Anatta in Buddhism

Nonacceptance of the existence of soul/self in Buddhism.

Origin and Meaning

The term atta/attā (Sk: ātman) has been used in religious and philosophical writings in ancient India to refer to an eternal essence of man. Literally meaning “breath or spirit,” this term is often translated into English as “self, soul, or ego.” As compared to this, anattā (Sk: anātman), which is the antonym of attā, may be translated into English as “no-self, no-soul, and no-ego.” Due to its nonacceptance of the existence of attā, Buddhism is sometimes referred to as anattavāda (“the teaching of no-self”).

The doctrine of the self, first formulated in the Upaniṣads, has remained fundamental to the Indian thought till date. Discussion on Buddhist perception of self, thus, can only take place with reference to the Upaniṣadic view of it. The Upaniṣads assume that there does exist an ātman in one’s personality which is permanent (leaving the impermanent body at death), immutable, omnipotent, and free from sorrow. Thus, the Chāndogya Upaniṣad points out that the ātman is “free from old age, from death and grief, hunger and thirst” ([1], p. 142). Some Upaniṣads like the Kaṭha Upaniṣad hold the view that the soul can be separated from the body like the sword from its scabbard or the stalk from the muñja grass ([1], p. 92), and it can travel at will away from the body, especially in sleep ([1], p. 30). Above all, the Bhagavadgītā says that the ātman is “eternal… is not born, nor does it ever die… unchangeable, primeval… all-pervading, stable, firm” ([2], Vol. ii, p. 27ff).

Buddhist View

Belief in the existence of attā is viewed by Buddhism as a form of delusion. As Brahman and ātman came to be identified with each other in the Upaniṣadic thought, Buddhist texts do not mention Brahman (neuter) as the one reality or of any identity of this with the ātman. The Brahmā mentioned in Buddhist texts is a personal god born and reborn as inescapably as any other being. The Buddha denied the view that a human being possesses a permanent, autonomous, and unchanging attā whose characteristic is bliss. Since Buddhism believes that everything is impermanent (sabbaṃ aniccaṃ) and transient (vipariṇāma), it automatically follows that the attā as a self-subsisting entity does not exist. Thus, Buddhism maintains that to think that anybody or anything has an unchanging and permanent self is a metaphysically incorrect or even a profane view (viparyāsa), for all things are always changing, and to cling to anything as if it were permanent is to misunderstand the nature of reality. To hold to a self is to hold to an artificial and ignorant construction because reality is anattā, i.e., “devoid of self.”

Why Does Buddhism Believe That There Is No Such Thing as a Soul?

