Ahimsa(Buddhism)

The principle of nonviolence included by the Buddha among his main teachings and regarded as of incomparable merit.

Introduction

The word ahiṃsā is a feminine noun formed by adding the negative prefix a to the word hiṃsā, derived from the root hiṃs meaning “to kill” or “to injure.” In historic India, the concept of ahiṃsā was used for the first time by the authors of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad ([1], p. 17.4) in connection with the cruelty of Vedic yajñas. Later, it was strongly advocated by the Buddha, who included it among his main teachings, provided it a theoretical basis, and regarded it as of incomparable merit.

Rationality Behind Buddhist Position Concerning Ahiṃsā

Buddhism believes that living beings live in a world of mutual injury where life can only be sustained by marginalizing others. Thus, it is not possible to literally uphold the principle of ahiṃsā as life in some forms has to be unavoidably injured or destroyed in order to survive. In a situation such as this, violence in one form or the other is unavoidable. In order to live, one must eat, and for that, most of the humans acquire their food through the capture of various kinds of animals. Some take to vegetarianism to escape such a killing. However, some believe that plants also possess life, and from their point of view, even this cannot be called a correct way of life. Moreover, when one is attacked by others, there arises the question of indulging in violence in self-defense. Then, there is the question of various kinds of insects like flies and mosquitoes being regularly eliminated in large numbers in order to minimize the risk of the harmful germs carried by them. Various kinds of drugs also kill germs in the body so that humans can recover from different ailments. As a matter of fact, germ theory which forms the very basis of modern medicine involves elimination of life in different forms. Scientists conduct experiments on animals in order to find cures for diseases that afflict humans. Therefore, if the principle of ahiṃsā is upheld literally, it would be difficult, to say the least, to obtain suitable food to maintain one’s own life, and probably, one shall have to starve oneself to death, i.e., commit suicide. Strictly speaking, suicide is also inconsistent with the principle of ahiṃsā. In other words, the practice of perfect and absolute ahiṃsā is impossible in this sense, and thus, the inner feeling of the spirit of ahiṃsā and its outer expression, i.e., the act of ahiṃsā, become different from one another. Thus, the Buddha based his philosophy of ahiṃsā on this simple fact that even though the action of ahiṃsā is difficult to perfect, yet the perfection of the spirit of ahiṃsā can be perfected in the heart through learning and practice. When the inner feeling of ahiṃsā becomes perfect and is expressed in outward actions, it is seen as an ideal life of a Buddhist. One can practice ahiṃsā in the real sense only if one can appreciate the true cognition of life, the contradictions of which are hard to resolve. Recognizing that complete ahiṃsā is difficult to practice, the Buddha avoided making unnecessarily rigorous rules for ahiṃsā as action. However, the Buddha’s injunction against the deliberate destruction of life was unambiguous. He severely criticized the sacrifice of animals in brāhmaṇical sacrifices ([2], p. 307ff; [3], Vol. i, p. 143).

This form of moderate and rational doctrine of ahiṃsā is perhaps the most important contribution of Buddhism to human civilization. In the Pāli texts, this principle is stated mainly in three terms, namely, pāṇātipātā veramaṇī, pāṇātipātā paṭivirati, and ahiṃsā. Of these three terms, ahiṃsā or avihiṃsā, meaning “non-violence,” is the most widely used in the Buddhist texts. The other two expressions indicate the same meaning of “abstaining or restraining oneself from causing injury to living beings” (pāṇātipātā/pāṇavadha/pāṇaghāta) ([2], p. 242; [3], Vol. I, p. 4, Vol. III, pp. 68, 70, 149, 182, 235; [4], Vol. I, pp. 83, 85, 193; [5], Vol. I, p. 361, Vol. III, p. 23) and are used mainly in relation to Vinaya rules regarding sīla that forbid the killing of a living being (jīva). Here, a special meaning in the form of precautionary endeavor and the application of will is contained in the words veramaṇī (abstaining) and paṭivirati (restraining). The endeavor of will is imperative for abstaining from evil proclivities such as destruction of life in any form. When the vow is made, “I will observe the principle not to kill living beings,” sīla is the self-actualizing attitude that emerges when one undertakes to carry on this endeavor. A child does not commit hiṃsā, and yet there is no sīla. The reason for this is that the child is not conscious of the fact that it is not doing evil. In the same manner, it cannot be said that one abides by sīla just because one does not kill living creatures. Ahiṃsā, thus, implies deliberate avoidance of injury to living beings. In other words, a Buddhist is expected not only to shun killing but also avoid inciting others to kill. Further, a person who has sīla has paññā (wisdom) and vice versa. Paññā is purified by sīla and sīla purifies paññā ([3], Vol. I, p. 24). Thus, the spirit of consciousness which originates from sīla moves onward, ultimately culminating in the supreme wisdom of enlightenment (bodhi). Thus, as ahiṃsā is included in sīla, it is supported by the spiritual force of the latter and is actualized by the mental power that arises with it.

