cannot' act, e.g. that he who is not building cannot build, but only he who is building, when he is building; and so in all other cases. It is not hard to see the absurdities that attend this view.
It is rather significant that the arguments and counterarguments of Dharmakirti and Udayana were presupposed much earlier in the Megaric school as well as in Aristotle. Dharmakirti's argument to prove his 'flux' doctrine was not entirely an innovation in Buddhist tradition. He must have derived his idea from Nagarjuna's dialectic. Nagarjuna, for example, has argued that if something exists it should exist always, and if it does not exist at one time it cannot exist at any time. This is how Najarjuna has criticized the concept of existence and 'own-nature'. Dharmakirti first assumes that to be means to have causal potency. Then he argues: if something has causal potency it must be functioning all the time, and if something does not have the causal potency at one time it would never have it at any other time. But Nagarjuna's philosophic conclusion is rather different from that of Dharmakirti. With the above argument Nagarjuna wishes to avoid the extremes of eternalism and annihilationism and follow the Middle Way. Dharmakirti, on the other hand, intends to conclude that since functioning is instantaneous, existence is also instantaneous.
And when we think of Udayana's counterargument, we are again reminded of Aristotle
Again, if that which is deprived of potency is incapable, that which is not happening will be incapable of happening; but he who says of that which is incapable of happening either that it is or that it will be will say what is untrue; .... But we cannot say this, so that evidently potency and actuality are different (but these views make potency and actuality the same, and so it is no small thing they are seeking to annihilate),....
The Jaina ontological position is influenced by both the Buddhists on the one hand and the Nyaya-Vaisesika on the other. The Jainas were also substantialist, but in a very qualified sense of the term. Their conception of existence (sat) is intimately related to their doctrine of substance. The Tattvarthasutra 5.29 asserts: "What there is, has the nature of substance." And the next sutra (5.30 in the Digambara tradition) adds: "What there is (the existent), is endowed with the triple character, origin, decay and stability (persistence)."
The Tattvarthabhasya explains that whatever originates, perishes and continues to be is called the existent; anything different is called the non-existent. The next sutra asserts that the existent is constant for it never gives up its being (essence?).
In sutra 5.37, the substance is again characterized as the possessor of qualities (gu.na) and modes (paryaya). Here the broad category 'attribute' is apparently broken into two sub-categories, qualities and modes. But the distinction between qualities and modes is not found in the sutra. Umasvati points out that qualities are permanent attributes of the substance while the modes(paryaya) are only temporary attributes which are subject to origin and decay. In the above analysis of the Tattvarthasutra, two compatible notions of substance are emphasized: 1. substance as the core of change or flux and 2. substance as the substratum of attributes. Kundakunda combines these two
notions as he defines substance in his Pravacanasara:
They call it a substance, which is characterized by origin, persistence and decay, without changing its 'own-nature', and which is endowed with qualities and accompanied by modifications. For the 'own-nature' of the substance is its existence (sad.bh~va) which is always accompanied by qualities and variegated modes, and at the same time, by origin, decay and continuity.
The Vaisesika school, as we have seen already, emphasized both these aspects of substance, but did not equate the 'own-nature' of the substance with EXISTENCE. Aristotle, who in fact suggested several notions of substance either implicitly or explicitly, remarked in Categories:
The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities.
In Metaphysics, Aristotle also implied that the substance is what is independently existent, for existence, in the proper sense of the term, applies to substances only, and qualities and relation have a secondary existence, a parasitic mode of being:
Therefore, that which is primarily, i.e., not in a qualified sense but without qualification,
must be substance.
The Jainas too, identify the notion of 'it is' or 'it exists' with that of substance, and they then explain that 'it is' means that it is endowed with the triple character of origin, decay and stability.
In fact, the Jainas explicated the notion of substance in such a way as to avoid falling between the two stools of being and becoming. It was a grand compromise of flux and permanence. The Jainas inherited from Mahavira and his later followers the well-known doctrine of 'many-natured' reality (.
anekanta-vada), and thus a 'compromise' position was only an important trait of their creed. The substance, in their analysis, is being, it is also becoming.
Kundakunda observes that a substance has both natures: from the standpoint of one 'one-nature' it is being (sat, unchanging), and from another standpoint it has triple character, origin, decay and continuity, i.e., fluctuations.
Siddhasena Divakara repeated the point more forcefully:
There is no substance that is devoid of modification, nor is there any modification without an abiding something, a substance. For origin, decay and continuance are the three constituents of a substance.