The Buddha pointed out that both animate and inanimate objects of the world are saṃkhata (constituted), so described on account of their being constituted of some elements, as distinguished from Nibbāna which is the asaṃkhata (the unconstituted). The constituted elements (khandhas) are divided into two distinct categories: nāma and rūpa, nāma denoting the nonmaterial or mental constituents of a living being and rūpa denoting the material only. All inanimate objects therefore are included in the term rūpa. Nāma is analyzed into four mental states, namely, vedanā (feeling), saññā (perception), saṃkhāra (resultant impressions produced through kamma), and viññāna (cognition, i.e., knowledge derived through the organs of senses), while the rūpakkhandha denotes the four great elements (mahābhūta): earth (paṭhavi), water (āpo), fire (tejo), and air (vāyu), including all that is formed out of these four. The four subdivisions of nāma along with the fifth, the rūpa, are collectively termed pañcakkhandhas. Every being and object is a composite of these five khandhas, without a sixth, the puggala (Sanskrit, pudgala) or attā. These five aggregates are explained in Buddhism as being appropriated (upādinna) by cognition (viññāna) in order to continue the existence to which it is bound by its previous activities ([3], Vol. ii, p. 63; [4], Vol. i, p. 176). In other words, these aggregates get compounded together in various configurations to constitute what is experienced as a person, exactly in the same manner as a chariot is constructed by putting together various parts ([5], Vol. i, pp. 134–135). But just as the chariot as an entity disappears when its constituent elements are pulled apart, so does an entity called a person with the dissolution of the khandhas (yathā hi aṅgasambhārā hoti saddo ratho iti, evaṃ khandhesu santesu hoti satto’ti sammuti) ([5], Vol. i, p. 135). Thus, one does not see anything like an attā as a residue here. When a person is indicated by giving him a name, it does not denote a self but is merely an appellation for the five khandhas which constitute the empirical individual ([6], p. 25ff). In other words, what conditions existence has no essence (sāra), and since a human being is the aggregate combination of various impermanent conditions, then that being has no permanent essence. What is experienced to be a person is not a thing but a process. Thus, the Buddhist analysis of the nature of the person centers on the realization that what appears to be an individual is, in fact, an ever-changing combination of five khandhas. There is no human being; there is only becoming (bhava) and no static and eternal attā. Thus, human life is anattā, like the constantly changing patterns of insubstantial bubbles on an insubstantial stream. A living being composed of five khandhas is beginningless and is in a continuous state of flux, each preceding group of khandhas giving rise to a subsequent group of khandhas, and this process is going on momentarily and ceaselessly in the present existence as it will go on also in the future till ignorance (avidyā) is got rid of and the ultimate goal of Nibbāna is accomplished. Buddhism views this process as rebirth and not transmigration and does not accept the existence of self which is supposed to pass from one existence to another like the caterpillar from one blade of grass to another ([3], Vol. ii, p. 63; [4], Vol. i, p. 176; [7], Vol. i, p. 53f).

Like the human being, Buddhism also analyzes into its component parts the external world with which the human being enters into relationship. This relationship is one of the cognition (viññāṇa) which is established through cognitive faculties (indriya) and their objects. These faculties and their objects are called āyatana (“sense sphere” or “sense base”), used to include both sense and sense object, the meeting of which two leads to cognition. These three factors, the sense faculty, the sense object, and the resultant consciousness that together comprise cognition, are called dhātu (“perceptual bases”). Thus, the human personality, along with the external world with which it enters into relationship, is divided into khandha, āyatana, and dhātu. These three generically are called dhamma (“element of existence”). This explains the significance of the formula put forth by the Buddha: sabbe dhammā anattā (All existence is no-self, i.e., without self) ([8], p. 279). Thus, when once Ānanda queried from the Buddha as to the meaning of the phrase “the world is empty,” the latter replied, “That is empty Ānanda, of a self or of anything of the nature of a self. And what is that that is empty? The five seats of the five senses, and the mind, and the feeling that is related to mind all these are void of a self or of anything that is self-like” ([9], Vol. iii, p. 54). That which is wholly impermanent and subject to suffering is also inevitably an-attā, i.e., “without attā.” At another place in the Pāli Tipiṭaka, the doctrine of the permanence of self is called a foolish doctrine by the Buddha for the simple reason that what is liable to pain and corruption cannot be the self of a thing ([7], Vol. i, p. 138).

How Is Rebirth Possible if There Is No Soul?

