Lokayatas

(Indian Materialism and Skepticism; also known as Cārvāka) The history of materialism in South Asia may be conveniently divided into two periods: preclassical and classical. In the preclassical period, a number of materialists, ethical agnostics, and skeptics appear in various sources, notably King Pāyāsi/Paesi in the Buddhist and Jaina canons, the six heretic teachers (esp. Ajita Keśakambalin) in the Śrāmaṇyaphalasūtra, and Jabāli in the Rāmāyaṇa . In this period, materialism was not yet a philosophical system, and the various materialists did not form a philosophical tradition. As for the termslokāyata/lokāyatika, cārvāka, bārhaspatya, and nāstika, most commonly used to designate materialism and materialists in the classical period, they are not yet connected to any philosophical doctrine. Various theories have been put forward about the original meaning of the term lokāyata (Rhys Davids, Tucci, Ruben, Jayatilleke, among others). In my opinion, lokāyata originally meant “(a thesis) about the world” (lit. [a thesis] extending to/directed toward the world); the term must originally have been an adjective qualifying a neuter noun such as vacana (statement). By extension it also came to mean the science that deals with such theses/statements in a dialectical context (see, e.g., the use of the term nyāya for reasoning, as well as for the science of reasoning). This science was practiced by Brahmans and was highly regarded in the early times. If Buddhaghoṣa’s interpretation (6th cent.) is correct, the term underwent a further modification and referred to a science of sophistic debate (vitaṇḍavādaśāstra). The word Cārvāka appears for the first time as a name of a demon (rākṣasa) in the Mahābhārata and has no connection to materialism. The term Bārhaspatya (lit., a follower of Bṛhaspati) is used for the first time in Kauṭilya’s Arthaśāstra (seeartha) to refer to the followers of a certain Bṛhaspati who founded a school of statecraft and economics; there is no reliable evidence to identify this Bṛhaspati with Bṛhaspati, the author of the Bṛhaspatisūtra and the founder of the materialist school. It seems probable that the founders of the two schools simply shared the same name. Some contended that Bṛhaspati, the author of the basic text of the materialist school, is identical with the mythological preceptor of the vedic gods. Finally, the term nāstika (deniers, nonbelievers) is only a general term for heretics of all sorts and is not particularly confined to materialists. 

This state of affairs was noted early on, and already in 1930 R.A. Schermerhorn (1930, 132–138) asked, “When Did Indian Materialism Get Its Distinctive Titles?” R.A. Schermerhorn rightly pointed out that the terms lokāyata and cārvāka in the early sources, such as the Buddhist canon, the Arthaśāstra, the Rāmāyaṇa, and the Mahābhārata , were not associated with materialism, and he argued that the designations Lokāyata and Cārvāka were associated with materialism for the first time in the 8th century (in the Tattvasaṃgraha) and 11th century (in thePrabodhacandrodaya), respectively. Although his conclusions are now obsolete, I am not aware of the usage of Cārvāka for materialists before the 8th century (in the Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya) and of Lokāyatika in the sense of materialist/hedonist before the 6th century (in Candrakīrti’s commentary on Nagārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakārikā, the Prasannapadā [see Vallée Poussin, 1903, 360]). 

In the classical period, materialism became a more or less coherent philosophical system, with its own metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics, and was counted among the established philosophical traditions (darśanas). Its foundational text was the Bṛhaspatisūtra, of which we possess only a few fragments. We also know the names of a handful of philosophers affiliated with this tradition; most of them seem to have written commentaries on the Bṛhaspatisūtra, and of these too we possess only a few fragments (see below). With the exception of Jayarāśi’sTattvopaplavasiṃha, no original writings of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata philosophical tradition survived. Our main sources of information for the classical materialist philosophy are the doxographic works Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya (8th cent.) and Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha (14th cent.). 

The Original Meaning of the Term Lokāyata

The original meaning of the term lokāyata has been one of the most disputed issues in modern scholarship on materialism in South Asia. In the introduction to his translation of theKūṭadantasutta, T.W. Rhys Davids (1899, 166–172) commented extensively on this term, which occasionally occurs in the Pali Canon. He pointed out that the descriptions of a good Brahman in the suttas (Skt. sūtras) mention Lokāyata as a branch of learning that a Brahman would be proud to master. It is therefore clear that Lokāyata is not used there to refer to materialism. T.W. Rhys Davids further noted that Buddhagoṣa explained Lokāyata as “the text book of the Vitaṇḍa” (lokāyataṃ vuccati vitaṇḍavādasattham, more literally, “the science of sophistic debate”; Chattopadhyaya & Gangopadhyaya, 1990, 371; note that vitaṇḍa seems to be used here as an adjective and is certainly not identical in meaning to vitaṇḍā [also originally an adjective qualifying kathā (debate)?] in the Nyāyasūtra). Elsewhere, Buddhagosa comments on the wordlokakkhāyikā (the adjective qualifies kathā and thus means “[debate] about the world”) as follows: "Foolish talk according to the Lokāyata, that is, the Vitaṇḍa, such as: 'By whom was this world created? By such a one. A crow is white from the whiteness of his bones; cranes are red from the redness of their blood.'" (Chattopadhyaya & Gangopadhyaya, 1990, 371).

T.W. Rhys Davids also pointed out that Aggavaṃsa (12th cent.) in the Saddanīti suggested two diametrically opposed analyses of the word Lokāyata (loka-āyata or loka-ayata): "Loko means the common world. Lokāyata means: 'on that they āyatanti'; that is, they exert themselves about it, strive about it, through the pleasure they take in discussion. Or perhaps it means: 'the world does not yatati by it'; that is, does not depend on it, move on by it. For living beings do not stir up their hearts to right-doing by reason of that book. Now Lokāyata is the book of the unbelievers (of the Titthiyas) full of such useless disputations as the following: 'All is impure; all is not impure; the crow is white, the crane is black; and for this reason or for that.'" (Chattopadhyaya & Gangopadhyaya, 1990, 371). 

T.W. Rhys Davids further observed (Chattopadhyaya & Gangopadhyaya, 1990, 372) that theMahābhārata uses lokāyata in the same way as the Buddhist Canon (the Piṭakas): it is counted among the accomplishments of a learned Brahman. The terms lokāyata and lokāyatika appear also in the Rāmāyaṇa, Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, the Jaina work Bhagavatī, and the Miliṇḍapaṇha; although the contexts do not allow an exact determination of the word, the meaning of materialism or materialist is nowhere apparent. In Bāṇa’s Harṣacarita the Lokāyatikas appear as hermits that the Vedāntins classify as heretics. T.W. Rhys Davids added, however, that we cannot conclude that there were actually Lokāyatikas living in Bāṇa’s time. Lastly, in various works of the 14th century and later, the Lokāyata system was fathered on Cārvāka, a mythical ogre in theMahābhārata (Chattopadhyaya & Gangopadhyaya, 1990, 373). He concluded that

"the best working hypothesis to explain the above facts seems to be that about 500 BC the word Lokāyata was used in a complementary way as a name of a branch of Brāhmin learning, and probably meant nature-lore – wise sayings, riddles, rhymes, and theories handed down by tradition as to cosmogony, the elements, the stars, the weather, scraps of astronomy, or elementary physics, even of anatomy, and knowledge of the nature of precious stones, and of birds and beasts and plants" (Chattopadhyaya & Gangopadhyaya, 1990, 374).