The Spirit of Compassion

In Theravāda, no separate category is made of ahiṃsā as a psychological process and is not included in the 52 kinds of cetasikadhamma of the Abhidhammatthasaṃghaha. In Mahāyāna, the spirit which promotes ahiṃsā is, psychologically speaking, called the spirit of compassion. Sthirmati of the Mahāyāna school of Vijñānavāda (pure consciousness) says in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi that compassion (karuṇā) is the mental property (caitasika) by which ahiṃsā is actualized and practiced ([6], Vol. I, p. 288). He believed that when the feeling of pity arises in one’s mind, one does not either harm or kill living beings, and on this basis, he proposed that karuṇā is ahiṃsā as mental power. On this basis, it was understood that compassion is the mental property on which the practice of ahiṃsā is based. Dharmapāla of the same school saw the mental property in the practice of ahiṃsā as being non-anger (adveṣa) ([6], Vol. I, p. 288). This implies that when mental power, as anger, awakens and stimulates someone, the object of that anger is either injured or killed. Thus, it was observed that when the mental power that extinguishes anger begins to rule the mind through the suppression of anger, the practice of ahiṃsā is actualized. The Sarvāstivāda school believed that ahiṃsā existed as an independent mental power, and when actualized, it resulted in bodily action. In other words, the mental quality from which ahiṃsā functioned as bodily action was not simply the feeling of pity (karuṇā) or the absence of anger (adveṣa), but an independent meritorious mental power (kuśalacaitsikadharma) ([6], Vol. I, p. 288).

Ahiṃsā to living beings, which is the first precept in Buddhism, is based upon the principle of mutual attraction and rightness common to all nature. To willfully take life means to disrupt and destroy the inherent wholeness and to blunt feelings of reverence and compassion that form the basis of humaneness. This precept is really a call to life and creation even as it is a condemnation of death and destruction. Deliberately to shoot, knife, strangle, drown, crush, poison, burn, or otherwise inflict pain on a living being are not the only ways to defile this precept. To cause another to kill, torture, or harm a living being likewise offends against the first precept. Though violence (hiṃsā) can take place in words, thoughts, and deeds, ancient Indian Buddhism was mainly concerned with violence in deeds. Sacrifices in various forms, especially the ones in which animals were deprived of life, were seen by the Buddha as not only a ridiculous absurdity but also as an unpardonable cruelty. He did not recognize the efficacy of sacrifices on the one hand and highly regarded the life of living beings on the other. According to him, “all living beings are not to be harmed” ([7], Vol. II, p. 183). “At the sort of sacrifice… (where)… creatures are put an end to… is neither of great fruitfulness nor of great profit; nor of great renown; nor of widespread effect. It is just as if a farmer were to enter a wood taking with him plough and seed, and were there, in an untilled tract, in unfavorable soil, among uprooted stumps, to plant seeds that were broken, rotten, spoilt by wind and heat, out of season, not in good condition, and the god were not to give good rain in due season” ([8], Vol. II, p. 307f.). It has been told in the Sāmaññaphala Sutta that “the bhikkhu, putting away the killing of living beings holds aloof from the destruction of life. The cudgel and the sword he has laid aside, and ashamed of roughness, and full of mercy, he dwells compassionate and kind to all creatures that have life” ([8], Vol. I, p. 79). Similarly, in one of the verses of the Dhammapada it has been pointed out that one does not become noble if one hurts living beings, but because of ahiṃsā toward all living beings, one is called noble ([9], p. 270).