It should be noted that the notion of continuity involved in the triple character of the substance is not identical with the notion of permanence of the substance. The former notion means persistence or continuance ( pravahanityata). The later notion means immutability. It is the notion in the back-
ground of which the triple character of origination, destruction and continuity becomes understandable. The notion of continuity, on the other hand, is essentially dependent upon origin and decay. Thus, Kundakunda observes:
There is no origin without destruction, nor is there any destruction without origin, and neither destruction nor origination are possible without what continues to be.
The Jainas were well aware of the Madhyamika critique of the 'own-nature' concept as well as the problem involved in the doctrine of the permanent substance. It is true that the immutability of own-nature invites a host of problems. But the notion of flux, the Jainas points out, is not sacrosanct.
Thus, just as the Buddhists argue that there is only fluctuation, there being no permanent being, the Jainas take the bull by the horns and answer that if there is no permanence there cannot be any change, any fluctuation, for it is only the permanent that can change. It is only the persisting soul that can transmigrate!
When the Tattvarthasutras defines substance as the substratum of qualities and modes, it was probably influenced by the Vaisesika school. Thus, Siddhasena points out that the rigid Vaisesika concepts of substance and quality were not compatible with the Jaina ontological principle of anekantata 'many-naturedness' or 'non-onesidedness'. In fact it would be as good as a heresy in Jainism if one intends to maintain a rigid distinction between substance and quality. The notion of triple character, origin, decay and continuity, embodying the principle of (conditioned) reality, was derived from the Buddhist source. The Buddha, for example, predicated this triple character of all the conditioned (samskrta) entities. Thus, in the Anguttara the Buddha said:
Of the conditioned entities, monks, the origin is conceived, even so their decay and their
stability (persistence).
Nagarjuna, however, directed his dialectical attack against the notion of the conditioned (samskrta), and concluded:
Since the notion of origin, persistence and decay cannot be established, the conditioned does not exist. And if the conditioned is not established, how will the unconditioned be established?
But why then did the Buddha speak about the triple character of the conditioned entities? Nagarjuna replied:
Just as magic, dream and the cloud-castle are unreal (but, nevertheless, are spoken about) so also origin, stability and decay have been described.
The Jainas postulate the triple character in the case of each event, each happening or change of state. Each fluctuation embodies origin, continuity and decay. Samantabhadra illustrates the point as follows:
if a golden pot is destroyed and a golden crown is made out of it, destruction, origination and continuity - all three - happen simultaneously and give rise to sorrow, joy and indifferent attitude in the minds of three different kinds of people, those in favour of the pot, those in favour of the crown, and those in favour of the gold stuff. ~
Siddhasena has shown great philosophic insight in expounding the Jaina ontological problem. According to him, reality can be viewed from two important standpoints, being and becoming, permanence and change. That is why Lord Mahavira acknowledged only two nayas or standpoints: 'substance exists' and 'modification exists'. If x is an element of reality, then, according to Siddhasena, x can be viewed as a SUBSTANCE from the standpoint of being, and as a PROPERTY from the standpoint of becoming. The standpoint of 'becoming' (modification) reveals that everything originates, stays and perishes; the standpoint of 'being' ('it is') reveals everything as existent, eternally without birth or decay. And, Siddhasena asserts, there cannot be being without becoming, or becoming without being; therefore, a substance (= reality) is defined as the combination of being (the existent) with becoming (origin, stability and decay).
The 'being' aspect is, according to Siddhasena, the result of generalization while the 'becoming' aspect is that of particularization. In our ordinary description of things, we necessarily combine the general with the particular.
From the point of view of the highest generalization, a thing is described as 'it is' which reveals the permanent being, the substance. But when, in ordinary descriptions, a thing is called a piece of wood, or a chair, or a red chair, we have an intermixture of 'being' and 'becoming' aspects. Insofar as the thing is identified as a non-fluctuating substance, it is the 'being' standpoint. And insofar as the attributes of the thing, such as being a piece of wood, being a chair, or redness, are revealed by the description, it is the 'becoming' stand- point. Qualities are nothing but modes or states of the substance. In any characterization or description of the thing there is thus an overlap of 'being'
and 'becoming' standpoints, until we reach the ultimate particularity, pure BECOMING, i.e., the point-instants (k.sa.nas) of the Buddhists.