Birth, according to the Buddha, is the arising of the khandhas. Just as the arising of a physical state is conditioned by a preceding state as its cause, so the appearance of these psychophysical phenomena is conditioned by causes anterior to its birth. The present process of becoming is the result of the craving for becoming in the previous birth, and the future birth is conditioned by the present instinctive craving. As the process of one life span is possible without a permanent entity passing from one thought moment to another, so a series of life processes is possible without anything to transmigrate from one existence to another. In other words, when a person begins his present life, he brings as his inheritance the kamma of his many previous lives. During the course of his existence in this world, he is always accumulating fresh kamma through his actions, thoughts, desires, affections, and passions. The kamma affects every moment of his life, and as a consequence, his character is constantly changing. At death, when the corporeal bond, which held him together, falls apart, he undergoes only a comparatively deeper change. The unseen potencies of his kamma bring forth a new person. The new body that he gets and which is determined by his past kamma becomes fitted to the sphere in which he is born. When a new life thus gets created, its component elements are present from its very inception although in an undeveloped condition. The first moment of the new life is called viññāna (consciousness) which arises only by causation, and it does not arise without assignable conditions. This has been explained by the Buddha in the Majjhima Nikāya in connection with the story of a monk called Sāti who believed that consciousness runs on and on without any break of identity (anañña). When he was brought to the Buddha, he told him that this was not so and that consciousness arises only by causation and with only assignable conditions ([7], Vol. i, p. 477). The Mahānidāna Suttanta contains the assertion that there is a “descent” of the consciousness into the womb of the mother preparatory to rebirth ([3], Vol. ii, p. 63f). The commentaries do not have the same opinion with regard to the question whether, besides the continuity of consciousness between the old and the new lives, there is some sort of corporeal accompaniment as well, i.e., some sort of subtle matter, so to say. Buddhaghoṣa has pointed out that the consciousness is not accompanied by any physical form and that it is in process of constant change. The “descent” is only an expression to denote the simultaneousness of death and rebirth. The new person, psychologically, if not physically, is a continuation of the deceased and suffers or enjoys what his “predecessor” had prepared for him through his kamma in the last birth. The elements that constitute the empirical individual are incessantly in flux, but they will never totally disappear till the conditions and causes that hold them together and impel them to rebirth, the craving (taṇhā) and the grasping (upādāna) and the desire for separate existence, are finally extinguished.

The upshot of the above-stated argument is that the Buddhist doctrine of rebirth is different from the theory of reincarnation in which the transmigration of an attā and its invariable material rebirth are the mandatory conditions. In the Buddhist texts such as the Milindapañha and the Visuddhimagga, several similes have been made use of for illustrating the point of view that nothing transmigrates from one life to another. The simile of the flame is worth mentioning here. Life is compared to a flame. Rebirth is like the transmitting of the flame from one lamp to another. The flame of life is continuous, though, apparently, there appears to be a break at the so-called death. Thus, “it is not the same mind and body that is born into the next existence, but with this mind and body… one does a deed… and by reason of this deed another mind and body is born into the next existence” ([6], p. 25ff). The last thought moment of this life perishes conditioning another thought moment in a subsequent life. The new being is not absolutely the same as it has changed, but at the same time, it is not totally different as it has followed from the same stream of kamma energy. In other words, there is merely a continuity of a particular life flux and nothing more.

How Does a Human Being Exist Without a Soul?

If Buddhism denied the existence of an ultimate and real self, then the question arises as to how does Buddhism account for the existence of human beings, their identity, continuity, and ultimate religious goal? It is never denied that at the level of the “conventional truth,” in the daily transactional world, there are more or less stable persons who are nameable and humanly recognizable. At the level of the “ultimate truth,” however, this unity and stability of personhood is viewed by Buddhism to be no more than just a matter of appearances ([10], Vol. ii, p. 77). In the end, there exist only collections of impersonal and impermanent elements (dhammā) arranged into temporary configurations by the moral force of deeds of the past (kamma) and by self-fulfilling but self-ruinous taṇhā (craving) which is both cognitive and effective. The Buddha was also opposed to annihilationism (ucchedavāda) and unambiguously denied that, at death, a human being is completely destroyed. Thus, there is no justification for assuming that the Buddha encouraged the annihilation of the feeling of self. “What was encouraged by him was the doing away of the belief in a permanent and eternal šghost in the machine” ([11], p. 38). As pointed out by G.P. Malalasekera, “Man, in Buddhism, is a concrete, living, striving creature and his personality is something that changes, evolves and grows, a composite, existent and changing. It is the concrete man, not the transcendental self that ultimately achieves perfection by constant effort and creative will” ([12], Vol. i, p. 569).