Basis of the Practice of Ahiṃsā

The basis of the practice of ahiṃsā is compassion (dayā), mercy (hitānukampā), and a feeling of shame (lajjā) of the cruelty of killing and injuring life. In this way, ahiṃsā has been amalgamated by Buddhism with compassion and a consciousness of shame. Where there is compassion in the heart, it is expressed in an outward act as ahiṃsā. Ahiṃsā is considered a noble act because it is not only the object of the act, but it also results in happiness to the one who practices it. On the other hand, those who harbor hatred not only injure others but also bring unhappiness to themselves. “Here (in this world) hatreds are indeed never appeased by hatred and are appeased by non-hatred. This is the eternal law” ([9], p. 5). “Who kills not, nor aught causes to be killed,/Who robs not, not makes others rob, for all/Within his heart hath share, he hateth none.” ([7], Vol. IV, p. 104.) The killing of living beings is a shameful act and is wrong because it opposes the spirit of compassion. Moreover, when ahiṃsā is practiced, one comes to know the true feeling of love and attains happiness. The attainment of this kind of happiness is said to be spiritually of a highly exalted state. “Sages who are harmless, always restrained with body, go to the eternal place where, having gone, they do not grieve” ([9], p. 225); “Gotama’s disciples are always well awake;/Both day and night their minds in harmlessness delight.” ([9], p. 300); “Always well awakened are disciples of Gautama whose mind by day and night is delighted in non-violence” ([10], p. 648). In this way, taking delight in ahiṃsā and cultivating a mind of compassion (mettā-citta-bhāvanā) are one and the same. Thus, to develop a compassionate heart is to desire happiness and well-being of all living beings. In Buddhism, ahiṃsā is taught from the standpoint that all people love their own lives and do not wish to be hurt or killed by others. This feeling of self-preservation and self-love is transferred in thought to other people, and in this way, the love for and protection of life come to be promoted. For instance, the Dhammapada echoes this very thought by pointing out that as all fear death, comparing others with oneself, one should neither kill nor cause to kill ([9], p. 129).

Benefits of Ahiṃsā

The application of ahiṃsā makes one aware of the true feeling of love and leads to the attainment of happiness, and, further, this happiness is also said to be spiritually a highly exalted state. To develop a compassionate heart is to desire that all living beings shall reach a state of happiness, tranquility and well-being, and then to awaken in oneself the feeling of compassion toward innumerable and infinite kinds of life, and thus, encompassing all life by the thought of compassion. This is called the mind of boundless compassion (mettā-appamaññā). Again, the fact that ahiṃsā has as its basis the compassionate mind, it also merges with the principle of the emancipation of mind by the power of compassion (mettā-cetovimutti). This principle means that the mind achieves serenity by developing a compassionate heart and thus attains emancipation. In Buddhism, ahiṃsā is not just confined to the ethical rule that one should love all living beings. It goes far beyond that and recognizes in a religious sense that by practicing it the lofty heights of Buddhahood can be realized. Therefore, in Buddhism, the practice of ahiṃsā is taught in many ways. For example, right action (sammākammanta) in the Noble Eightfold Path can be explained and interpreted as ahiṃsā ([5], Vol. iii, p. 251). Again, in the highly regarded dasakusalakammapatha (Path of Ten Kinds of Good Actions), the first step is that of not killing living beings ([3], Vol. iii, p. 269). Similarly, when the Buddha taught the correct daily conduct of a lay follower to Siṅgālika, the first principle expounded was that of non-killing of beings ([3], Vol. iii, p. 181).