Thus, the Jaina conception of reality, in bringing together the opposing viewpoints of the Buddhists and the Nyaya-Vaisesika, comes very close to that of Whitehead, according to whom the chief aim of philosophy is the "elucidation of our integral experience", of both the flux and permanence of
things. Whitehead has said that philosophers who have started with 'being' have given us the metaphysics of 'substance' and those who have started with 'becoming' have developed the metaphysics of flux. But Whitehead point out the inseparability of the two:
But, in truth, the two lines cannot be torn apart in this way; and we find that a wavering balance between the two is a characteristic of the greater number of philosophers. Plato found his permanences in a static, spiritual heaven, and his flux in the entanglement of his forms amid the fluent imperfections of the physical world .... Aristotle corrected his Platonism into a somewhat different balance. He was the apostle of 'substance and attribute', and of the classificatory logic which this notion suggests.
In the Indian context, one may observe that the Buddha's search for nirvana, the unconditioned state, freedom from suffering or duhkha, spelled out a philosophy for the later Buddhists, according to which the flux of things, impermanences, '~the fluent imperfections of the physical world" are identical with suffering (duh.kha, cf. whatever is impermanent, is suffering). And NIRVANA, the unconditioned state, is actualized with the cessation of this duhkha. The Vaisesikas, on the other hand, were, much like Aristotle, the apostles of substance-and-attribute duality.
the term 'logic' either. But the history of logic as well as ontology in the Western tradition seems to start with him. Aristotle talks about a 'first philosophy', which, he says, is about being as being, and this is taken in later Western tradition to be the nearest analogue of 'ontology'. For our present
discussion, I shall assume ontology to mean a general theory of 'what there is' and try to apply it to the Indian tradition. There are many other problems usually discussed in connection with ontology in the West, such as the doctrine of distinction of essence and existence, the theory of transcendental properties of all entities, but these questions will not directly concern us in this paper.
The Nyaya-Vaisesika ontological problem was connected with the Vaisesika doctrine of categories (padartha), and the category of substance was the focal point of this doctrine. The system of Vaisesika categories is generally regarded as a classification of real and fundamental entities. It is also possible to view it as an analysis of the 'concrete' objects of our experience into their
various parts in order to form a theoretical basis for our philosophical discussion. The Nyaya-Vaisesika philosophers, however, believe that if we can analyse and classify the concrete object of our experience in this manner into substance, quality and action, we would achieve a satisfactory explanation of 'what there is', i.e., an explanation of what is meant when we say, 'that object
exists'.
The Buddhists, on the other hand, think that the so-called concrete object of our experience is at best a synthetic object and hence is analysable into a number of fundamental properties or elements called dharmas. The Buddhist conception of a dharma is that it is by nature a non-substance (anatman). ~
The question, 'What is there?' can be answered, according to the Buddhists, if we can prepare a satisfactory list of such non-substances or dharmas, which we can refer to while we are accounting for and analysing the objects of our experience. The dharmas are also in perpetual flux, 'in a beginningless state of commotion', and nirvana is posited as the ultimate cessation of this 'commotion' for a person. Nirvana is also said to be the ultimate reality, the ultimate nature of things, to be contrasted with the phenomenal existence of dharmas, but, as I have already indicated, this problem will not be our
concern in this context.
Our prephilosophical common-sense tells that there are around us things which somehow undergo change. Our philosophical worries start along with our recognition of the phenomenon of change vis-a-vis our feeling for continuity and sameness underlying change. In India this problem was reflected in the old dispute over Sat-cosmogony versus Asat-cosmogony (found in the .Rgveda as well as in the Upanishads). The philosophic resolution of this dispute is to be found in the two rival theories about causation and creation in ancient India: 1. sat-karya-vada 'the theory of pre-existence of the effect in
the cause' and 2. asat-karya-vada 'the theory of new creation of the effect which was non-existent before'. For those who prefer a comparative approach, it is significant to note that the so-called paradox of change and permanence, of being and becoming, was as much a live issue for the early Indian philosophers as it was for the Greeks, i.e., the pre-Socratics. Those who were indined toward permanence not only posited the notion of an enduring substance but also argued that change was only superficial transformation of the existent (the substantial) from one state to another. The Samkhya and the early Vedanta belonged to this group insofar as they gave prominence to Sat 'the existent'. The Vaisesikas belonged to the group of Asat cosmologist inasmuch as they admitted change to be real and the function of the cause to be the creation of new things, effects. But they also posited the doctrine of substance, in fact, plurality of substance, and their substantial elements were said to be persistent through changing states. The Buddhist Asat cosmologists were very radical, for they argued that change alone was real and the notion of continuity or persistence was illusory, and the notion of soul-substance was a myth. The Jaina theory, as we will see later on, was a compromise between the Buddhists and the Nyaya-Vaisesika.