In the Dhammacakkapavattana Sutta delivered at Isipatana (Sārnāth), the Buddha pointed out that if there were an attā, it should be autonomous, but no such thing is to be found. Matter (rūpa) is not the self. What is conditioned by not self cannot be self. The cause and condition for the arising of matter are not self, so it is asked, how could matter, which is brought into being by what is not self, be self ([5], Vol. iii, p. 24). In all the statements attributed to the Buddha regarding the doctrine of no-self, there is complete consistency. When, for instance, he is asked who, in the absence of a self, is it that has feelings or other sensations, his answer is that there is no one who feels, but there is feeling, which is a totally different proposition. Similarly, it is not correct to ask who becomes old, who dies, and who is reborn. There is old age, there is death, and there is rebirth ([5], Vol. ii, p. 62). Indeed, if any assertion can be made about a self, it would be more correct to call the body the self because, whereas the body may last as long as a 100 years, the mind in all its forms is in constant flux, like an ape in a forest which seizes one branch only to let it go and grasp another ([5], Vol. ii, p. 94f). The doctrine of no-self is a necessary corollary to the teaching of impermanence (anicca). Since all things are impermanent, they are fraught with sorrow, and since bliss is the characteristic of the self, they are without self. Thus, there is no-self in things. Furthermore, all things being impermanent, they are fraught with suffering because they are without self, inasmuch as they are not autonomous. Existence is nothing but dependent upon a series of conditions; hence, their existence is a conditional one, and there is nothing in the universe that is permanent, i.e., independent of conditions. All things, mind and matter (nāma-rūpa), have no abiding self-reality. What appears to be real is a temporary existence, an instant in a conditional sequence, the effect of two or more conditions combined. Since the saṃkhāras have nothing perdurable or stable in them and are in a state perpetual becoming (bhava), the phenomenal world is, therefore, a world of continuous flux or flow (santāna), a congeries of ever-changing elements in a process of ceaseless movement. All things, without exception, are nothing but strings or chains of momentary events, instantaneous “bits” of existence. Thus, from the Buddhist point of view, even the simple stability of empirical objects is regarded as something constituted by one’s imagination. The empirical thing is a thing constructed by the synthesis of one’s productive imagination on the basis of sensation. It is nothing but an imagined mental computation. Every element (dhamma), though appearing only for a single instant (Sanskrit, kṣaṇa; Pāli, khaṇa), is a “dependently originating element,” i.e., it depends for its origin on what had gone before it. Thus, existence becomes “dependent existence” where there is no destruction of one thing and no creation of another. There is only a constant, uninterrupted, infinitely graduated change. Thus, the personality is only a bundle of elements or forces (saṃkhāras) and a stream or a series of successive states. Everything is a succession; there is nothing substantial or permanent. The human individual does not remain the same for two consecutive moments. The “spiritual” part (nāma) of the human being and its physical “frame” (rūpa) are linked together by causal laws. The individual is entirely phenomenal, governed by the laws of life, without any extraphenomenal self within him.

If any of the constituents of the body was self, then the body would not be subject to misery and affliction, and one should be able to say to it, “let my body be thus, let my body be not thus.” But this is not possible as the body is shifting and constantly changing and, therefore, invariably accompanied by suffering. The conclusion is, therefore, reached that all these things, whether past, future, or presently arisen, in oneself or external, gross or subtle, inferior or superior, far or near, are all not to be viewed thus: “This is mine (etaṃ mama), this is what I am (eso’ham asmi), this is myself (eso me attā).” Then, it is pointed out, when a man realizes that all these things are not the self, he turns away from them, and by the extinction of desire, he attains release ([5], Vol. iii, p. 66). Here can be found for the first time, as pointed out by Malalasekera, an indication of the Buddha’s purpose in enunciating his doctrine. All misery, in his view, arises from the delusion of self which causes man not only to endeavor to profit himself but also to injure others ([13], Vol. i, p. 570).