The development from “nature-lore” to materialism he explained as follows:

"[A] too exclusive acquaintance with Lokāyata came to be looked upon with disfavour. Even before the Christian era, masters of the dark sayings, and mysteries, of such mundane lore, were marked as sophists and casuists ... In the first half of the eighth century Kumārila uses the word as a mere term of abuse, and in the sense of infidel" (Chattopadhyaya & Gangopadhyaya, 1990, 374-375).

Shortly afterward, Śaṅkara ascribes to the Lokāyata, “possibly wrongly,” the doctrine that the soul is the same as the body.

"Finally in the fourteenth century the great theologian Sāyaṇa-Mādhava has a longish chapter in which he ascribes to the Lokāyatikas the most extreme form of let-us-eat-and-drink-for-tomorrow-we-may-die view of life, of Pyrrhonism in philosophy, and of atheism in theology. The Lokāyata had, no doubt, at that time, long ceased to exist ... Throughout the whole story we have no evidence of anyone who called himself a Lokāyatika, or his own knowledge Lokāyata. After the early use of the word in some such sense as nature-lore, folk-lore, there is a tone of unreality over all the statements we have. And of the real existence of a school of thought, or of a system of philosophy that called itself by the name, there is no trace" (Chattopadhyaya & Gangopadhyaya, 1990, 375). 

T.W. Rhys Davids was strongly criticized by G. Tucci (1924, summarized in 1925) who had taken an altogether different approach. G. Tucci placed Lokāyata within the traditional framework of the four aims of man (puruṣārtha): kāma , artha , dharma , and mokṣa (liberation). The Lokāyatikas and Cārvākas, hedonists and politicians, were outspoken in defense of the “will to live,” that is, of the first two goals. G. Tucci also identified Bṛhaspati the author of the materialistic Bṛhaspatisūtra with Bṛhaspati the Arthaśāstra teacher.

Materialism, G. Tucci said, is a general name, and there is a multitude of names for materialists: Nāstika, Cārvāka, Lokāyatika, Bārhaspatya, Svābhāvika, Bhūtavādin, Icchāntika; although these are quasi-synonymous in later times, one cannot assume that they were so from the beginning. But from which school, he asked, did the first Lokāyata work issue (Chattopadhyaya & Gangopadhyaya, 1990, 387)? According to G. Tucci,

"materialism means either a conception of reality which explains everything on the basis of mechanical laws and denies the existence of every transcendental being, or, in the usual vulgar sense, an epicurean manner of life which ignores any religious feeling and whose only goal is to enjoy life" (Chattopadhyaya & Gangopadhyaya, 1990, 388).

The latter meaning is illustrated, for instance, by Vihārabhadra in the Daśakumāracarita. Not every “denier” (nāstika), such as a denier of the authority of the Veda, or of God, is automatically a materialist. Therefore, the peculiar characteristic of Lokāyata must be identified. This, G. Tucci suggested, is the denial of karman (Chattopadhyaya & Gangopadhyaya, 1990, 389). The Lokāyatikas represented a reaction against the pessimistic notion of life and the idea that one’s aim is not to be sought in this world, but in nirvāṇa (lit. extinction). Rather, they taught that only what is perceived exists, and the only means of knowledge is perception. It is a mere fancy to consider them as forerunners of scientific research, as T.W. Rhys Davids and R.O. Franke did (see Tucci, 1924). Loka never has the meaning of “nature” in Sanskrit (for “nature,” Tucci opines, one uses the words pradhāna, prakṛti, svabhāva, or, in Buddhist texts, bhajanaloka). Rather, lokameans the human world.

"Therefore, this Lokāyata, which has for its aim lokayātrā [worldly affairs], is the forerunner ofnīti [the science of ethics and politics] and arthaśāstra [the science of government], that is of a science which was attributed by Brahminical sources also to Bṛhaspati from whom the Lokāyata is called Bārhaspatya as well as Bārhaspatyamata and had the meaning of nīti" (Chattopadhyaya & Gangopadhyaya, 1990, 390). 

Thus, G. Tucci maintained that at the beginning Lokāyata “represented the science of thepurohita [the main priest] who on earth assisted his king, as in heaven Bṛhaspati assisted Indra” (Chattopadhyaya & Gangopadhyaya, 1990, 390). From a certain time onward, there were twoartha schools: those who accepted the authority of dharma, and those who accepted only arthaand kāma as “goals of humanity,” denying god and karman (Chattopadhyaya & Gangopadhyaya, 1990, 391). Seductive as G. Tucci’s assumption may be, one has to remember that it lacks any positive evidence and is contradicted by all the Buddhist sources. G. Tucci attempted to connect Lokāyata as arthaśāstra to other doctrines associated with Indian materialism: in order to justify their denial of karman, the Lokāyatikas appealed to the svabhāva doctrine that things arise by themselves, which can be traced back to upanishadic times, and to which Mokkhali Gosāla and Pūraṇa Kassapa were related. The svabhāva doctrine, G. Tucci says, had only one point in common with the Lokāyata, namely the denial of karman, and striking analogies to thekālavāda (the doctrine of time) and the pariṇāmavāda (the doctrine of transformation), which maintained that everything happens by combination of the material elements and that human effort is useless. The Lokāyatikas accepted this doctrine in order to explain the diversity of the world without having recourse to karman (Chattopadhyaya & Gangopadhyaya, 1990, 391–392). 

By and by, the ancient Lokāyata lost its original character of nīti and became “hetuvidyā, tarkavidyā full of logical subtleties. The dhūrta-cārvāka became suśikṣita-cārvāka” (Chattopadhyaya & Gangopadhyaya, 1990, 392). How this change happened G. Tucci does not explain; however, the terms dhūrtacārvāka (the cunning/fraudulent Cārvākas) andsuśikṣitacārvāka (the well-instructed Cārvākas [the term is used ironically]) are used only in the 10th century by Jayanta in the Nyāyamañjarī, and we now know that they both refer to the same Cārvāka teacher: Udbhaṭa (see below). G. Tucci concluded his essay by stating that later on Lokāyata seems to have disappeared, but its doctrines remained occasionally accepted by “disbelievers or materialists who always exist in every country – even in a country which can be called the fatherland of idealism” (Chattopadhyaya & Gangopadhyaya, 1990, 392). 