The ontological positions of Nyaya-Vaisesika, Buddhists and Jainas were necessarily influenced by their respective stands on the problem of change and continuity. The Buddhists, for example, were pre-eminently anti-substantialists in the Indian tradition. This anti-substantialism culminates in their 'flux' doctrine, according to which the components of every object, all dharmas, change completely from moment to moment. A comparativist might be reminded here of the anti-substantialism of Heraclitus of Ephesus, who held, contrary to Parmenides' denial of change, that change was incessantly
occurring. But it is not certain that the Heraclitean acceptance of change as reality amounted to the 'flux' doctrine, as it was understood by both Plato and Aristotle. The 'flux' doctrine may be due to an interpretation of the Heraclitean position by the philosopher Cratylus. This would at least give
credence to the anecdote related by Aristotle about the 'river' example of Heraclitus. Aristotle says that Cratylus "rebuked Heraclitus for saying that you could not step twice into the same river; he (Cratylus) thought you could not even do so once. '' Thus, probably Cratylus was much closer to the
Buddhists in this regard.
The Nyaya-Vaisesikas, on the other hand, were substantialists while they accepted also change much in the same manner as Aristotle. But we need not proceed in this comparative vein any further. It is important to understand now the Nyaya-Vaisesika doctrine of existence as well as their notion of sub-
stance. Vaisesika-sutra 8.14 asserts that what exists can be analysed into three categories, substance quality and action, s Existence in this system is regarded as a generic property common to the members of the three classes, substance, quality and action. Each of these classes has a class-property or generic property, viz., substance-ness, quality-ness and action-ness; but these generic properties are to be distinguished from 'existence' as a generic property. Candramati, in fact, regarded existence as a separate category (padartha) altogether while class-properties like substance-ness were included under the category of 'generality' (. samanya or samanya-visesa). But Prasastapda interpreted 'existence' as the highest generic property and thus brought both existence, on the one hand, and other class-properties like substance-ness and quality-ness, on the other hand, under one category (padartha) called generality. But still a special place was accorded to existence as the all- inclusive generic property which should be distinct from the included (vyapya) generic properties such as substance-ness and quality-ness. A particular substance is characterized by the being of substance or substance-hess much as it is also characterized by many qualities and probably by some actions. But it is also characterized by 'existence' (inasmuch as it exists) which is not to be identified with its substance-ness or with any of its quality.
The best way to explain the notion of existence in this system is to contrast it with the notion of 'real' as well as with that of the non-existent.
Existence along with other included generic properties are themselves REAL but not EXISTENT. For, otherwise, we will have to indulge in talking about the existence of existence and so on ad infinitum. Similarly, the important relation called samavaya that combines the generic property existence with
the particular existents, such as a substance or a quality or an action, is also regarded as REAL but not EXISTENT. Thus, the generic properties and their inseparable relation with the particulars are posited as real, as means of explicating the notion of existence. Hence they themselves should not be construed as 'existents' to avoid the problem of self-dependence and regress but nevertheless, these notions, existence, generalities and samavdya, are claimed in this system to be real in the sense of their being independent of our thought or mind and thus being distinct from a non-entity. A non-entity is NON- EXISTENT and hence unreal, for example, the sky flower, the son of a barren woman, the rabbit's horn and the unicorn.
Briefly stated, the 'Existents' in this system (early Vaisesika) are equivalent to the particulars, such as a chair, a particular color, a particular action. The class of existents is a sub-class of the class of reals. Universals (including relations) are not thus EXISTENTS but REALS. Prasastapada used two signi-
ficant notions in order to separate the class of existents from that of universals: satta-sambandha and svatmasattva. The first notion characterizes each existent, for it means that EXISTENCE resides in the particular entity by samavaya relation. The second notion became a bit puzzling for the later commentators.
Udayana explains it as 'lacking existence' (satta-viraha). Sridhara gives almost the same interpretation but also points out that 'existence' could be ascribed to the universals only by mistake. Vyomasiva says that while the first notion means that EXISTENCE is correctly applied to the class of particulars, the
second notion means that EXISTENCE is only metaphorically applied to the class of universals.