Vinaya Rules and Ahiṃsā

The lay follower (upāsaka, upāsikā) is exhorted to follow the pañcasīla (Five Precepts) of which the first one is that of noninjury to living beings (pāṇātipātā veramaṇī sikkhāpadaṃ). As a result, the lay follower undertakes to abstain from injury to living beings not only as a matter of intent but also by actualizing it in action. Even despite having the intent, when one cannot practice it in real life on certain occasions, the precept is broken. This sort of breach of the precept means that while the intent of ahiṃsā is there, the selfish desires opposed to this intent are very strong. In such circumstances, the breach of the precept is regretted and, thus, confession (paṭidesanā) is made. However, this confession must come from the heart. The importance of the doctrine of ahiṃsā in Buddhism can be measured from the fact that the precept of ahiṃsā is included in the Aṭṭhaṅgika-uposatha (Eight Precepts) which are practiced by the Buddhists on the 4 days of uposatha (fast) of the month. It is also included as the first of the ten precepts for the sāmaṇera and sāmaṇerī. The non-killing of life is given in great detail in the Pātimokkha, in the Vinaya of the bhikkhus and bhikkhunīs. As per the third precept of the Pārājikā in the Pātimokka, a monk or a nun is expelled from the Saṃgha for committing a murder, which is the severest punishment for the members of the Saṃgha. Buddhism condemns strongly the one “who should deliberately and purposely (iticittamano cittasaṃkappo) in various ways praise the beauty of death or should incite (anyone) to death” ([4], Vol. iii, p. 73). The methods of causing death mentioned in the Vinaya are many and varied, including the use of weapons, devices ranging from pits and traps to more subtle psychological strategies like frightening someone to death by dressing up as a ghost, and, of course, death resulting from unsuccessful medical treatments. In terms of intention, the examples show that guilt is firmly tied to state of mind (mens rea) of the accused at the time the offense was committed. Guilt or innocence depends upon the outcome tallying with the intention with which one undertook the project in question. The concept of agency is important where other parties are involved as intermediaries, as when one monk instructs another to carry out a lethal plan. Generally speaking in the Vinaya, an action which requires intention for it to be an offense is no offense at all if there is no bad intention. Moreover, as emphasized in the Kurudhamma Jātaka ([11], Vol. iii, pp. 366–381), at least in a lay context, unintended harm to others should not be counted against one, and it is not wise to agonize over such matters (see [12], pp. 191–203). Buddhism places abortion on the same level as killing a human being. Suicide is also forbidden in Buddhism ([4], Vol. iii, pp. 73, 82).

There is a ban on injuring plant life (Pācittiya nos. 10 and 11), and, thus, according to the Buddha, “the perfect person abstains from injury both to seed life and plant life” (bījagāma bhūtagāma) ([7], Vol. ii, p. 222). He called upon all “for having compassion on creatures” ([13], Vol. v, p. 241). The Buddha felt that the humane sentiment of mankind is not to be limited merely to themselves but to be extended to all sentient beings, who should share as much kindness as mankind itself does. The Buddha taught “never to destroy the life of any living creature, however tiny it might be” ([14], Vol. xvii, p. 30; Vol. xx, p. 128). It is even forbidden to throw the remains of food on green grass or into water because the creatures living in both water and grass can be harmed ([14], Vol. xvii, p. 22). According to him “making onslaught on creatures, being cruel, bloody handed, intent on injury and killing, and without mercy on living creatures… is conducive to shortness of life span” ([15], Vol. iii, p. 250) and saw it as repulsive (āmagaṅdha) ([14], Vol. x(2), p. 39). Not even “for the sake of sustaining life would we intentionally deprive any being of life,” ([7], Vol. iv, p. 129) said the Buddha. Monks are forbidden from digging soil ([4], Vol. iv, p. 33). Water must be strained before drinking because it contains living things ([11], Vol. I, p. 83; [16], Vol. iii, p. 3), and only that fruit which “has not yet any seed in it… (or)… has no more seed in it” ([14], Vol. xx, p. 75) should be eaten.

Violent Occupations

All those following bloody and cruel occupations (kurūrakammantā) such as a butcher, fowler, hunter, fisherman, bandit, executioner, and jailer are seen by Buddhism with a distinct disfavor ([17], Vol. ii, p. 171; [18], Vol. iii, p. 383; [19], p. 56). Similarly, professions involving cutting, flogging, binding, highway robbery, and plundering are considered as violent and heinous ([7], Vol. ii, p. 223). A cattle butcher suffers for “many hundred thousands of years in purgatory” ([17], Vol. ii, p. 170). “One neither sees or hears of a butcher slaughtering and selling cattle‒ rams, pigs… or beasts of the forest and living in the abundance of great wealth” ([7], Vol. iii, p. 273). Some of the kammic results, which a man brings upon himself by committing injury to a life, are “suffering in an unpleasant state for a long period, and rebirth in some lower form of being. If born again as man, he may be infirm, ugly, unpopular, cowardly, divested of compassion, subject to disease, dejected and mournful, separated from the company of loved ones, and unable to attain to ripe age” (see [20], p. 89). In Buddhism, the circumstances under which a being is killed as well as the physical and mental development of the being decide the gravity of the moral guilt involved in killing. The kammic “result of killing a man and killing a child vary in proportion to the physical and mental development of the two” ([20], p. 88).