W. Ruben, in contrast, connected materialism to “Realpolitik” (1935, 142f.), notably in the case of King Pāyāsi, whom he took to have been a historical king of Setavyā who was subordinate to King Prasenajit of Kosala (against Leumann and Schrader, see Ruben, 1935, 143n3). The characteristics of Realpolitik, according to W. Ruben (1935, 178), are (1) brutal openness, (2) recklessness, (3) dishonesty, (4) unorthodoxy, (5) impiousness, (6) egotism, (7) cruelty, (8) and nonfatalist activity. Recently R. Bhattacharya (2009, 21–32) strongly objected to the association of Lokāyata with kings. 

Just like G. Tucci, W. Ruben associated Lokāyata with the arthaśāstra, but, unlike the former, he rightly considered that loka has three meanings: the world, people in general, and the lay or common people. W. Ruben attempted to determine what the meaning of loka is for the materialists in contradistinction to the realists and the idealists (“Es kommt auf eine genauere Interpretation der ‘Welt’ an, wenn der Materialist sich vom Realisten unterscheiden will”; Ruben, 1935, 198). His investigation, however, did not lead to any results because, as pointed out above, in the ancient texts, lokāyata does not refer to materialism.

Although of dubious scholarly value, the work of D.R. Shastri may be mentioned – A Short History of Indian Materialism, Sensationalismand Hedonism (21957) – which has been popular in India and is often referred to in secondary literature. D.R. Shastri distinguished four “logical” stages of development of Indian materialism and coordinated them with the four common names given to materialism and materialists: Bārhaspatya, Lokāyata, Cārvāka, and Nāstika. In the first period, materialism was a mere tendency of opposition. It denied the authority of all evidence, of the Veda as well as of perception and inference. In this period, its name wasbārhaspatya (“The record of this period is kept by Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa”; Chattopadhyaya & Gangopadhyaya, 1990, 400). In the second period, materialism became a philosophical system, adapted the doctrine of svabhāvavāda, identified the self with the body, and accepted perception as a means of knowledge. In this period, it came to be known as Lokāyata. In this same period, Ajita Keśakambalin, Kambalāśvatara, and Pūraṇa Kāśyapa flourished. At the third stage, an extreme form of hedonism formed the most important feature of the school. “Devils occupied the seat of angels” (Chattopadhyaya & Gangopadhyaya, 1990, 397), and “Cārvākism” originated.

"Under severe attack from the spiritualists, it [the materialist school] gave up the theory that there is no self apart from the body and tried, gradually, to identify the sense organs, breath and organ of thought with the self" (Chattopadhyaya & Gangopadhyaya, 1990, 397). 

In this stage, the materialists also accepted inference in a restricted form. Philosophers like Purandara advocated this form of materialism. At the fourth stage, the school was designated asnāstika and joined the Buddhist and the Jain in opposing the Veda. Although these stages are called logical, D.R. Shastri implies that they also correspond to four historical periods. However, it is hard to reconcile D.R. Shastri’s statements with the historical evidence at hand. 

Perhaps the most important work on early Lokāyata was accomplished by J.N. Jayatilleke in hisEarly Buddhist Theory of Knowledge (1963). He compared the Chāṇḍogyopaniṣad (7.2.1) list of sciences and Śaṅkara’s comments thereon with the list of sciences in the Pali Canon (47–48), and I believe he was right to relate lokāyata to vākovākya and brahmodya. 

J.N. Jayatilleke further drew attention to two important passages in the Saṃyuttanikāya (II.77) and Aṅguttaranikāya (IV.428). The Saṃyutta passage specifies four lokāyata theses: 

1.

Everything exists (sabbaṃ atthī ti).

2.

Nothing exists (sabbaṃ natthī ti).

3.

Everything is unity (sabbam ekattan ti).

4.

Everything is distinctness (sabbam puttuta). 

The four theses clearly form two pairs, and one can safely assume that the two members of each pair were debated against each other. J.N. Jayatilleke added, "This dialectical opposition in these pairs of views reminds us of the Vedic institution of the brahmodya, which found expression in the form of vākovākya (v. supra, 47), which was originally a dialogue and later a debate" (Jayatilleke, 1963, 50–51). He was also the first to draw attention to a crucial passage in theLaṅkāvatārasūtra that contains no fewer than 31 Lokāyata theses (Nanjio, 1923, 176–179). D.T. Suzuki (1932, 152–155) and K.-H. Golzio (1996, 181–182) consistently mistranslate lokāyata in this passage as “materialism.”

The theses are the following: 

1.

Everything is produced (kṛtaka). (This thesis is called the first thesis about the world [prathamaṃ lokāyatam].)

2.

Everything is not produced.

3.

Everything is impermanent (anitya).

4.

Everything is permanent.

5.

Everything is to be brought forth (utpādya).

6.

Everything is not to be brought forth.

7.

Everything is unity (ekatva).

8.

Everything is difference (anyatva).

9.

Everything is duality (ubhayatva).

10.

Everything is nonduality.

11.

Everything depends on causes (karaṇādhīna).

12.

Everything is inexplicable (avyākṛta).

13.

Everything is explicable.

14.

There is a self ( ātman ).

15.

There is no self.

16.

This world exists.

17.

This world does not exist.

18.

The other world exists.

19.

The other world does not exist.

20.

The other world exists and does not exist.

21.

There is liberation (mokṣa).

22.

There is no liberation.

23.

Everything is momentary (kṣaṇika).

24.

Everything is nonmomentary.

25.

Space-ether, suppression without insight (apratisaṃkhyānirodha), and nirvāṇa are conditioned.

26.

Space-ether, suppression without insight, and nirvāṇa are not conditioned.

27.

There is an intermediate existence (between death and rebirth; antarābhava).

28.

There is no intermediate existence.

29.

The threefold world is caused by ignorance, desire, and karman.

30.

The threefold world is without a cause (ahetuka).

31.

All things are classified (?) by their particular and general characteristics (svasāmānyalakṣaṇapatita). 

To conclude, loka in lokāyata certainly does not mean “nature” as suggested by T.W. Rhys Davids, nor “people” as suggested by G. Tucci. J.N. Jayatilleke suggested “cosmos” (1963, 55–65). He took his cue from the fact that many of the Lokāyata theses refer to the world as a whole, that is, many of them begin with the word “everything” and refer to the “entire universe.” He also pointed to a passage in the Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad where, so he claimed, loka is used synonymously with brahman (the statement reads, “you are brahman, you are the sacrifice, you are the world”). However, “cosmos” has a particular connotation of good order and orderly arrangement, which is absent in loka, and therefore it seems preferable to keep the more neutral word “world.” In my view, Llokāyata in the early sources such as the Buddhist canon, theArthaśāstra, the Mahābhārata, and so forth refers to (a thesis about) the world as well as the science that deals with such theses in a dialectical context. 