The riddle of existence and non-existence is further complicated in the later Nyaya-Vaisesika by the acceptance of negative properties as real. Our negative statements, according to the later Nyaya-Vaisesika, are expressions of something, some negative facts. The affirmative-negative dichotomy among
judgments is interpreted differently in this system. Thus, just as a positive judgment attributes a positive property to a thing so also a negative judgment attributes another property, a negative one, to the thing denoted by the subject-term. Just as a positive property predicated by a judgment can be construed as a real property, so also a negative property, absence of some positive property, predicated by a judgment can be construed as a real property. Thus, 'the room is dark' can be interpreted as expressing the room that is characterized by the property of absence of light. Now, this property, absence of light, and the like, are regarded by the Nyaya-Vaigesika as REAL inasmuch as they are to be distinguished from the unreal such as the round square, and unicornhood. But again, care should be taken to note that the absence of light is not however EXISTENT in this system in the sense a substance or a quality or an action is existent. It may also be noted that although
the negation of an entity is construed in this system as expressing absence of that entity, a so-called negative property, no non-entity like the sky flower or the unicorn can be negated (in other words, absence of such non-entities will not be an acceptable negative property in this system). Leaving aside the riddle of existence and non-existence, let us concentrate on the Nyaya-Vaisesika doctrine of substance and quality, which was at the focal point of their ontology. Several notions of substance have been emphasized in the Vaisesika at some time or other: 1. substance as the locus of
qualities and actions, 2. substance as the substratum of change, and 3. substance as capable of independent existence. It is difficult to say whether the concept of substance as the logical subject was at all implied in early Nyaya-Vaisesika doctrine, for it was never thoroughly worked out. Later
Nyaya and Buddhist logicians (notably Dinnaga) developed the concept of dharmin 'property-possessor' which was the nearest Indian analogue for 'logical subject'. But this concept was regarded as neutral to the ontological beliefs of the logicians. The concept of substance as the unchanging 'essence' was prevalent in the Samkya school as well as in the early Vedanta ( the spiritual substance), but this concept was not treated seriously in the Vaisesika school. It is also to be noted that the Madhyamika Buddhists were uncompromising critics of the doctrine of sva-bhava 'own-nature' which was analogous to the notion of essence or inner immutable core of things.
The doctrine of substance as the substratum of change needs further elaboration in the present context, for this will throw much light on the Vaisesika theory of causation and change. For any effect, the Nyaya-Vaisesika will identify a particular substratum cause (samavayi-karana) in which that
particular effect is supposed to inhere. If the physical conjunction of two material bodies are taken to be the effect in question, its substratum cause will be the two bodies themselves. If the taste of a fruit is regarded as the effect, its substratum cause will be the fruit-stuff itself. But when the effect is
nothing but a concrete individual like a pot, its substratum cause will be the pot parts, or in final analysis, the atomic constituents of the pot material.
Thus, the substratum cause of an effect need not be an ever unchanging substratum. We do not have to posit an unchanging substantial core as the locus of change. What is needed is only the temporal stability, persistence through a period of time, of the substance which acts as the locus of the effect.
The substances are, according to the Nyaya-Vaisesika, either impermanent (having origin, stability and decay) or permanent (without origin or decay).
Material bodies of intermediate size (called avayavin 'whole' in this system) like a pot or a table are of the first type. They have temporal stability and can be the loci of qualitative change. These substances are breakable into parts and those parts into further parts. But the atomic constituents of these substances along with other non-material substances such as soul, sky, time and space are of the second type, i.e., permanent. An important part of this doctrine of substance is the ontology of the 'whole' (avayavin) as distinct from the assemblage of parts. A material body, e.g., a piece of chalk, is a whole which is a distinctly existent entity to be distinguished from the integration of its parts or combination of its atomic constituents. It is a new entity that is created as soon as the parts or atoms are put together. Moreover, draw a line on the board with this piece of chalk and you have created a new piece, for some parts of the old one are lost. The seeming identity of the new one with the old piece works for all our practical purposes, but ontologically the two
are distinguishable.