Warfare, Agriculture, and Meat Eating

It has been generally pointed out that the attitude of ancient Indian Buddhism toward “warfare, agriculture and meat-eating was more mixed than was its attitude to blood sacrifices. It made no whole-hearted condemnation of these three practices although they all entail the taking of life” ([21], p. 443). Though soldiers were not admitted into monkhood ([14], Vol. xiii, pp. 196, 230), and monks were told to stay away from watching wars or walking with the armies ([4], Vol. iv, pp. 104–108), and yet there are some similes and examples given in the Vinaya and Sutta Piṭaka in which fighting men and martial qualities are emulated. For instances, monks are often told to be steadfast as in battle and to wage spiritual battles like the armed ones (see, e.g., [18], Vol. ii, p. 116, Vol. iii, pp. 89, 100, 161; [11], Vol. ii, p. 276). There are certain Jātaka stories in which the Bodhisatta participates in a battle “to win renown… raising his battle cry as he dashed into the fight” ([11], Vol. i, pp. 205–206). Despite the drum of non-killing being sounded through a town ([11], Vol. iii, pp. 428, 434), its having been heard by the kings of yore ([11], Vol. iii, p. 428) and landlords laying interdiction upon the slaughter of animals ([11], Vol. iv, p. 115), killing of animals continued on a large scale at least till the days of Aśoka ([21], p. 348). Among the best known names of individuals who practiced ahiṃsā virtues was king Aśoka who prohibited the sacrifice of animals as offering was prohibited, restricted the eating of meat, and, even in the palace, the killing of animals in the royal kitchen was reduced to a minimum. Except perhaps bringing about a decrease in the popularity of great sacrifices, in the other fields of violence, Buddhism appears to have met with very little success, as pointed out by Horner ([21], p. 439), because the Buddha was not a temporal ruler, and hence, he had no actual power to impose a body of restrictive regulations and penalties on the laity as he had on his monastic followers.

The Buddhist concept of ahiṃsā has two facets. One is negative, which covers injury inspired by compassion, self-restraint, and the desire to alleviate pain. The second is positive, which covers noninjury inspired by the same motive and desire and intention. In other words, positive objective considerations justify injury as an expression of nonviolence. Thus, dual concept on nonviolence is realistic. The negative aspect is based on the recognition of the fact that the universe as such is suffused with death and destruction. No one can survive and live in the world without committing one or the other kind of violence. The positive aspect of nonviolence partakes of the nature of a moral ideal without which no social, human, or cosmic order can survive. Violence cannot be eschewed completely and is inescapable in certain critical situations. In other words, in certain situations, application of negative aspect of nonviolence is unavoidable. One can see certain examples of the application of the negative concept of nonviolence, namely, injury with a view to alleviate pain or violent defense of the honor of women. Buddhism also makes a distinction between man and animals plus plants, seeds, etc. Though destruction of or injury to both involves sin, there is a difference of degree. The sin accrued by killing a man is more than the cutting of a plant. Further, sin accrued as a result of killing a person with a developed mind is more than in the case of a man whose mind is less developed.