Ajita Keśakambalin 

In the Śrāmaṇyaphalasūtra, King Ajātaśatru tells the Buddha about his previous encounters with various ascetics (Meisig, 1987; MacQueen, 1988). One of them was Ajita Keśakambalin, who earned his nickname (keśakambala, “blanket of hair”) from wearing a blanket made of hair, which kept him hot in the summer and cold in the winter. His teachings testify to an early form of materialism: donations (charity) and sacrifices, good and bad deeds (karman) have no results. There is neither this world (?) nor the other world; there are no father and mother; and there are neither ascetics nor Brahmans who take the right path. Man consists of the four elements. When he dies, the element earth goes back to earth, the element water to water, the element fire to fire, and the element wind to wind. The senses go back to space-ether. There is no life after death. 

Other teachers mentioned in the Śrāmanyaphalasūtra, such as Pūraṇa Kāśyapa or Kakuda Kātyāyana, are also occasionally associated with the Lokāyata by modern scholars, not because they hold materialistic doctrines, but because of their ethics, which deny karmic retribution. Other versions of the Śrāmanyaphalasūtra attribute the same doctrines to other teachers (see MacQueen, 1988, 153). 

King Paesi 

Both the Buddhist and the Jaina canons report the story of a dialogue between the materialist king Paesi (Pāyāsi) and a pious monk called Kesi in the Jaina canon (for a recent translation, see Bollée, 2002). Kesi contends that the soul is different from the body. The king argues that he had an evil grandfather who, according to Kesi’s teaching, must have gone to hell. Paesi, however, was his most beloved grandchild, and yet he did not return to warn him that evil deeds conduct to hell. Had he returned, Paesi would have believed that the soul is different from the body. Kesi asks what the king would do if his queen would be unfaithful to him with another man. The king answers that he would have the man killed. Kesi continues, suppose the man would say, “Let me warn my family and friends not to repeat such an act,” would the king let him go? In the same manner, the grandfather may well wish to warn his grandson but is unable to do so. 

Paesi retorts that this is only an inappropriate analogy. He had a pious grandmother who, according to Kesi’s teachings, must be in heaven now. Had she come back to reprimand him, he would have believed that the soul is different from the body. Kesi answers that this world is too disgusting for those in heaven, and this may be the reason why the king’s grandmother did not come back to reprimand him. 

Paesi then tells Kesi about some experiments. He once put a thief in a big pot and sealed its lid. After a while, he opened the lid and found the thief dead. Had the pot had some hole through which the soul could have escaped, he would have believed that the soul is different from the body. Paesi recounts further experiments. Once he had a thief put in a pot. When he opened it after some time, the pot was full of worms. Had the pot had some holes through which the souls of the worms could have entered it, he would have believed that the soul is different from the body. Another time Paesi weighed a thief before and after his execution. His weight was exactly the same. Had his soul escaped the body, he would have weighed less. Therefore, his soul could not have escaped the body. Another experiment consisted in cutting the body of a criminal into very small pieces and looking for the soul, but it could not be found anywhere. 

Cārvāka/Lokāyata in the Classical Period 

In the classical period, we encounter Lokāyata/Lokāyatika and Cārvāka as designations for a materialist, hedonist, and antireligious philosophical tradition as well as for the persons adhering to this tradition. In the absence of appropriate evidence, all attempts to explain the historical development from lokāyata as a science of disputation dealing with theses about the world, as well as from Cārvāka as the name of a demon in the Mahābhārata, to a philosophical tradition or school of thought and to its adherents, must remain a matter of speculation. The first doxographic work that has come down to us is the Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya (Compendium of Six Worldviews) by the Jaina author Haribhadrasūri (8th cent.), and it counts the Lokāyata among the philosophical systems. In contrast, Bhāviveka, who wrote theMadhyamakahṛdayakārikā, a semidoxographic work, in the 6th century, does not mention the Cārvāka/Lokāyata among the philosophical traditions he criticizes. Nevertheless, thanks to the testimony of Candrakīrti (see Vallée Poussin, 1903, 360), we can be fairly certain that the Lokāyata as a materialist school of thought existed already in the 6th century. So far I have not encountered an earlier reference where lokāyata or cārvāka refers to materialism or materialists. 

Bṛhaspati 

The foundational work of Lokāyata materialism is the Bṛhaspatisūtra. The text is now lost, and only a few fragments are known to us from quotations in other sources. I am not aware of any quotation of the text prior to the 8th century, but I assume that it was composed no later than the 6th cen-tury. Dharmakīrti seems to refer to it, or at least to the position that perception is the only means of knowledge (see sūtra 12 below), in the Pramāṇaviniścaya (see Steinkellner, 2007, 4). Further, if I am right in assuming that Dharmakīrti refers to Kambalāśvatara (Franco, 1997, 102–105), then the Bṛhaspatisūtra must precede Dharmakīrti by at least two generations. D.R. Shastri (1930) and C. Namai (1996, 7–15) collected Lokāyata fragments and paid special attention to the Bṛhaspatisūtra; recently, these collections were augmented and critically discussed by R. Bhattacharya (2009, 69–104). Clearly, it is not certain which quotations should be considered the genuine quotations of the original sūtras (the same is true, of course, for the other lost Lokāyata works that are known only from fragmentary quotations and/or paraphrases). The following are fairly certain quotations from the Bṛhaspatisūtra. Fragments 4 and 9 seem to render each other redundant but are both well attested. Note that fragments 7 and 8 are known only from a Tibetan translation of Jñānaśrībhadra’s Āryalaṅkāvatāravṛtti and are therefore slightly doubtful. 

1.

Therefore, we will now explain the principle (of reality) (tattva).

2.

Earth, water, fire, and wind are the principles.

3.

The terms “body” (of living beings), “sense,” and “object” (are used) in respect to their aggregates.

4.

Consciousness (arises) from these.

5.

Just as the power of intoxication (arises) from ferment and so on.

6.

Living beings are like bubbles of water.

7.

Because of the diversity (recon. vaicitrya; however, Namai, 1996, reconstructs citra) of the elements, the world/people too is/are diverse.

8.

Just like the eye on a peacock’s tail (recon. mayūracandrakavat).

9.

(Consciousness arises) from the body alone.

10.

There is no other world (i.e. life after death) because there is no (soul) that goes to the other world.

11.

Liberation (apavarga) is nothing but death.

12.

Perception is the only means of knowledge.

13.

Inference is not a means of knowledge.

14.

Desire (kāma, i.e. the fulfillment of desire) is the only aim of life. (Or, according to another quotation, desire and wealth [artha] are the only aims of life.) 