The Buddhist anti-substantialism finds its extreme expression in the Sautrantika doctrine of momentariness. According to this doctrine, a seemingly stable object like a chair is dissolved into a cluster of continuously fluctuating chair-moments or chair-stages. The real entity is a point-instant, an exclusive particular, an essentially unqualifiable, ineffable 'here-now' subject. Everything else in this system is only a conceptual construction - an interplay of the commonly shared imagination. In what sense does a moment exist? A moment exists insofar as it functions in some way or other. Thus,
Dharmakirti has argued that to be means to be capable of functioning in some way or other. ~s If a thing does not have causal efficacy, it does not exist. Starting from this initial position, Dharmakirti and his followers have formulated a proof of their 'flux' doctrine. It will be interesting to note the crucial steps taken by the Buddhists in proving the 'flux' doctrine
1. To be is to do something, i.e., to function or to have causal potency.
2. To have causal potency means to be actually doing what is supposed to be done.
3. If something has causal potency at a particular moment it must do its work at that moment. (This is a rephrasing of 2.)
4. If something does not do a work at a given moment, it must be causally impotent to do that work. (This i., a contraposition of 3.)
5. The same thing cannot be both causally potent at one moment and impotent at another (next) moment, for potency and impotency are contradictory properties, mutually incompatible.
6. Therefore, the thing at the moment of its potency must be held ontologically different from the thing at the moment of its impotency. A difference in qualities implies difference in the thing itself!
7. Everything, in this manner, can be shown to be in perpetual flux. We cannot step twice into the same river!
The most crucial step is taken by the Buddhist here when he identifies causal potency with actuality or actual doing. In other words, the notion of potentiality is completely rejected. If a thing exists and it is capable, it must function without lying in wait for anything to come and help. If we posit two different functionings at two different moments, we have to construe them as belonging to two different things or objects. In each moment a new object (bhava) emerges when a new functioning sets in and the old functioning perishes. Thus, what exists is the ever fluctuating here-and-now. Even the ontology of stages or moments is not quite satisfactory to the Buddhists. For moments or stages are also hypothetical abstractions in the face of continuum.
Thus, we have to say that there is only process, only flux, without something being there to fluctuate. There is only transmigration without there being any transmigrating soul (. the 'non-soul' doctrine).
Udayana, setting forth a defence for the Nyaya-Vaisesika doctrine of substance, has criticized the above argument of the Buddhist by pointing out that it is essentially dependent upon the total rejection of the notion of potentiality. Why, asks Udayana, is it to be assumed that the causally potent cannot
(and should not) 'wait' for its accessories. Causality operates with two mutually compatible notions: svarupayogyata 'potentiality' and phalopadhayakata 'actuality'; the former relates to the general while the latter relates to the particular. If the Buddhist equates potentiality with actuality then,Udayana argues, part of the Buddhist argument is reduced to tautology, for he would have to say that x is actually functioning because it actually functions. And tautology is not a good philosophic argument. In fact, potentiality is explained by Udayana not as an essential constituent of the thing, but as the mere presence of the thing coupled with the absence of some accessory or other and the consequent absence (or non-arising) of the effect Y Thus, Udayana argues, if x does not cause y when and only when z is absent then it follows that when z is present x produces y. This is only another way saying that z is an accessory to x in bringing about y. Besides, the properties of causing y and not causing y are not two mutually incompatible characters like cow-ness and horse-ness. A cow, of course, can never be a horse. But a thing, if it is not just a flux, can cause y at time t1 and may not cause y at time t2. la
In fact, what Udayana says is reminiscent of Aristotle's rejection of potentiality:
There are some who say, the Megaric school does, that a thing 'can act only when it is acting, and when it is not acting it 'cannot' act, e.g. that he who is not building cannot build, but only he who is building, when he is building; and so in all other cases. It is not hard to see the absurdities that attend this view.
It is rather significant that the arguments and counterarguments of Dharmakirti and Udayana were presupposed much earlier in the Megaric school as well as in Aristotle. Dharmakirti's argument to prove his 'flux' doctrine was not entirely an innovation in Buddhist tradition. He must have derived his idea from Nagarjuna's dialectic. Nagarjuna, for example, has argued that if something exists it should exist always, and if it does not exist at one time it cannot exist at any time. This is how Najarjuna has criticized the concept of existence and 'own-nature'. Dharmakirti first assumes that to be means to have causal potency. Then he argues: if something has causal potency it must be functioning all the time, and if something does not have the causal potency at one time it would never have it at any other time. But Nagarjuna's philosophic conclusion is rather different from that of Dharmakirti. With the above argument Nagarjuna wishes to avoid the extremes of eternalism and annihilationism and follow the Middle Way. Dharmakirti, on the other hand, intends to conclude that since functioning is instantaneous, existence is also instantaneous.