Animal Sacrifices and Agricultural Revolution

The Buddhist opposition to animal sacrifices has been sometimes associated with the so-called agricultural revolution that is said to have taken place on the eve of the origin of Buddhism (see, e.g., among others, R.S. Sharma, at [22], p. 96). The idea of economic utility of animals being partly responsible for the unpopularity of sacrifices was originally propounded by Horner who had proposed that “the growing realization that large scale sacrifice was both spiritually and economically unsound will have played a decisive part in stamping it out” ([21], p. 440). The reason as to why the Buddha criticized animal sacrifices was that they were cruel, illogical, and futile. Moreover, cow (especially a milch cow) which most importantly contributed toward agriculture had been protected much earlier. In the Sutta-Nipāta, “brāhmaṇas of yore” are told as having regarded cows as their parents, brothers, and kin, as their best friends, and as the source of all healthful things, and hence, in gratitude, they never killed cows ([2], p. 52). Also the evidence provided by early Indian Buddhist literature for the suppression of great animal sacrifices suggests that outside the brāhmaṇical circles, this practice was not particularly cherished by the ordinary people ([21], p. 442).

Meat Eating and Tikoṭiparisuddha

If the statements of the Pāli texts, which presume to be a record of the Buddhavacana, are accepted at face value, it can be argued that the Buddha allowed the eating of animal flesh. But are these portions a later interpolation in the Pāli literature? The view of flesh eating is sharply criticized and contradicted by the Mahāyāna Sūtras, also purporting to be the spoken words of the Buddha, which categorically assert that flesh eating is contrary to the spirit and intent of the first precept since it makes one an accessory to the slaying of animals and therefore contravenes the compassionate concern for all life that lies at the core of Buddhism. For instance, in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, it has been pointed out that “The bodhisattvas who seek the enlightenment of the Buddha, how can they eat the flesh of various living beings?” (425). Is there reliable evidence that the Buddha sanctioned flesh eating? Unfortunately, no serious attempt has been made by scholars to resolve the glaring discrepancy between the contentions of the two branches of Buddhism on meat eating. Along with this also arises the question as to whether the Buddha died of eating a piece of pork, as claimed by some scholars, or from a poisonous mushroom, as asserted by others. If one were to go by the Pāli Tipiṭaka as it is, the Buddha did not put a ban on the eating of flesh. A monk is allowed to accept “what has been put in his alms bowl” ([14], Vol. iii, p. 155). In Theravāda, in three cases, meat may not be eaten by a monk if he has (a) seen, (b) heard, or (c) suspected that the meat has been especially acquired for him by killing an animal. In other words, at the time of accepting cooked meat, if a monk has no reason to think that the animal whose flesh he is accepting was not killed on purpose for him, then the monk can accept it ([15], Vol. ii, p. 33; [16], Vol. i, p. 298). This rule is called the Rule of Tikoṭiparisuddha (Pure in Three Ways). Pāli Buddhism did not see any sin being committed by meat-eating monks as long as they followed the Rule of Tikoṭiparisuddha, even if the meat that they happened to eat had been acquired by somebody by deliberately killing an animal to feed them ([11], Vol. ii, p. 182). The Rule of Tikoṭiparisuddha, though restrained the monks from being directly instrumental in killing animals for meat, the Theravādin attitude toward meat eating appears to be somewhat contradictory. The Mahāyāna Sūtras deeply deplore any kind of allowance made for the eating of meat.

Did the Buddha Die of Pork Eating?

Meat eating in Buddhism is also sometimes justified on the ground that the Buddha himself had died of pork eating (which was putrid and, thus, poisoned the Buddha) at the home of one of his followers called Cunda. They further point out that they gratefully accept whatever is put before them, without preference or aversion. Various statements and actions of the Buddha are used to justify the eating of meat, implying that if the Buddha himself ate flesh food when it was offered to him, surely, they have permission to do likewise. The last meal that the Buddha ate consisted of sweet rice and cakes, and sūkara-maddava” ([3], Vol. ii, pp. 126–27). Sūkara-maddava, though has been translated as “pork” by some scholars (see [23]: s.v. sūkara.), it is now generally agreed that this word does not mean “pork,” but in all probability, Davids translated it as “quantity of truffles” (see T.W. Rhys Davids at [8], Vol. ii, p. 137 and [24], p. 149). The word in Pāli used for pork is sūkaramaṃsa ([18], Vol. iii, p. 49). There is another reason as to why sūkara-maddava cannot mean (pork). Cunda could not have offered pork to the Buddha as it would have meant violation of the Tikoṭiparisuddha (considering that the Buddha had actually made this rule) as the meal was particularly prepared for the Buddha, the latter having been invited by the former a day earlier (see [14], Vol. cvii, p. 88).