At the end of his chapter on the Cārvāka, the doxographer Mādhava in theSarvadarśanasaṃgraha quotes 11 ½ verses that he attributes to Bṛhaspati. It seems, therefore, that another work, probably a verse compilation of a later date, was also attributed to Bṛhaspati. The quoted verses contain mainly criticism of Brahmans and sacrifices and are partly known also from other sources; they do not contain anything specifically materialist. Mādhava concludes the chapter by quoting these 11 ½ verses:

There is no heaven, no liberation, no self/soul which goes to another world; nor do the actions of the four castes and stages of life (varṇāśrama) bear fruit.

Sacrifices, the three Vedas, and ascetic practices – such as bearing the three sticks (symbolizing control over thoughts, words, and actions) and smearing oneself with ashes – are means of livelihood made by the creator (dhātṛ) for those who lack intelligence and manliness. (This is a rather surprising reference to a creator whose existence no Cārvāka would accept; this could be explained either as indicating a non-Cārvāka origin of this verse or as mere irony.)

If the animal slain in the jyotiṣṭoma sacrifice goes to heaven, why doesn’t the sacrificer kill his own father there? (This diatribe is also known from Buddhist sources.)

If the śrāddha ritual satisfies the dead, (adding) oil to an extinguished lamp would increase the light.

It would be useless to prepare provisions for a journey for travelers in this world; (they could) be nourished on the road by the śrāddha prepared (at home) by householders.

If beings in heaven are satisfied by a donation (of food burnt here below and transported to them by smoke), why is it not given to those who stand on the roof of the house (in other words, why are they not fed in the same way)?

As long as one lives, one should live happily; contracting debts, one should drink ghee. Once the body has turned into ashes, how could it come again?

If he who has gone out of his body would go to the other world, why does not he return, motivated by the love of his kin? (See also the section on Paesi above.)

Therefore, the sacrifices for the dead are only a means of livelihood arranged by the Brahmans (for their own profit). There is nothing else.

The three authors of the (three) Vedas were a buffoon, a rogue, and a demon, as is clear from the incomprehensible words jarbharī, turpharī, and so on transmitted by the paṇḍits.

The queen’s touching the penis (of the horse) in the aśvamedha sacrifice was ordained by buffoons; so were all other things to be done in sacrifices.

Similarly, the eating of meat was ordained by a demon. 

Bhāvivikta 

Most of the other Lokāyata fragments seem to come from commentaries on the Bṛhaspatisūtra. Bhāvivikta is called by Jayanta in the Nyāyamañjarī (10th cent.) an “old” (or “ancient”) “Cārvāka teacher” (cirantanacārvākācārya) in contradistinction to Udbhaṭa (see below). He interpreted the sūtra “tebhyaś caitanyam” (sūtra 4 above) as “consciousness arises from them,” that is, from the material elements. In other words, the case ending -bhyaḥ is taken, as indeed one would expect, as an ablative suffix (pañcamī; see also the Nyāyamañjarigranthibhaṅga [Shah, 1972, 197]). Later on, Udbhaṭa interpreted the same case ending as a dative suffix.

Kambalāśvatara 

Another early commentator, who probably lived in the time between Dignāga (480–540?) and Dharmakīrti (600–660?), was Kambalāśvatara (a peculiar name that literally means “blanket mule”), who is referred to by Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla in the Tattvasaṃgraha andTattvasaṃgrahapañjikā, respectively (see Franco, 1997, 102–105). Obviously, the Cārvākas were hard pressed to explain how consciousness could arise from the material elements alone (sūtra4) or from the body alone (sūtra 9). Thus, Kambalāśvatara explained that “from the body alone” actually means “from the body supported by exhaling, inhaling, and so on (prāṇāpānādyadhiṣṭhita)” (see Krishnamacharya, 1926, 1864). The attribution of a sūtra text to Kambalāśvatara by C. Namai and others seems to be based on a misunderstanding ofTattvasaṃgrahapañjikā, where it is stated that Kambalāśvatara explained the (Bṛhaspati)sūtrain this manner (see Krishnamacharya, 1926, 521). 

According to a quotation in the Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra (see Sāṅskṛtyāyana, 1953, 750–810; quoted and translated in Franco, 1997, 104), Kambalāśvatara also offered a new interpretation ofsūtra 4 (tebhyaś caitanyam): the pronoun tebhyaḥ (from these) is usually considered to refer to the four elements – earth and so forth (in sūtra 2) – but Kambalāśvatara interpreted “from these” to mean “from the body, the sense, and the objects” (in sūtra 3).

The context of the discussion in the Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā suggests that Kambalāśvatara is also the author of the following inference, which denies life after death: "The cognition at the time of death (i.e. the last cognition in this life) of an ordinary person does not connect to (i.e. produce) another cognition (i.e. the first cognition in the next life), because it is cognition at the time of death, just like the cognition at the time of death of an arhat" (Franco, 1997, 116).

This inference is valid because the Buddhists admit that the cognition at death of an enlightened arhat (“noble one”) does not produce another cognition, and because the presence of a productive death-cognition cannot be observed in dissimilar instances. This inference, too, may have been one of the reasons why Dharmakīrti argued very strongly that mere non-observation of the reason in dissimilar instances is not sufficient to establish its absence (see Franco, forthcoming a). 

Aviddhakarṇa 

Another Lokāyata commentator referred to by Kamalaśīla is Aviddhakarṇa (see Krishnamacharya, 1926, 1485). He is said to have composed a Tattvaṭīkā, which I also take to be a commentary on the Bṛhaspatisūtra. Aviddhakarṇa seems to have objected that the so-called inference for another (parārthānumāna) is not an inference at all (perhaps in order to undermine inference in general). Is another person, he asked, being instructed by inference (for another)? For, it is said that only a reason that is established for both disputants makes known the property to be proven. But this is not correct, because inference (for another) has the nature of speech and is not a means of knowledge for the speaker (who already knows beforehand what he is about to say). If the speaker instructs another person because his intention is to make him understand, then this intention is not necessarily conveyed by a reason that is admitted by both parties. 

Aviddhakarṇa is probably referred to in the same chapter in the following statement (see Krishnamacharya, 1926, 1463). Someone else says that inference for another is not a means of knowledge because it is a repetition as far as the speaker is concerned. As for the hearer, it is for his own sake (thus, for him too this is not an inference for another). Indeed, what is the difference if an object is perceived by hearing or by seeing? Just as when the sense of vision operates it is not considered to operate for the sake of another person, when the sense of hearing operates in the case of the so-called inference for another, its operation should also not be considered “for the sake of another” from the point of view of the hearer. According to Karṇakagomin in his Pramāṇavārttikavṛttiṭīkā (see Śāṅskṛtyāyana, 1944, 19), Aviddhakarṇa admitted that there are true inferences inasmuch as they are perceived by common people (lokapratīta), but objected that the definition of the inferential sign as propounded by the Buddhist and other philosophers is not correct. His position is thus somewhat similar of that Puranda (see below). 