As pointed out by Malalasekera ([13], Vol. i, p. 569), the Buddhist argument against the doctrine of ātman is twofold. The first argument is that the Buddha takes various aspects of the personality and contends that none of them can be identified with the ātman since they do not have the characteristics of the ātman. Thus, the question is asked ([7], Vol. i, p. 232ff): Is the body (the physical personality) permanent or impermanent? The answer is it is impermanent. Is what is impermanent sorrowful or happy? Sorrowful. Of what is impermanent, sorrowful, and liable to change, is it proper to regard it as “This is mine, this I am, this is my soul”? It is not. The Paṭisambhiddāmagga adds that none of the khandhas has a core (sāra), and thus, none of them can be attā ([14], Vol. i, p. 37). Concerning the eternality of attā, the Buddha gave no answer saying that it was inexpressible (avyākata). He felt that whether attā was eternal or not was a metaphysical question and had no bearing for the Holy Path nor would it lead to Nibbāna ([13], Vol. ii, p. 318). Another explanation of the Buddha’s refusal to be drawn into this and similar controversies is the impossibility to provide a conclusive answer to a question which contains an intrinsic falsehood ([13], Vol. i, p. 574). The second argument of the Buddha is that belief in a permanent self would negate the usefulness of the moral life. In other words, the individual being entirely phenomenal, governed by causal laws, were there to be in him a self, which transcends these laws, then ethical life would lose its point ([13], Vol. i, p. 575). Buddhism does not set up any independent subject, as it regards every existence as dependent on causal arising (paṭiccasamuppāda), clearly expressed in the causality theory which says, “When this is, that is; when this is produced, that is produced; when this is not, that is not; when this perishes, that perishes” ([13], Vol. ii, p. 319).

It is thus evident that the Buddha explicitly denied the self in the phenomenal realm. To this extent, his views were not opposed to the Orthodox Brāhmaṇical views as expounded in the Upaniṣads. For what he here denies is that any of the khandhas may have attā, not the attā as such. But what about the transcendent-immanent self as inculcated in the Upaniṣads? Different scholars have answered this question differently. According to Stcherbatsky, the Buddha did not believe in the existence of self of any type and the Dhamma that he taught was thoroughly anattavādī ([15], p. 55). According to T.W. Rhys Davids, at the time of the Buddha, there were prevalent in northern India animistic, polytheistic, pantheistic, and dualistic views. The belief in attā was fundamental to all of them. The Buddha not only ignored it but also regarded it as a hindrance in spiritual progress. The denial of self by the Buddha emanated from the fact that he found in his experience nothing that paralleled the supposed characteristics of the attā, namely, independence, permanence, and blissfulness ([16], pp. 210–237). According to Poussin, in the Pāli literature, there are many passages which support anattavāda, but there are a few which support attavāda ([17], pp. 821–824). In the opinion of Hegel, Buddhism was a creed of final negation ([18], pp. 167–172). However, according to Schrader, the Buddha appeared as a “soul denier” to his contemporaries only because they conceived of the soul in an extremely anthropomorphic fashion, speaking of its form, weight, color, etc. ([19], Vol. vi). C.A.F. Rhys Davids vehemently supported the view that the Buddha did not propound the “no-soul” theory. According to her, it was a later monkish development which was imposed on the original gospel under the influence of the hostility toward the brāhmaṇas. She has argued that had the Buddha opposed the Upaniṣadic theory of soul, he would have certainly brought it forward while debating with the brāhmaṇical scholars, which he did not do ([20], pp. 789–715). Similarly, she pointed out as to why, if anattā was such a fundamental tenet in Buddhism, when the Paribbājaka Vacchagotta asked the Buddha “Is there an attā or is there not,” the Buddha remained silent instead of categorically stating that there was no attā ([21], p. 285). However, it may be pointed out here that the Buddha had indeed explained this to Ānanda later by saying that if he had replied by saying that self exists, he would have been quoted by those who believe in the existence of self (sassatavādins) that a permanent self exists, whereas if he had said that self does not exist, he would have sided with the ucchedavādins (annihilationists). But he did not agree with either of these two views ([5], Vol. iv, pp. 400–401). The Buddha’s statement “seek yourself” (attānaṃ gaveseyyatha) in the Vinaya Piṭaka has been interpreted by C.A.F. Rhys Davids as “the self, the God within you” ([22], p. 147). Further, commenting on a verse of the Saṃyutta Nikāya which she compares with a passage of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka, she has pointed out: “I believe it is far more likely, that the original speaker of the verse used attā in the sense in which the original speaker of the Upaniṣad utterance used atman” ([23], p. 602). Similar views have been reiterated by Coomaraswamy ([24], pp. 680–681; [25], Vol. xxiv) and Radhakrishnan ([26], pp. 386–389) in more or less the same sense. According to Coomaraswamy, the words attadīpa and attasaraṇa are used in the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta to exhort the monks to regard the attā as their light and refuge ([27], pp. 680–681). Similarly, in the opinion of Radhakrishnan, “It is… wrong to think that there is no self at all according to Buddha… The Upaniṣads arrive at the ground of all things by stripping the self of veil after veil of contingency. At the end of this process they find the universal self, which is none of these finite entities, though the ground of them all. Buddha holds the same view, though he does not state it definitely” ([26], p. 388). On the basis of some references in the Buddhist texts, it has also been suggested that what survives a man’s death is his citta or viññāna and that this doctrine is almost certainly pre-Buddhist which the Buddha appears to have modified rather than rejecting it. There is no doubt that Viññāna continues to exist after death. However, it is not an entity of a permanent nature and is extremely changeable. But in Nirvāṇa, its fluctuations stop, and it comes to its own natural infinity and luminosity. Thus, it has been pointed out that viññāna is similar to the ātman of some of the Upaniṣadic texts ([28], pp. 254–259). Sogen and Suzuki too were of the opinion that the Buddha denied the soul in the sense of a finite substantial individual but not in the sense of the absolute unity of the universe ([29], p. 18; [30], pp. 31–38).