And when we think of Udayana's counterargument, we are again reminded of Aristotle
Again, if that which is deprived of potency is incapable, that which is not happening will be incapable of happening; but he who says of that which is incapable of happening either that it is or that it will be will say what is untrue; .... But we cannot say this, so that evidently potency and actuality are different (but these views make potency and actuality the same, and so it is no small thing they are seeking to annihilate),....
The Jaina ontological position is influenced by both the Buddhists on the one hand and the Nyaya-Vaisesika on the other. The Jainas were also substantialist, but in a very qualified sense of the term. Their conception of existence (sat) is intimately related to their doctrine of substance. The Tattvarthasutra 5.29 asserts: "What there is, has the nature of substance." And the next sutra (5.30 in the Digambara tradition) adds: "What there is (the existent), is endowed with the triple character, origin, decay and stability (persistence)."
The Tattvarthabhasya explains that whatever originates, perishes and continues to be is called the existent; anything different is called the non-existent. The next sutra asserts that the existent is constant for it never gives up its being (essence?).
In sutra 5.37, the substance is again characterized as the possessor of qualities (gu.na) and modes (paryaya). Here the broad category 'attribute' is apparently broken into two sub-categories, qualities and modes. But the distinction between qualities and modes is not found in the sutra. Umasvati points out that qualities are permanent attributes of the substance while the modes(paryaya) are only temporary attributes which are subject to origin and decay. In the above analysis of the Tattvarthasutra, two compatible notions of substance are emphasized: 1. substance as the core of change or flux and 2. substance as the substratum of attributes. Kundakunda combines these two
notions as he defines substance in his Pravacanasara:
They call it a substance, which is characterized by origin, persistence and decay, without changing its 'own-nature', and which is endowed with qualities and accompanied by modifications. For the 'own-nature' of the substance is its existence (sad.bh~va) which is always accompanied by qualities and variegated modes, and at the same time, by origin, decay and continuity.
The Vaisesika school, as we have seen already, emphasized both these aspects of substance, but did not equate the 'own-nature' of the substance with EXISTENCE. Aristotle, who in fact suggested several notions of substance either implicitly or explicitly, remarked in Categories:
The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities.
In Metaphysics, Aristotle also implied that the substance is what is independently existent, for existence, in the proper sense of the term, applies to substances only, and qualities and relation have a secondary existence, a parasitic mode of being:
Therefore, that which is primarily, i.e., not in a qualified sense but without qualification,
must be substance.
The Jainas too, identify the notion of 'it is' or 'it exists' with that of substance, and they then explain that 'it is' means that it is endowed with the triple character of origin, decay and stability.
In fact, the Jainas explicated the notion of substance in such a way as to avoid falling between the two stools of being and becoming. It was a grand compromise of flux and permanence. The Jainas inherited from Mahavira and his later followers the well-known doctrine of 'many-natured' reality (.
anekanta-vada), and thus a 'compromise' position was only an important trait of their creed. The substance, in their analysis, is being, it is also becoming.
Kundakunda observes that a substance has both natures: from the standpoint of one 'one-nature' it is being (sat, unchanging), and from another standpoint it has triple character, origin, decay and continuity, i.e., fluctuations.
Siddhasena Divakara repeated the point more forcefully:
There is no substance that is devoid of modification, nor is there any modification without an abiding something, a substance. For origin, decay and continuance are the three constituents of a substance.
It should be noted that the notion of continuity involved in the triple character of the substance is not identical with the notion of permanence of the substance. The former notion means persistence or continuance ( pravahanityata). The later notion means immutability. It is the notion in the back-
ground of which the triple character of origination, destruction and continuity becomes understandable. The notion of continuity, on the other hand, is essentially dependent upon origin and decay. Thus, Kundakunda observes:
There is no origin without destruction, nor is there any destruction without origin, and neither destruction nor origination are possible without what continues to be.
The Jainas were well aware of the Madhyamika critique of the 'own-nature' concept as well as the problem involved in the doctrine of the permanent substance. It is true that the immutability of own-nature invites a host of problems. But the notion of flux, the Jainas points out, is not sacrosanct.
Thus, just as the Buddhists argue that there is only fluctuation, there being no permanent being, the Jainas take the bull by the horns and answer that if there is no permanence there cannot be any change, any fluctuation, for it is only the permanent that can change. It is only the persisting soul that can transmigrate!