Vyāḍi 

Vyāḍi was a Lokāyata teacher referred to in the Syādvādaratnākara (see Motilāla, 1926/27, 1076). He maintained that there is an illusion of perception with respect to nonexisting objects, which are beyond the range of the senses and are designated by words such as “self” (ātman). For instance, a person with closed eyes has an illusion of perceiving darkness (which proves that nothing can be perceived as something). When a cognition of a visible form and so forth arises, it determines the nature of that form, but the cognition that takes the form “I” does not apprehend the nature of the self (ātman; i.e. when a cognition takes the form “I am x,” the word “I” does not refer to something real); it is just like the cognition of the word (i.e. the proper name) Indradatta – it does not determine the nature of the person bearing that name. Therefore, the cognition in the form “I” is not accepted as conveying to a real object. 

Purandara

Purandara seems to have composed an independent treatise that contained sūtras and a commentary (vṛtti). Only one of his sūtras survived and is quoted several times: "Because a means of valid cognition is not secondary/subordinate/metonymical (gauṇa), the determination of an object on the basis of an inference is hardly possible" (Franco, 1991, 161n1).

It is not quite clear in what sense Purandara maintained that inference is gauṇa. Prabhācandra in the Nyāyakumudacandra (see Jain, 1938, 71) enumerated no fewer than eight possible interpretations: 

1.

because it depends on another (parāpekṣa) for the determination of its object (svārthaniścaya),

2.

because it is deceptive (visaṃvādaka),

3.

because it is preceded by perception (pratyakṣapūrvaka),

4.

because it is not produced by a real object (artha),

5.

because it has an unreal thing for its object (avastuviṣaya),

6.

because of the metonymical usage of the word “thesis” (pakṣaśabdopacāra) for the subject of the inference (dharmin),

7.

because it is sublated/contradicted (bādhyamāna) (by another valid cognition), and

8.

because there is no means of knowledge that proves the invariable connection (pratibandhaprasādhakapramāṇābhāva) between the reason and the property to be proven. 

As the original work is lost, we cannot determine which of the above corresponds to Purandara’s original intention. Interpretation (6) seems to have been common and was rejected by Udbhaṭa (see below). I have argued (see Franco, 1991) that it probably does not correspond to Purandara’s original intention.

Whatever the interpretation of the sūtra may be, Purandara’s purpose was not to reject inferences altogether, but only such inferences that establish nonperceptible entities such as a permanent self, god, and so forth. In his commentary, probably on the above sūtra, he said, "Inference that is well known in the world is certainly accepted by the Cārvākas too, but the one that is taught by certain (would be philosophers) who transgress (with it) the worldly path is rejected" (see Krishnamacharya, 1926, 1481–1482). R. Bhattacharya (2009, 109–122) argued that this tenet of Purandara should be understood as a faithful interpretation of the Bṛhaspatisūtra(12–13 above). In my opinion, this is implausible.

Udbhaṭa 

The most innovative Cārvāka was Udbhaṭa (see Solomon, 1977–1978). In his work Tattvavṛtti, probably a commentary on the Bṛhaspatisūtra, he suggested several radically new interpretations of some sūtras. Thus, commenting on the sūtra enumerating the four material elements, he said that it does not contain a complete list of principles, but serves only as an indication of them. Consciousness, sound, pleasure, pain, volition, effort, and mnemonic traces left by past experience are different from the material elements. It is possible that he also accepted the four types of absences (prāgabhāva and so forth; see Nyāya) of the material elements as real entities. In the Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga (see Shah, 1972, 43), it is said that he interpreted the particle iti (in sūtra 2 above), which often concludes a complete or incomplete enumeration, as indicating that the number of the objects of valid cognition cannot be determined (prameyāniyamapratipādaka). He also interpreted the word tattva (principle) in the first sūtra (athātas tattvaṃ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ) to indicate that one cannot determine the number and characteristics of means of knowledge and objects of means of knowledge (pramāṇaprameya-saṃkhyālakṣaṇaniyamāśakyakaraṇīyatā). 

Udbhaṭa also proposed a somewhat far-fetched new interpretation of tebhyaś caitanyam (sūtra4 above). As the suffix -bhyaḥ functions as both ablative and dative case ending, the sūtra could also be read as “consciousness is for the sake of the elements.” This interpretation relieved Udbhaṭa of the task to explain how consciousness can arise from the material elements. Further, the proposed reading is certainly also a humorous inversion of the Sāṃkhya tenet that matter (prakṛti ) is for the sake of consciousness/soul ( puruṣa ). “Being for the sake of the elements” means that consciousness helps the elements to create the living body (see Shah, 1972, 197). Udbhaṭa also recognized dharma as a special nature (svabhāvaviśeṣa) of the material elements that produce the body, and which accounts for various experiences of pleasure and pain (see Shah, 1972, 198). 

According to the Syādvādaratnākara (see Motilāla, 1926/27, 265), Udbhaṭa also referred to thePaurandarasūtra and claimed that not all inferences are to be considered secondary (gauṇa). If the reason is a property of the subject of inference, which is part of the property to be proven (sādhyaikadeśadharmidharmatva), then its occurrence (vṛtti) is not secondary in any way; only if inferences are employed to prove objects such as heaven and life after death, it is said in thePaurandarasūtra that the determination of an object by inference is hardly possible. 

In the Nyāyamañjarī, Jayanta occasionally refers to the dhūrtacārvāka (the cunning/fraudulent Cārvākas) and suśikṣitacārvāka (the well-instructed Cārvākas). Until the Cakradhara’sNyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga was published in 1972, one naturally assumed that these two appellations refer to different groups or subschools of Cārvāka. It turned out that they both refer to Udbhaṭa, the one derogatorily, the other ironically. 

The Anonymous Commentators (Vṛttikāras) 

The Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā (see Krishnamacharya, 1926, 1858) reports of two groups of commentators (note, however, that the plural in Sanskrit does not necessarily refer to more than one person) who proposed different verb supplements to the sūtra (4 above): tebhyaś caitanyam. According to one group, one has to supplement the verb utpadyate and thus read, “Consciousness arises from these (elements).” This is certainly the older and traditional interpretation of the sūtra. According to the other group, one has to supply the verbal formabhivyajyate and thus read, “Consciousness is manifested from these (elements).” The second interpretation comes close to Udbhaṭa’s opinion, for, if consciousness is merely manifested from the elements, it is different from the elements and exists independently of them even prior to its manifestation. 

The Sadvitīyaprayoga

Many Cārvāka fragments cannot be attributed to a particular author. Among the anonymous fragments, the so-called Sadvitīyaprayoga is perhaps the best known. In the period between Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, the Cārvākas made up some sophisms to prove their tenets; the following is an example: "The pot is accompanied either by a man who is characterized as a body where consciousness is manifested, or by pot, because it is not a lotus, just like a wall" (Tillemans, 1991, 407).