Why Did the Buddha Refuse to Answer a Direct Question on the Soul’s Existence?

When asked directly, the Buddha is reported to have refused to answer the question about the existence of the attā either positively or negatively. In the opinion of Keith ([12], pp. 39–46, 75–91) and Poussin ([17], pp. 821–824), it was the result of his “agnosticism,” while according to Rosenberg, the Buddha did not answer this question simply because the word attā was meaningless for him (see [31], p. 505). In between the puruṣa of the Upaniṣads and the puggala of the Nikāyas is the expression puriṣa-puggala which “signifies the individual acting, believing, and experiencing the results of his acts.” The Buddha himself preached on different classes of puggalas. Normally, the usage puriṣa-puggala does not indicate a belief in self, but the well-known Bhārahāra Sutta is an exception as it unambiguously makes a distinction between puggala and khandhas whereby khandhas are described as a burden of puggala ([31], p. 490).

“The critical question for the Buddhists was not the survival of the individual at death, which they held and defended against the doctrine of annihilation (ucchedavāda), but the existence of the individual when the aggregation of the khandhas has finally ceased. That question depends upon the much disputed meaning of Nirvāṇa” ([32], p. 106). A closer examination of the two words leads to the unavoidable conclusion that ātman means the “existing ego” and anātman the “nonexistent ego.” To put it differently, between the two extremes “is” and “is not” is a dualism which has no independent nature of its own. For this reason, in Mahāyāna Buddhism, a follower of the Buddha is taught to release his hold of not only “is” but of “is not,” that is, of both ātman and anātman, in order not to be held in bondage by either of them. Thus, the Buddha points out in the Diamond Sūtra: “Even the Dharma should be cast aside, how much more so the Not-Dharma? Thus, we come to this: (1) The worldly man grasps ātman. (2) The Southern School man grasps anātman. (3) The Mahāyāna man grasps neither ātman nor anātman” ([33], Vol. i, p. 10).