When the Tattvarthasutras defines substance as the substratum of qualities and modes, it was probably influenced by the Vaisesika school. Thus, Siddhasena points out that the rigid Vaisesika concepts of substance and quality were not compatible with the Jaina ontological principle of anekantata 'many-naturedness' or 'non-onesidedness'. In fact it would be as good as a heresy in Jainism if one intends to maintain a rigid distinction between substance and quality. The notion of triple character, origin, decay and continuity, embodying the principle of (conditioned) reality, was derived from the Buddhist source. The Buddha, for example, predicated this triple character of all the conditioned (samskrta) entities. Thus, in the Anguttara the Buddha said:
Of the conditioned entities, monks, the origin is conceived, even so their decay and their
stability (persistence).
Nagarjuna, however, directed his dialectical attack against the notion of the conditioned (samskrta), and concluded:
Since the notion of origin, persistence and decay cannot be established, the conditioned does not exist. And if the conditioned is not established, how will the unconditioned be established?
But why then did the Buddha speak about the triple character of the conditioned entities? Nagarjuna replied:
Just as magic, dream and the cloud-castle are unreal (but, nevertheless, are spoken about) so also origin, stability and decay have been described.
The Jainas postulate the triple character in the case of each event, each happening or change of state. Each fluctuation embodies origin, continuity and decay. Samantabhadra illustrates the point as follows:
if a golden pot is destroyed and a golden crown is made out of it, destruction, origination and continuity - all three - happen simultaneously and give rise to sorrow, joy and indifferent attitude in the minds of three different kinds of people, those in favour of the pot, those in favour of the crown, and those in favour of the gold stuff. ~
Siddhasena has shown great philosophic insight in expounding the Jaina ontological problem. According to him, reality can be viewed from two important standpoints, being and becoming, permanence and change. That is why Lord Mahavira acknowledged only two nayas or standpoints: 'substance exists' and 'modification exists'. If x is an element of reality, then, according to Siddhasena, x can be viewed as a SUBSTANCE from the standpoint of being, and as a PROPERTY from the standpoint of becoming. The standpoint of 'becoming' (modification) reveals that everything originates, stays and perishes; the standpoint of 'being' ('it is') reveals everything as existent, eternally without birth or decay. And, Siddhasena asserts, there cannot be being without becoming, or becoming without being; therefore, a substance (= reality) is defined as the combination of being (the existent) with becoming (origin, stability and decay).
The 'being' aspect is, according to Siddhasena, the result of generalization while the 'becoming' aspect is that of particularization. In our ordinary description of things, we necessarily combine the general with the particular.
From the point of view of the highest generalization, a thing is described as 'it is' which reveals the permanent being, the substance. But when, in ordinary descriptions, a thing is called a piece of wood, or a chair, or a red chair, we have an intermixture of 'being' and 'becoming' aspects. Insofar as the thing is identified as a non-fluctuating substance, it is the 'being' standpoint. And insofar as the attributes of the thing, such as being a piece of wood, being a chair, or redness, are revealed by the description, it is the 'becoming' stand- point. Qualities are nothing but modes or states of the substance. In any characterization or description of the thing there is thus an overlap of 'being'
and 'becoming' standpoints, until we reach the ultimate particularity, pure BECOMING, i.e., the point-instants (k.sa.nas) of the Buddhists.
Thus, the Jaina conception of reality, in bringing together the opposing viewpoints of the Buddhists and the Nyaya-Vaisesika, comes very close to that of Whitehead, according to whom the chief aim of philosophy is the "elucidation of our integral experience", of both the flux and permanence of
things. Whitehead has said that philosophers who have started with 'being' have given us the metaphysics of 'substance' and those who have started with 'becoming' have developed the metaphysics of flux. But Whitehead point out the inseparability of the two:
But, in truth, the two lines cannot be torn apart in this way; and we find that a wavering balance between the two is a characteristic of the greater number of philosophers. Plato found his permanences in a static, spiritual heaven, and his flux in the entanglement of his forms amid the fluent imperfections of the physical world .... Aristotle corrected his Platonism into a somewhat different balance. He was the apostle of 'substance and attribute', and of the classificatory logic which this notion suggests.
In the Indian context, one may observe that the Buddha's search for nirvana, the unconditioned state, freedom from suffering or duhkha, spelled out a philosophy for the later Buddhists, according to which the flux of things, impermanences, '~the fluent imperfections of the physical world" are identical with suffering (duh.kha, cf. whatever is impermanent, is suffering). And NIRVANA, the unconditioned state, is actualized with the cessation of this duhkha. The Vaisesikas, on the other hand, were, much like Aristotle, the apostles of substance-and-attribute duality.
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