This sophism has been the subject of several studies (see the pioneering study of Tillemans 1991; recently T. Iwata has shown that Dharmakīrti’s modification of the definition of “thesis” [pakṣa] was introduced in order to disable this sophism [Iwata, 2007; see also Franco, forthcoming c ]), but clarity could not be gained because these studies were more concerned with Dharmakīrti’s refutation of the Cārvāka position, rather than with Cārvāka position itself. 

The Cārvāka stratagem expressed in this sophism was to relate the first member of the disjunction to the subject of the inference (pakṣa), and the second to the similar example (sapakṣa). To understand this move, one has to remember that the term “accompanied” (sadvitīya, lit. together with a second), implies that one is accompanied by a second, different thing, that is, one is not accompanied by oneself. In other words, "to be accompanied" has the same extension as "to be different". Further, the difference intended is not numeric, but qualitative (in the sense that one pot is not different from another pot in as much as they are both pots; thus, as Śākyabuddhi says, the subject of the inference includes all pots). The terms of this inference which determine the validity of the reason are clear:

1.

Subject (pakṣa): pot.

2.

Similar example (sapakṣa): a wall, that is, whatever is accompanied by (i.e., is different from) a man who is characterized as a body where consciousness is manifested, or by a pot. While the first member of the disjunction may be problematic, the second member suffices to establish the wall as a representative of the spakṣa, for one cannot deny that a wall is accompanied by (i.e., is different from) a pot.

3.

Dissimilar example (vipakṣa): Whatever is not accompanied either by a man who is characterized as a body where consciousness is manifested, or by a pot. No concrete example is given, and presumably none had to be given because the group of dissimilar examples was considered to be empty. If, for the sake of simplicity, we take the accompaniment as difference and its negation as identity, the negative example would be either (something not different from) a pot or (something not different from) man characterized as a body where consciousness is manifested. The pot is excluded because it is the subject of inference, and the person is excluded because its existence is contested by the opponent, and only something agreed upon by both parties can be used as an example. Thus, nothing, or at least nothing existing, can be used as a negative example.

Now, the first condition of a valid reason, namely being a property of the subject of inference (pakṣadharmatva), obviously holds because the property of not being a lotus is present in a pot (since the pot is not a lotus). The second condition, namely to be present in the similar example, holds too because the property of not being a lotus is present in a wall (since the wall is not a lotus). The third condition, namely absence in dissimilar examples, cannot and need not to be satisfied because there are no dissimilar examples. Alternatively, as explained by Dharmottara, the Cārvāka could have used non-existing things as negative examples. A non-existing thing does not have real properties, even negative ones, such as being non-lotus.

Thus, the three conditions of a valid reason are fulfilled and the disjunctive property: “being accompanied either by a man who is characterized as a body where consciousness is manifested, or by pot” is correctly attributed to a pot. However, as mentioned above, a pot is not accompanied by a pot. Therefore the second member of the disjunction has to be eliminated in the case of a pot. Consequently, the pot is accompanied by a man who is characterized as a body where consciousness is manifested.

The purpose of the Cārvāka in this inference was probably not to establish that a person is nothing but a body in which consciousness is manifested (for this inference can easily be countered with the opposite inference), but to show a serious deficiency in structure of inference that allows any odd thesis to be established, and consequently that inference should not be considered a reliable means of knowledge. 

Jayarāśi 

Jayarāśi’s Tattvopaplavasīṃha (late 8th or early 9th cent.?) is the only original Lokāyata text that survived (Franco, 1987; Solomon, 2010). It is at least as radical and innovative as Udbhaṭa’sTattvaṭīkā and in fact throws materialism overboard in favor of full-fledged skepticism. Its affiliation with the Lokāyata is, nevertheless, clear. Jayarāśi begins his work by quoting the first three (Bṛhaspati)sūtras, but claims that their sole purpose is to reflect opinions that are common among people. Even the four material elements, which are well established among people, are to be rejected upon examination – thus how much more other principles (held by Naiyāyikas, Buddhists, etc.) that are far less established? There is a close connection between Jayarāśi’s interpretation of the sūtras and an anonymous fragment that reads, “Everywhere (i.e., throughout the text) the sūtras of Bṛhaspati have the sole purpose of questioning (the opinions of) others” (Franco, 1987, 6). 

The bulk of Jayarāśi’s work consists of a formidable refutation of all means of knowledge, especially perception (Franco, 1987) and inference (Solomon, 2010; Franco, forthcoming b), that were held by the important philosophical schools of the time (Nyāya, Buddhist, Mīmāṃsā, and Sāṃkhya). 

The fact that such disparate philosophical positions as those maintained by Udbhaṭa and Jayarāśi could be associated with the Bṛhaspatisūtra shows that classical Lokāyata was not about materialism, but about opposition to any kind of religion, be it Brahmanism, Buddhism, or Jainism. The turn from materialism to skepticism can be explained by the fact that the latter was better suited to defend the antireligious stance of the Lokāyata. 

The Doxographies 

The above fragments, by their very nature, do not convey a systematic picture of the Lokāyata philosophy. For this, one has to turn to the doxographies, the first of which is theṢaḍdarśanasamuccaya by Haribhadra Sūri. Already in the 8th century, the number of philosophical “points of view” was fixed at six (see Gerschheimer, 2007), but their identity was still fluid. Thus, after an exposé of Buddhist philosophy, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Jaina philosophy,Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsā, the author adds that some consider Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika to be a single tradition, and in that case, to arrive at the number six, he adds the Lokāyata (see Suali, 1905, 79). Haribhadra then summarizes the Lokāyata tenets in seven verses, which I paraphrase closely below (see Suali, 1905, 80–86). 

The Lokāyatas say, there are no sacred writings (Veda), no liberation, no merit and demerit (dharma and adharma), and no result of meritorious or evil deeds, and the world extends only to the realm of the senses (i.e. there is no other world, such as heaven or hell). Those who infer another realm beyond this world by certain signs are simply mistaken. Haribhadra laconically refers to a story about a Cārvāka materialist who taught his wife to distrust inferences by tracing on the sand with his fingers markings similar to the footprints of wolves (the same story is referred to by Candrakīrti in the Prasannapadā [Vallée Poussin, 1903, 360]). The next morning the learned people of the village saw the markings on the sand and got scared. The Cārvāka then told his wife, “Eat, drink, pretty woman, enjoy your youth while it lasts; once it’s gone it will not return.” For the body, according to the Cārvākas, is only a collection of material elements. Further, earth, water, fire, and wind are the constituent principles of the world. For the Cārvākas, these are the basis for consciousness. The only means of knowledge is perception that arises from the senses. When the four principles, the earth and so forth, come together, the (living) body and so forth arise, just as the power of intoxication arises from the fermentation of various plants. For this reason, the Cārvākas maintain that people who abandon the visible for the sake of the invisible are stupid. The pleasure that arises from obtaining a desired object or avoiding an undesired one is without purpose (futile); it is empty like space. Oddly, this last verse seems to describe the Cārvākas more like fatalists than hedonists. 

This is all that Haribhadra reports about the Cārvākas. Guṇaratna’s commentary (theTarkarahasyadīpikā) thereon, however, contains some interesting additional statements, even though it is not always clear to what extent they refer to any historical reality. For instance, he says that the Cārvākas have sexual relations with their mothers and so forth, and that every year they assemble and copulate randomly with women. More credible seems the statement that some Cārvākas accepted space-ether (ākāśa) as a fifth element. This minority opinion seems to point to the following dilemma: on the one hand, the Cārvākas did not want to admit the existence of an invisible element such as space-ether, for this would go against their tenet that perception is the only means of knowledge; on the other hand, neither the four elements nor their qualities (and we do not know whether the Cārvākas accepted the distinction between elements and qualities) could be assumed to be the object of the sense of hearing. It was widely assumed in classical Indian philosophy that sound was the quality of space-ether. 

The Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha is the most important Sanskrit doxography. Its author Mādhava arranged 16 philosophical “points of view” in a hierarchy in which the Cārvāka/Lokāyata is at the very bottom. Mādhava begins his exposé by saying that the Cārvāka’s way of life (ceṣṭita) is hard to get rid of, for most living beings follow the popular saying, “As long as one lives, one should live happily.” There is no one who escapes death. Once the body turns to ashes, one cannot return to life. Most people accept only pleasure and wealth as the aim of man, deny the existence of life after death, and follow the doctrine of Cārvāka: earth, water, fire, and wind are the four principles. When they are transformed into the form of a body, consciousness arises, just as the power of intoxication arises from the fermentation of various plants. When these (principles that are transformed into a body) are destroyed, consciousness is destroyed. The Cārvākas quote from the Upaniṣads to substantiate this tenet (BĀU. 2.4.12). Therefore, the self (ātman) is nothing but the body qualified by consciousness, for there is no proof of a self beyond the body. It cannot be proven because perception is the only means of knowledge. Pleasure produced by embracing beautiful women is the only aim of life, and one should not think that pleasure is not an aim just because it is mixed with pain. One should abandon the inevitable pain and enjoy pleasure, just as someone who desires fish takes the fish with their scales and bones, eats the flesh, and leaves the bones. Therefore, one should not abandon natural pleasures out of fear of pain. Nobody refrains from sowing rice because there are wild animals (who may eat it), or stops cooking because there are beggars (who may request some of it). Someone who, being fearful in this way, would abandon visible pleasure would be as stupid as a beast. 

If one objects that there is pleasure in life after death because otherwise people of knowledge and experience would not undertake sacrifices such as the agnihotra (see yajña) at great expense and bodily effort, this objection is not correct, because the Vedas are vitiated by the faults of untruth, contradiction, and superfluous repetition. Further, the vedic experts, namely, the Mīmāṃsakas and the Vedāntins, reject and contradict one another. 

Bṛhaspati said that sacrifices, the three Vedas, and smearing oneself with ashes are only means of livelihood for those who lack intelligence and manliness/strength. Therefore, the so-called hell is nothing more than pain that arises from thorns and so forth. The supreme lord is the king (and not any god), and final liberation is the destruction of the body. According to the doctrine that the self is body (dehātmavāda), expressions such as “I am fat” and “I am black” have the same reference (i.e. the words “I” and “black” refer to the same thing), whereas expressions such as “my body” are metonymical, just like the expression “the head of Rāhu” (even though the demon Rāhu, who has no body, is nothing but a head). 

An opponent may argue that this would be the case, had one no proof of life after death; but there are such proofs, or means of knowledge, namely, inference and verbal communication. Otherwise, one would not infer fire from smoke or would not act upon statements such as “there are fruit on the bank of the river.” 

These are just fanciful words, answers the Cārvāka. For a valid inference, the inferential sign (liṅga), or the reason, must be concomitant with the property to be proven (i.e. wherever the reason is present, the property to be proven should be present). Moreover, the inferential sign does not give rise to the inference by its mere existence, as is the case with the sense of vision and so forth, which produce perception, but has to be known as such. But how could it be known? Not by percep-tion, which is either external or internal. External perception perceives only objects in contact with the senses and thus cannot make known a concomitance that includes past and future objects. One should not think that this difficulty can be avoided because the cognition of concomitance is a cognition of a universal. In that case, the concomitance would not hold between two particulars, as required. Internal perception too cannot perceive the concomitance because the inner sense depends on the outer senses for the perception of external objects and thus cannot operate independently of the latter. 

Inference can also not be the means of perceiving the concomitance because this would lead to an infinite regress: the inference that would establish the concomitance requires itself a previously established concomitance, which would have to be established by a previous inference, and so forth. 

Nor is verbal communication the means for establishing the concomitance because, according to the Vaiśeṣikas, it is included in inference. Even if it is not included, it is unable to overcome the faults of infinite regress and so forth, as in the case of inference: the child learns by language from its parents, who learn from their parents, and so on. And there is no certainty that things such as fire and smoke are concomitant just because Manu (the legendary author of the authoritative treatise about dharma; see dharmaśāstra ) and others say so. Further, a man would not be able to make an inference by himself, without a verbal communication about the concomitance by someone else, and thus inference for oneself (svārthānumāna) would be doubtful. Other means of knowledge, such as analogy, are also not suitable to make known a universal concomitance. Further arguments of a more technical nature against the possibility of knowing a concomitance are reported by Mādhava, but are not summarized here.

Thus, according to the Cārvākas, the fact that the cognition of fire occurs immediately after the cognition of smoke is based either on perception (i.e. previous perceptions of smoke and fire together) or on error. The fact that inference sometimes leads to results in everyday practice is accidental (yādṛcchaka), just as is the case with amulets, mantras, medications, and so on. Therefore, the “unseen” (adṛṣṭa = the result of ritual and moral actions) and so on cannot be proven by inference. If one objects that without accepting the “unseen,” the diversity (vaicitrya) of the world would be accidental/without a cause (ākasmika), the Cārvāka answers that the diversity is established from the own being/nature (svabhāva) of things. Here, Mādhava quotes a well-known verse: "Fire is hot, water is cold, refreshing the wind. Who created this diversity? (No one!) Therefore it is established from the own nature of things." Mādhava concludes the chapter by quoting 11 ½ verses that he attributes to Bṛhaspati (see above).

To conclude, between the 6th and 9th centuries, the Cārvāka/Lokāyata was a fascinating, vibrant, and innovative philosophical tradition, which engaged critically with the major philosophies of its time. Unfortunately, with the exception of Jayarāśi’s outstanding work, only a few undoubtedly genuine fragments of this tradition have come down to us.